



BuddhistRoad

Dynamics in Buddhist Networks in Eastern Central Asia 6th–14th Centuries

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.4

**TELLING INFELICITIES AND HIDDEN
INTELLIGIBILITY:
THE ‘INTERLINGUAL QUESTIONS’
FROM THE SAMYÉ DEBATE
IN TIBET (792–794)**

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BUDDHISTROAD PAPER

Peer reviewed

ISSN: 2628-2356

DOI: 10.46586/rub.br.203.178

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Please quote this paper as follows:

Ding, Yi. “Telling Infelicities and Hidden Intelligibility: The ‘Interlingual Questions’ from the Samyé Debate in Tibet (792–794),” *BuddhistRoad Paper 1.4* (2022).

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This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 725519).

TELLING INFELICITIES AND HIDDEN INTELLIGIBILITY:
THE ‘INTERLINGUAL QUESTIONS’ FROM THE
‘SAMYÉ DEBATE’ IN TIBET (792–794)*

YI DING

Abstract

This article revisits two texts relevant to the so-called Samyé Debate, which presumably took place in the late 8th century between Chinese monk Moheyan (fl. second half of 8th c., 摩訶衍) and his Indo-Tibetan opponents. They are the *Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue* 頓悟大乘正理決 [The Judgement on Sudden Awakening Being the True Principle of Mahāyāna] in Chinese and the Tibetan equivalent of the ‘old questions’ and Moheyan’s answers. This article argues that lexical and grammatical infelicities can be used to reveal the interlingual nature of the questions and answers in these two texts. Whereas Moheyan’s answers were originally composed in Chinese and translated into Tibetan, the questions were originally formulated in Tibetan and translated into Chinese. The language barriers did not cause a breakdown in communication, as the two sides of the debate could manage to understand each other well via Tibetan as a written language.

1. Introduction

The legendary Samyé Debate that allegedly took place at Samyé Monastery (Tib. bSam yas gtsug lag khang) between 792 and 794¹ has

* I am grateful to Michael Radich, Paul Harrison, Carmen Meinert, and Sam van Schaik for their many suggestions and corrections. Any errors are mine alone.

¹ According to Moheyan, “After [the citizens of] Shazhou submitted [to Tibet], I was summoned from afar by gracious order of the emperor [(Khri srong lde btsan; 755–797)] and was asked to spread the Chan school [in Tibet]” 當沙州降下之日，奉贊普恩命遠追令開示禪門 (ZLJA, 154a6–b1); according to Wang Xi’s (王錫) preface to the ZLJ, Moheyan, after having arrived at Lhasa, engaged in disputes with his Indo-Tibetan opponents between a *shen* (甲) year and a *xu* (戊) year. Scholars have largely agreed with Demiéville that these two years are 792 and 794 because Dunhuang (敦煌) is thought to have fallen to Tibet in 787; see Paul Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa: une controverse sur le quétisme entre bouddhistes de l’Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l’ère chrétienne* (1952; Paris: Imprimerie Nationale de France, 1987), 169–178. Horlemann argues that the



been subject to intense scholarly scrutiny in the last century. This event—more possibly, written exchanges that stretched over time—was depicted, if not mythologised, as a watershed moment of Tibetan intellectual history by premodern Tibetan historians and thinkers, even though it was unknown to premodern Buddhists in China. For modern scholars, the interest in this debate may be twofold. On the one hand, the clash between Indian Buddhism and Chinese thought in a third country seems intriguing from the perspective of historiography; on the other hand, the dichotomy of gradualism and subtism at the centre of the debate is seen as one of the keys to understanding Buddhism as a whole.

The only Chinese text that directly deals with this event is the *Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue* 頓悟大乘正理決 [The Judgement on Sudden Awakening Being the True Principle of Mahāyāna; hereafter ZLJ], which exists in three manuscript copies, P. 4646/3 + S. 8609² (hereafter ZLJ^A),

conquest of Shazhou (沙洲) /Dunhuang happened already in the 760s; see Bianca Horlemann, “A Re-evaluation of the Tibetan Conquest of Eighth-Century Shazhou/Dunhuang,” *Tibet, Past and Present: Tibetan Studies I (PIATS 2000)*, ed. Henk Blezer and Abel Zadoks (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 49–66. However, even though Dunhuang might have been occupied by the Tibetans briefly in the 760s, Dunhuang could not have been fully incorporated into the Tibetan Empire as an administrative unit that early: if the detailed account in the *Xin Tangshu* 新唐書 [New History of the Tang] is not entirely fictitious, Yan Chao (d. 787?, 閩朝) became the commander of the defenses at Dunhuang in 777 and the resistance fought on for about ten years, if not exactly ten years; see Wei Yingchun 魏迎春 and Zheng Binglin 鄭炳林, “Tang Hexi jiedushi xiqian he Tufan dui Dunhuang Xiyu de zhanling 唐河西節度使西遷和吐蕃對敦煌西域的占領 [The Westward Relocation of the Tang Governor of Hexi and Tibetan Rule in Dunhuang and the Western Regions],” *Dunhuangxue jikan* 敦煌學輯刊 [Journal of Dunhuang Studies] 2020.1: 7–15. In addition, if we agree that Śāntarakṣita ordained the first seven Tibetan monks (Tib. *sad mi mi bdun*) ca. 779 and at least a few years must have transpired before Moheyan and his followers clashed with Moheyan’s Indian-Tibetan opponents, the debate, which did not involve Śāntarakṣita at all, would not have taken place in 780. I am responsible for all modern punctuations in premodern Chinese texts discussed in this article; all English translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

² P. 4646 is 182-folio *pothī* manuscript that contains five texts in total, with the ZLJ being the third text (ff. 126b–158a). Folio 152, catalogued separately as P. 8609, fell off from P. 4646 at some point and was recently identified by Cheng Zheng; see Cheng Zheng 程正, “Eizō tonkō bunken kara hakken sareta zenseki ni tsuite (2) 英藏敦煌文獻から発見された禪籍について (2) [On the Chan Texts Found in the Dunhuang Materials in the British Library (2)],” *Komazawa daigaku bukkuyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒澤大学仏教学部研究紀要 [Journal of the Faculty of Buddhism of Komazawa University] 76 (2018):149–50. Demiéville’s translation goes from the end of folio 151 to the beginning of folio 153 as if there is no missing folio; see Demiéville, *Le concile*, 150.

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S. 2672 (hereafter ZLJ^B), and P. 4623/3³. It has been pointed out, according to this document, “this is not a debate but an extended discussion,” and “the location of the protagonists is not given.”⁴ The term ‘Samyé Debate’ cannot be understood literally: Moheyan might not have physically travelled to Samyé Monastery, where most of his opponents probably resided, and the discussions were by and large not orally presented.⁵

Although Demiéville’s study and translation of the ZLJ constitutes an incredible philological feat, its usefulness has been somewhat reduced by the fact that it utilises only one incomplete manuscript (P. 4646/3) and it does not engage with Tibetan sources. For some reason, Demiéville thinks the use of Tibetan was limited to the oral components of the debate.⁶ As I will demonstrate, Tibetan sources are actually useful at a philological level, as Tibetan was certainly used as a written language to facilitate the debate process. This article, by focussing on the interlingual nature of the ZLJ, attempts to demonstrate that, despite the occasional slips and

³ P. 4623 is a long scroll that can be divided into three parts: (1) quotes from various Mahāyāna scriptures, (2) three questions and answers about the ‘sudden awakening’, and (3) the first eleven third-round questions and answers in the ZLJ. Ueyama claims that P. 4623 in its entirety can be seen as part of an original ‘long draft’ (Chin. *changbian* 長編) used by Moheyan; see Ueyama Daishun 上山大峻, *Zōho Tonkō Bukkyō no kenkyū* 增補敦煌仏教の研究 [A Study of Dunhuang Buddhism with Supplements] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 2012), 255. It seems unlikely to me: the three additional questions do not sound like debate questions, and the answers deviate from Moheyan’s answers in the ZLJ. For a transcription of P. 4623/2, see *ibid.*, 593–598.

⁴ Sam van Schaik, *Tibetan Zen: Discovering a Lost Tradition* (Boston: Snow Lion, 2015), 115.

⁵ van Schaik, *Tibetan Zen*, 115: “The dramatic and highly charged symbolism of a single debate at the great monastery of Samyé, presided over by the Tibetan emperor himself, looks like a later elaboration of the story.” However, according to Wang Xi’s preface, the wording of Moheyan’s initial request for a debate is as follows, “Je demande humblement à sa Sainte Majesté de réclamer au Moine Brâhmane ses questions, afin que nous en débattions ensemble et vérifions le sens des textes sacrés.” (Demiéville, *Le concile*, 40); ZLJ^A 128a4–a5: 伏請聖上，於婆羅門僧，責其問目，對相詰難。The Chinese term *duixiang* (對相) literally means ‘face to face.’ Even though we do not know how reliable Wang Xi’s presentation of the event is, one cannot exclude the possibility that the two sides attempted to communicate with each other via the help of interpreters.

⁶ Demiéville, *Le concile*, 20: “Ils ne savaient certainement pas le sanskrit, pas plus que leurs adversaires indiens ne connaissaient le chinois. La controverse dut se développer autour de pièces écrites en sanskrit et en chinois, le tibétain servant de langue commune aux deux parties dans les débats oraux.”



blunders, the ZLJ on balance is comprehensible and more or less successfully conveys the positions of the two sides.⁷

2. The ‘Old Questions’

When Demiéville was translating the ZLJ into French, he was not aware of the existence of Tibetan texts that directly correspond to the first-round questions and answers in the ZLJ. It was Yoshirō Imaeda who first identified P.T. 823/1 (TQA^A) as a text that contains both the so-called ‘old questions’ (Chin. *jiuwen* 舊問) and Moheyan’s answers to them in the ZLJ.⁸ Over time, one additional fragmentary piece of the same text, P.T. 827/2 (TQA^B) was discovered as well.⁹ Hereafter I refer to the Tibetan text

⁷ Demiéville is probably too harsh in asserting that ‘[le ZLJ est] un texte qui fourmille de malentendus terminologiques’ (*Le concile*, 22). The only serious ‘terminological misunderstanding’ that I can detect is the use of Chin. *li* (理). Although the *li* in the Chinese phrase *yuli xiangwei* (於理相違) (Tib. **rigs pa dang ’gal ba / rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin*) in Q II.1a refers to ‘reason’ or ‘logic’ (Tib. *rigs*), Moheyan misunderstands *li* as ‘the principles of the Buddhist teachings’ in his answer (A II.1a). In addition, the Tibetan translators clearly attempt to match Moheyan’s Chin. *buguan* (不觀)/*wuguan* (無觀) (‘non-examination’) with the Tibetan term (*rnam par mi rtog pa* (Skt. *nirvikalpa*; ‘non-conceptualisation’), but this is more of an interpretive move than an unintentional misunderstanding; see A I.5, A I.9, A I.11, and A I.12 (TQA^A, r2.2, r5.1, r8.2, r9.1). For the use of *nirvikalpa* as a cross-tradition concept, see Carmen Meinert, “Structural Analysis of the Bsam gtan mig sgron: A Comparison of the Fourfold Correct Practice in the Āryāvikalpapraveśanāmadhāraṇī and the Contents of the Four Main Chapters of the Bsam gtan mig sgron,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 26.1 (2003): 184–191.

⁸ Yoshirō Imaeda, “Documents tibétains de Touen-Houang concernant le concile du Tibet,” *Journal Asiatique* 263 (1975): 125–146. A transcription of TQA^A is in *ibid.*, 142–144; see also Ueyama, *Tonkō bukkyō*, 598–602.

⁹ TQA^B was first identified by Harada; see Harada Satoru 原田覚, “Makaen zenji kō 摩訶衍禪師考 [On Chan Master Moheyan],” *Bukkyōgaku* 仏教学 [Buddhist Studies] 8 (1979): 109. Harada also claims that P.T. 829/2 may belong to the TQA. Okimoto argues that P.T. 21/1, instead of P.T. 829/2, belongs to the TQA; see Okimoto Katsumi 沖本克己, “Tonkō shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshū bunken no naiyō 敦煌出土のチベット文禪宗文献の内容 [Contents of Tibetan Chan Documents Found at Dunhuang],” in *Kōza tonkō 8: Tonkō butten to zen 講座敦煌 8: 敦煌仏典と禪* [Dunhuang Lecture 8: Buddhist Texts and Chan at Dunhuang], ed. Shinohara Juyū 篠原壽雄 and Tanaka Ryōshō 田中良昭 (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1980), 423, 437–438, ns 50–51; Harada again disagrees with Okimoto; see Harada Satoru 原田覚, “Makaen zenji to tonmon 摩訶衍禪師と頓門 [Chan Master Moheyan and the Sudden School],” *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 28.1 (1980): 429, fn. 10. See also Sam van Schaik, *The Tibetan Chan Documents: A Complete Descriptive Catalogue of Tibetan Chan*

reflected in both TQA^A and TQA^B as the TQA, a translation of which can be found in Appendix III.¹⁰ As Imaeda points out, the existence of this Tibetan document forces us to ask questions about the linguistic nature of the ZLJ.¹¹ Why was there a Tibetan version of part of the ZLJ in the first place? What is the relationship between the TQA and the ZLJ?

The TQA was clearly not translated directly from the ZLJ. First, the ZLJ does not demarcate the ‘old questions’ and their answers (§§I.1–I.14) as a separate textual unit. Instead, each ‘new question’ and its answer(s) are inserted beneath a certain answer to an ‘old question’. In contrast, the TQA presents §§I.1–I.14 as a separate textual unit. Moreover, an extra question and answer (§I.15) is missing in the ZLJ.¹² Nonetheless, Imaeda and other scholars seem to assume that the TQA is a Tibetan translation of a certain Chinese text that was eventually incorporated into the ZLJ.¹³

Texts in the Dunhuang Manuscript Collections (Bloomington: The Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 2014), 48, 74–75. Either way, both are too short to be helpful; see Appendices I and II. Van Schaik also argues that P.T. 823/1 continues with the recto of the two panels in IOL Tib J 703, because P.T. 823/1 ends with the beginning of a *gāthā* that can be found in IOL Tib J 703; see van Schaik, *The Tibetan Chan Documents*, 37–38. However, IOL Tib J 703 starts with Tib. [a missing glyph] *pa bden pos // sangs rgyas sras po nga la nyon* instead of the expected *rnams // sangs rgyas sras po nga la nyon*. Furthermore, this *gāthā* was quite popular and is also included in several Tengyur texts, including the *Rim gyis 'jug pa'i sgom don* [The Meaning of Meditation of the Gradual Approach] (Derge Tōhoku no. 3938) and a meditation manual titled *Ting nge 'dzin gyi tshogs* [Prerequisites for Samādhi] (Derge Tōhoku no. 3924). At any rate, the content of this *gāthā*, which focuses on general exhortations of cultivating the *dharma* (Tib. *chos la bsgom*), does not fit with the context of a doctrinal discussion and it seems unlikely to be originally part of a text submitted to the Tibetan court by Moheyan. For other Tibetan Chan texts claimed to be associated with Moheyan, see Luis O. Gómez, “The Direct and the Gradual Approaches of Zen Master Mahāyān: Fragments of the Teachings of Mo-ho-yen,” in *Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen*, edited by Robert M. Gimello and Peter N. Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1983), 69–168; van Schaik, *The Tibetan Chan Documents*, 47, 52–58, 63, 67–70.

¹⁰ For an English translation of the TQA, see van Schaik, *Tibetan Zen*, 123–127.

¹¹ Imaeda, “Documents tibétains,” 129: “L'existence de ce dossier tibétain de la controverse nous conduit à réfléchir sur la langue dans laquelle celle-ci s'est déroulée.”

¹² See Yamaguchi Zuihō 山口瑞鳳, “Makaen no zen 摩訶衍の禪 [Moheyan's Zen],” in *Kōza tonkō 8: Tonkō butten to zen 講座敦煌 8: 敦煌仏典と禪* [Dunhuang Lecture 8: Buddhist Texts and Chan at Dunhuang], ed. Shinohara Juyū 篠原壽雄 and Tanaka Ryōshō 田中良昭 (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1980), 386.

¹³ Imaeda, “Documents tibétains,” 129–130: “Comme le texte tibétain correspond presque littéralement au texte chinois dont M. Demiéville a déjà donné une traduction.” See also Kimura Ryūtoku 木村隆徳, “Tonkō shutsudo chibetto zenshū bunken no seikaku” 敦煌出土チベット文禪宗文献の性格 [The Nature of the Tibetan Chan Materials from



Although it is clear that Moheyan’s answers were originally composed in Chinese, and hence the answers in the TQA were Tibetan translations of the answers in a Chinese source that were eventually incorporated into the ZLJ, it does not necessarily follow that the questions in the ZLJ were originally formulated in Chinese or that the questions in the TQA were translated from a Chinese source. In fact, when one reads the TQA and ZLJ side by side, the evidence seems to suggest that the questions and answers were not originally formulated in the same language.¹⁴

2.1. *From the Bodhisattva to the Bodhi*

In A I.10, for example, the translators of the TQA mistranslated a whole passage by Moheyan, and the resulting Tibetan text clearly puzzled the opponents of Moheyan. Moheyan’s original answer in the ZLJ is not self-contradictory or nonsensical:

[A I.10] According to *Prajñāpāramitāsūtras*, ‘the merit of staying faithful upon hearing this principle of *prajñāpāramitā* is incalculable and unsurpassable, surpassing [the merit of] enabling all sentient beings, such as deities, humans, *śrāvakas*, and *pratyekabuddhas*, to completely realise the unsurpassed *bodhi*. Why is that? Humans, gods, *śrāvakas*, *pratyekabuddhas*, and various bodhisattvas all come from *prajñāpāramitā*, while humans, gods, and bodhisattvas do not give rise to *prajñāpāramitā* [because *prajñāpāramitā*, unlike humans, gods, and bodhisattvas, is not conditioned.]’¹⁵

When the translators translated this passage into Tibetan, the Chinese term *pusa* (菩薩, Skt. *bodhisattva*; Tib. *byang chub sems dpa*’) is mistakenly rendered as the Tibetan term *byang chub* (Chin. *puti* 菩提; Skt.

Dunhuang], in *Kōza tonkō 8: Tonkō butten to zen 講座敦煌 8 : 敦煌仏典と禪* [Dunhuang Lecture 8: Buddhist Texts and Chan at Dunhuang], ed. Shinohara Juyū 篠原壽雄 and Tanaka Ryōshō 田中良昭 (Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha, 1980), 442–443.

¹⁴ My approach, which relies on semantic and syntactical nuances in determining the nature of the source language, is similar to the procedures utilised in Michael Radich, “Tibetan Evidence for the Sources of Chapters of the Synoptic *Suvarṇa-prabhāsa-sūtra* T 664 Ascribed to Paramārtha,” *Buddhist Studies Review* 32.2 (2015): 245–270.

¹⁵ ZLJ^A, 138b3–b6: 據《般若經》云：『假令一切眾生，天、人、聲聞、緣覺，盡證無上菩提，不如(ZLJ^B om. 如)聞此般若波羅蜜敬信功德，算數所不能及。』何以故？人、天、聲聞、緣覺、及諸菩薩等，皆從般若波羅蜜出；人、天及菩薩等，不能出得般若波羅蜜。For a French translation, cf. Demiéville, *Le concile*, 90.

bodhi).¹⁶ The resulting translation in the TQA becomes doctrinally farcical,

[A.I.10] According to *prajñāpāramitā*, however, the merit of staying faithful upon hearing the principle of *prajñāpāramitā* is incalculable and inexhaustible, [much more than the merit of] establishing all sentient beings as gods, humans, *śrāvakas*, and *pretyekabuddhas* up to being in the reach of the unsurpassed *bodhi*.¹⁷ Why is that? Because humans, gods, *śrāvakas*, and *pretyekabuddhas* up to the unsurpassed *bodhi* [sic!] all come from *prajñāpāramitā*, and the enumerated ones,¹⁸ such as *bodhi*, humans, and so on, do not give rise to *prajñāpāramitā*.¹⁹

The doctrinal absurdity here is that, as opposed to the claim made in the last sentence above, Buddhists have access to *prajñāpāramitā* exactly because the unsurpassed *bodhi* gives rise to *prajñāpāramitā* in the first place, not the other way around. This blunder clearly did not escape the attention of the Indo-Tibetan side, as a question directly rebuking this claim in the Tibetan translation can be found in the so-called ‘new questions’ (Chin. *xinwen* 新聞), that is to say, the second-round questions from the Indo-Tibetan side.

[Q II.9] The ninth ‘new question’ asks: ‘If the merit [of staying faithful upon hearing the principle of *prajñāpāramitā*] surpasses that of enabling all sentient beings to completely realise the unsurpassed *bodhi*, [paradoxically, *prajñāpāramitā*] would become something superior to the ‘unsurpassed

¹⁶ In Dunhuang documents, Tib. *byang chub sems dpa'* is routinely spelled as *byang chub sems pa*, which might possibly be mistaken for *byang chub sems* (Skt. *bodhicitta*).

¹⁷ The translators misunderstood the structure of this sentence (假令一切眾生天人聲聞緣覺盡證無上菩提) by taking the phrase (天人聲聞緣覺盡證無上菩提) in a locative sense as the destination of the established all sentient beings instead of a phrase appositional to ‘all sentient beings’. They also mistook the adverb *jin* (盡), ‘completely’, for a proposition meaning ‘up to in the reach of’ (Tib. ... *la thug pa'i bar du*).

¹⁸ I translate Tib. *grangs su smos pa'i rnam* as ‘the enumerated ones’ based on Yamaguchi’s suggestion *migi ni kazoe ageta* (右に数えあげた); see Yamaguchi, “Makaen no zen,” 389.

¹⁹ TQA^A, r5.1–r6.2: *shes rab kyi pha rol du phyin pa las kyang / sems can thams cad lha dang myi dang nyan thos dang / rang sangs rgyas nas bla na myed pa'i byang chub la thug pa'i bar du bkod pa bas ni // shes rab kyi pha rol du phyin pa'i gzhung thos te / yid ches pa'i bsod nams bgrang zhing brtsir myi lang bar che'o // de ci'i phyr zhe na / myi dang lha dang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang / bla na myed pa'i byang chub la stsogs pa thams cad ni / shes rab kyi pha rol du phyin pa las 'byung gi / byang chub dang myi la stsogs pa grangs su smos pa'i rnam las ni / shes rab kyi pha rol du phyin pa myi 'byung ba'i phyr ro //*



bodhi.²⁰ Is it not the case? Then you mention that ‘*prajñāpāramitā* gives rise to the unsurpassed *bodhi* and so on,’ and that ‘the unsurpassed *bodhi* does not give rise to *prajñāpāramitā*.’ As for the latter, what kind of *bodhi* is that? [...]’²¹

In this case, the translational blunder in the Tibetan version of A I.10 is immediately attacked by the Indo-Tibetan side in Q II.9. The absurd claim that “the unsurpassed *bodhi* does not give rise to *prajñāpāramitā*” (Chin. *wushang puti buchū boreboluomi* 無上菩提不出般若波羅蜜) corresponds to the sentence in the Tibetan version of A I.10, but *not* to the sentence in the Chinese version of A I.10. The treatment of this red herring demonstrates (1) that the TQA, not its Chinese equivalent, was used by opponents of Moheyan to formulate the ‘new questions’;²² (2) that the answers in the TQA were translated from Chinese to Tibetan;²³ and (3) that the ‘new questions’ in the ZLJ were translated from Tibetan to Chinese.

²⁰ Here the questioner correctly points out that Moheyan has previously overstated his case in his reply in §I.10, because, indeed, no *prajñāpāramitā* text makes the illogical claim that “[the merit of] hearing this principle of *prajñāpāramitā* surpasses [the merit of] enabling all sentient beings such as deities, humans, *śrāvakas*, and *pratyekabuddhas* to completely realise the unsurpassed *bodhi*”; ZLJ^A, 138b3–b4: 假令一切眾生、天、人、聲聞、緣覺盡證無上菩提，不如聞此般若波羅蜜義。 Moheyan in §II.9 explains that his statement intends to compare *prajñāpāramitā* with other Buddhist theories that make the ultimate soteriological claim and that he does not intend to suggest that *prajñāpāramitā* surpasses the unsurpassed *bodhi*.

²¹ ZLJ^A, 139a6–b2: 新問第九，問：令一切眾生盡證無上菩提猶^(a)不及此福者，此無上菩提，乃成有上，此乃是否？次後說言「無上菩提等從般若^(b)波羅蜜出」、「無上菩提不出般若波羅蜜；不出者，說是阿^(c)那箇菩提^(d)？[...]」

^(a) ZLJ^B: 猶; ZLJ^A: 由. ^(b) ZLJ^A om. 若. ^(c) ZLJ^B om 阿. ^(d) Demiéville’s correction: 提; ZLJ^A ZLJ^B: 薩.

For a French translation, cf. Demiéville, *Le concile*, 93. Chin. *anage* (阿那箇; ‘which one’) is a common interrogative pronoun in medieval vernacular Chinese.

²² Harada seems wrong in this regard, as he posits: “もちろん宗論がチベット語を介して行なわれたとするならば、宗論当時にも旧問部に相当する藏文、さらに梵文が存したであろうが、少しくとも現存の藏文旧問部は宗論当時のものではない [Of course, if the debate was conducted through Tibetan, the Tibetan, or even Sanskrit, text that corresponds to the ‘old questions’ section might have existed during the time of the debate. However, the extant Tibetan version of the ‘old questions’ section is not the text used in the debate at all];” Harada Satoru 原田覚, “Tonkō sōbun mkhan po Ma ha yan shiryō kō (1) 敦煌藏文 mkhan po Ma ha yan 資料考 (1)) [On Dunhuang Tibetan Materials about mkhan po Ma ha yan (1)],” *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 30.1 (1981): 463.

²³ See Imaeda, “Documents tibétains,” 130. Imaeda first points out that the Chinese title *Siyi jing* 思益經 [Brahmaviśeṣacintipariprcchā] mentioned in A I.8 corresponds to *Phan sems dpa’* in the TQA, a slavish translation of the Chinese title that fails to convey

2.2. Rendering Skt. *Dharmaparyāya*

Imaeda argues that the Tibetan term *chos kyi sgo* should be considered a literal translation of the Chinese term *famen* (法門), because the *Mahāvīyutpatti* twice lists Tib. *chos kyi rnam grangs* as the accepted translation for Skt. *dharmaparyāya* (Mvyt 1279 and Mvyt 6263).²⁴ However, this assertion seems anachronistic in that the *Mahāvīyutpatti* was promulgated in 814, well after the debate took place.²⁵ The appearance of the Tibetan term *chos kyi sgo* before 814 does not necessarily suggest Chinese influence, for many *sūtras* in the Kangyur that were translated from Sanskrit still retain this term.²⁶

	Q I.7	A I.7	Q I.9	Q I.10	A I.10
TQA	<i>chos kyi sgo</i>	<i>chos kyi sgo</i>	<i>chos kyi sgo</i>	<i>chos kyi gzhung</i>	<i>chos kyi gzhung</i>
ZLJ	<i>famen</i> (法門)	<i>famen</i>	<i>famen</i>	<i>fayi</i> (法義)	<i>fayi</i>
Demiéville's translation	les rubriques de la Loi	les rubriques de la Loi	méthode	doctrine	doctrine

Table 1. The equivalents of *dharmaparyāya* in the ZLJ.

Furthermore, Tib. *chos kyi sgo* in §I.9 is referred to as Tib. *chos kyi gzhung* in §I.10, which in turn corresponds to Chin. *fayi* (法義) in the ZLJ (see tab. 1). It would have been quite natural for Moheyan's Tibetan opponents to switch from Tib. *chos kyi sgo* to Tib. *chos kyi gzhung* when

the underlying Sanskrit proper name *Viśeṣacinti* (lit. 'Distinction-Thinker'). His second piece of evidence is about the Chinese term *wangxiang* (妄想), which, instead of the expected Tib. *rnam par rtog pa* ('conceptualisation' or 'differentiation'), corresponds to Tib. *myi bden ba'i 'du shes* (lit. 'false thoughts') in A I.1a, A I.1b, and A I.3. The last two examples are Tib. *myi bden pa'i sems* (lit. 'false mind') for Chin. *wangxin* (妄心) in A I.11 and Tib. *chos kyi sgo* ('a door to the *dharmā*') for Chin. *famen* (法門). Except for the last one discussed in detail below, the examples are only concerned with Moheyan's answers and can only be used to prove that the answers in the TQA were translated from Chinese to Tibetan.

²⁴ Imaeda, "Documents tibétains," 130.

²⁵ The term *chos kyi rnam grangs* does not appear in the *sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa* [Word Formation in Two Fascicles] (Derge Tōhoku no. 4347) and should be considered an entry of the *Mahāvīyutpatti* promulgated in 814.

²⁶ For example, see *Kuśalamūlasaṃparigrahasūtra* (Derge Tōhoku no. 101), *Sarvavāidalyasaṃgrahasūtra* (Derge Tōhoku no. 227), *Mahāmeghasūtra* (Derge Tōhoku no. 232), *Sūryagarbhasūtra* (Derge Tōhoku no. 257), etc.



they were formulating the ‘old questions’, since Tib. *chos kyi gzhung* was an established alternative term for Skt. *dharmaparyāya* in the pre-*Mahāvvyutpatti* era.²⁷ In contrast, the Chinese term *fayi* was probably not understood as a ready equivalent of Skt. *dharmaparyāya* by Moheyan and his fellow medieval Chinese Buddhists;²⁸ the semantic equivalency between Chin. *famen* in Q I.9 and Chin. *fayi* in §I.10 even escapes the eyes of Demiéville and Ueyama,²⁹ despite the fact that both terms clearly refer

²⁷ Tib. *chos kyi gzhung* appears in the introduction of the *sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa* as an equivalent of *dharmaparyāya*; see Cristina A. Scherrer-Schaub, “Enacting Words: A Diplomatic Analysis of the Imperial Decrees (bkas bcad) and Their Application in the *sGra sbyor bam po gñis pa* Tradition,” *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 25.1–2 (2002): 322. This term in the Tibetan title *Las kyi rnam par ’gyur ba zhes bya ba’i chos kyi gzhung* [The Scripture of Classification of Acts] (Derge Tōhoku no. 339) clearly translates Skt. *dharmaparyāya* in the Sanskrit title *Karmavibhaṅganāmadharmaparyāya* preserved in the *Them spangs ma* recensions of this text, despite the wrong Sanskrit restoration *Karmavibhaṅganāmadharmagrantha* provided by the *Tshal pa* recensions. Even the *Laṅkāvatāra* (Derge Tōhoku no. 107), which was considered an exemplar by the *Mahāvvyutpatti* standards, still features some pre-*Mahāvvyutpatti* terms, including Tib. *chos kyi gzhung*; see Tib. *tshig gi rnam par rtog pa’i mtshan nyid kyi snying po zhes bgyi ba’i chos kyi gzhung* for Skt. *vāgvikalpalakṣaṇahrdayaṃ nāma dharmaparyāyaṃ* in Derge 107, mdo sde, ca (vol. 49), 89a5. For the importance of the *Laṅkāvatāra* to the establishment of new translation practices, see Scherrer-Schaub, “Enacting Words,” 298–302. It should be emphasised that the *Laṅkāvatāra* in question was translated from Sanskrit, even though the Derge editors mistakenly attributed it to the famous Wu Facheng (fl. first half of 9th c., 吳法成, Tib. Chos grub); see Jonathan A. Silk, “Chinese Sūtras in Tibetan Translation: A Preliminary Survey,” *Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology* 22 (2019): 235.

²⁸ For example, one of the quotes from the *Brahmapariṣcchā* (T. 586.15) used by Moheyan in the ZLJ contains the Chinese term *fayi*, but here it does not correspond to Skt. *dharmaparyāya*. Instead, it is a translation of Skt. **dharmanayākāra* (Tib. *chos kyi tshul gyi mam pa*; ‘configuration/apparatus of the *dharmā*’). Demiéville renders this specific Chin. *fayi* as ‘doctrine’ (*Le concile*, 118). Another appearance of Chin. *fayi* in the *Brahmapariṣcchā* (T. 586.15 and T. 587.15) similarly corresponds to Skt. **dharmanaya* (Tib. *chos kyi tshul*); see Goshima Kiyotaka 五島清隆, “Chibetto yaku bonten shomon gyō: wayaku to yakuchū (2) チベット訳『梵天所問経』-和訳と訳注 (2) [An Annotated Japanese Translation of the *Brahmapariṣcchā* in Tibetan (2)],” *Indogaku chibetto gaku kenkyū* インド学チベット学研究 [Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies] 14 (2010): 104, 108 n. 118. In the *Yogācārabhūmi* translated by Xuanzang, Chin. *fayi* is usually reserved for Skt. *dharmārtha* (Tib. *chos kyi don* or *chos dang don*) and never corresponds to Skt. *dharmaparyāya*; see Yokoyama Koitsu 横山紘一 and Hirokawa Takayuki 廣澤隆之, *Kanbonzō taishō yugashijiron sōsakuin* 漢梵藏対照瑜伽師地論綜索引 [Chinese-Sanskrit-Tibetan Index to the *Yogācārabhūmi*] (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1996), 960.

²⁹ Demiéville renders Chin. *fayi* in I.10 as ‘doctrine’, even though it explicitly refers to something that can be practised (Chin. *xing* 行); Demiéville renders the Chinese term *fofayi*

to the approach of Chinese Chan advocated by Moheyan. In short, the existence of *chos kyi sgo* in the TQA does not necessarily support the claim that the ‘old questions’ were translated from Chinese.

2.3. Two Additional Examples

In Q I.13, Moheyan is asked to pin down his own intellectual affiliation.

[Q I.13] Question: Given that there are three [ontological positions], one that clings to external objects, one that clings to consciousness, and one that clings to Madhyamaka, which one is the principle [(Tib. *gzhung*)] discussed in your explanations?

TQA^A: *dris pa / bshad pa la yul 'dzin pa dang / rnam par shes pa 'dzin pa dang dbu ma 'dzin pa gsum yod na / 'di skad du bshad pa'i gzhung gang /*

又問：說執境、執識、執中論，此三法中，今依何宗？³⁰

Whereas the Chinese rendering is rather awkward,³¹ the Tibetan counterpart is quite clear, with the ‘three positions’ referring to three different Buddhist approaches to ontology. ‘One that clings to external objects’ refers to the Bāhyārthavāda (Tib. *phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba*) view that the consciousness-independent world described in the *sūtras* exists; ‘one that clings to consciousness’ refers to the Vijñānamātra (Tib. *rnam par shes pa tsam*) view that only consciousness-dependent reality exists; ‘one that clings to Madhyamaka’ refers to the Mādhyamika view that neither consciousness-dependent nor consciousness-independent reality exists.³² It is much more plausible that the Chinese question is a translation of the Tibetan counterpart.

(佛法義) as ‘l’interprétation de la Loi du Buddha’; see Demiéville, *Le concile*, 89, 91, 157; cf. Ueyama, *Tonkō bukkyō*, 265–267.

³⁰ TQA^A, r9.4–10.1; ZLJ^A, 141a1; Demiéville, *Le concile*, 100.

³¹ This sentence seemingly puzzles both Demiéville and Imaeda, both of whom put a punctuation after Chin. *zhizhong* (執中), instead of taking Chin. *zhizhonglun* (執中論) as a single phrase; Ueyama provides the correct punctuation; see Ueyama, *Tonkō bukkyō*, 578.

³² The distinctions are explained in the *lTa ba'i khyad par* [Distinguishing the Views] attributed to the famous translator Yeshé dé (d.u., Ye shes sde), a contemporary of Moheyan: “L’analyse des sectes donnée dans le *lTa-ba'i khyad-par* correspond sans doute aux trois termes employés dans le dossier chinois” (Imaeda, “Documents,” 135). For a translation of relevant passages, see David Seyfort Ruegg, “Autour du lTa ba'i khyad par de Ye šes sde (Version de Touen-Houang, Pelliot Tibétain 814),” *Journal Asiatique* 269 (1981) : 215–217. In this question, the distinction between the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika school and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school is clearly not invoked; both sub-schools would have been subsumed under the parent category Mādhyamika (Chin. *zhizhonglun* 執



Moheyan thinks this inquiry is an attempt to trap him into overtly committing himself to a fixed ontological position, and, as a result, he refuses to provide a definitive answer.

My position is the Mahāyāna Chan School of no-thought in accordance with *prajñāpāramitā*. In the meaning of no-thought, there does not exist even one [fixed standpoint], let alone three.³³

Let us turn to the second example. In Q I.12, Moheyan’s opponents raise the question of how one can perform decision-making and behave ethically if one enters the non-conceptual gnosis, a mental state in which no differentiating thought based on raw sensory data should exist.

[Q I.12] Question: How does one benefit sentient beings with non-conceptual gnosis?

dris pa / myi rtoḡ pa'i ye shes k̄yis sems can gyi don ji ltar mdzad //
舊問：若不(ZLJ^A om. 不)觀智，云何利益眾生？³⁴

中論). Note that the *lta ba'i khyad par* can also be found P.T. 820 and P.T. 833, in addition to P.T. 814 studied by Seyfort Ruegg.

³³ ZLJ^A, 141a1–a2: 此義是般若波羅蜜無思大乘禪門，「無思」義中，何論有三，一亦不立。《般若經》中廣說。It seems to me that Moheyan is not aware of that he in fact contradicts himself. Although Moheyan here pretends to be a Mādhyamika fundamentalist, his own intellectual outlook is quite close to that of a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika, a relatively new label unknown to Chinese Buddhists at the time. He invokes the slogan “the three worlds are mind-only” (Chin. *sanjie weixin* 三界唯心; Skt. *cittamatram tribhavam*) two times and explicitly endorses the *yogācāra*-oriented explanation of the external world, e.g.: “The heavens and vehicles you are asking about are all delusional concepts [created by] one’s own mind”; A III.5, ZLJ^A, 148b1: 所問天、乘者，皆是自心妄想分別。Facheng labels Śāntarakṣita’s Yogācāra-Mādhyamika as *yilun zhongzong* 依論中宗 (‘the Mādhyamika school that accords with the *śāstra* [i.e., the *Yogācārabhūmi*]’) in his *Dasheng Daogan jing suiting shoujing ji* 大乘稻竿經隨聽手鏡記 [Lecture Notes and Memos on the Mahāyāna Śālistamba Sūtra] (T. 2782.85, 544c21); see Paul Demiéville, “Recents travaux sur Touen-Houang,” *T’oung Pao* 56.1/3 (1970): 61; Imaeda, “Documents Tibétains,” 135; Saitō Akira 齊藤明, “*lta ba'i khyad par* ni okeru Kyō(bu) chūgan no imi *lta ba'i khyad par* における「經(部)中觀」の意味 [On the Meaning of Sautrānta-Mādhyamika in the *lta ba'i khyad pa*],” *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 [Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies] 55.2 (2007): 111–119.

³⁴ TQA^A, r9.1–r9.2; ZLJ^A, 140b5–b6. Demiéville does not realise that there is a missing negative in ZLJ^A: “Si selon votre doctrine tout doit n’être que connaissance contemplative, comme sera-t-on utile aux êtres?” See Demiéville, *Le concile*, 97; cf. Imaeda, “Documents Tibétains,” 131–132.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.4. Ding, “Telling Infelicities and Hidden Intelligibility”

While the Tibetan question is perfectly understandable, the Chinese counterpart is puzzling at best.³⁵ It seems likely that the translators mistakenly rendered the instrumental particle *kyis* as a conjunction *ruo* (若). If one changes *ruo* to an instrumental preposition *yi* (以) and adjusts the word order, the resulting sentence will make good sense (*云何以不觀智利益眾生).

In sum, these infelicities point to the fact that the Tibetan ‘old questions’ in the TQA served as the source for the Chinese ‘old questions’ in the ZLJ.

3. The Second- and Third-round of Questions

Moheyan’s own words confirm the fact that he received edicts from the Tibetan court more than once.

I, Moheyan, have reported [to the court] for the sake of the Buddhist *dharma* and the doctrine of the silent [i.e., *nirvāna*-oriented] Chan. On successive occasions, I have been honoured to be given the questions, and I have responded unreservedly with my own understanding. The question of whether or not various wholesome matters such as the six *pāramitās* should be practised, has been repeatedly asked in the royal edicts.³⁶

The edicts that Moheyan received from the court must have contained something close to a list of questions in Tibetan. Most likely, Moheyan had to figure out the meaning of the questions by relying on his Tibetan-speaking followers, who were more than a few according to both the ZLJ and *dBa’ bzhed* [Testament of the Ba].³⁷ Although there is no extant

³⁵ The only way to make sense of the Chinese phrase 若(不)觀智 is to render it as ‘if wisdom is (not) examined,’ but contextually it does not make much sense. For the Japanese translation, see Ueyama, *Tonkō bukkō*, 578.

³⁶ ZLJ^A, 155a5–a6: 摩訶衍聞奏，為佛法義、寂禪教理。前後頻蒙賜問，余有見解，盡以對答。其「六波羅蜜等及諸善要修不修」恩勅屢詰。 Cf. ZLJ^A, 154b6: 臣前後所說 [...] (“What I have explained on successive occasions [...]”). Note that Demiéville seems to take the phrase *Moheyan wenzou* (摩訶衍聞奏) as belonging to the previous petition; see Demiéville, *Le concile*, 157.

³⁷ See Yamaguchi, “Makaen no zen,” 383–384. I agree with Yamaguchi that Demiéville’s punctuation needs emendation and Qi Shemi (d.u., 乞[年?]奢彌) and Shi Bimoluo (d.u., 尸[尼?]毗磨羅), two of Moheyan’s supporters who protested against the ban on Chan Buddhism by committing self-mutilation, correspond to Nyang Shami (d.u., Tib. Myang Sha mi) and Ngak Jimala (d.u., Tib. rNgags Byi ma la) in the *sBa bzhed* [Testament of the Ba]. The latter has several different variants in different manuscripts of the *dBa’rBa/sBa bzhed*; for example, Nyak Bimala (Tib. gNyags bi ma la) in the *dBa’*



Tibetan text that directly corresponds to the section of ‘new questions’ (§§II.1–II.12; see Appendix III) and the section of the third round of questions (§§III.1–III.12) in the ZLJ, there are some intimations that these questions, similar to the ‘new questions’, should be considered Chinese translations of a Tibetan source.

3.1. *Unusual Wording*

In Q III.9, the Indo-Tibetan side argues that “[If one claims that we should] not think of both [good and evil],³⁸ it is a *jiashuo*.” (Chin. [*shan e*] *erju buguan, zeshi jiashuo* [善惡]二俱不觀，則是假說.)” Demiéville interprets Chin. *jiashuo* (假說) as Skt. *prajñapti*, that is to say, a ‘convention’ or ‘provisional designation’.³⁹ Although Moheyan indeed uses *jiashuo* in the sense of *prajñapti* in A III.9, the claim here that one should not take note of both good and evil is clearly not a *prajñapti* because it goes against moral conventions. The only way to make sense of Chin. *jiashuo* here is to take it as a rendering of a Tibetan phrase similar to Tib. *rdzun tshig/gtan/smra* (‘false claim’).

In Q III.10, it is pointed out that

from [karmic] maturation does one’s merit emerge; based on one’s accumulation [(Chin. *jizhu* 積貯)] [of merit] is one’s spiritual accomplishment obtained. One should not claim ‘there is no merit in the new accumulation [of merit]’!⁴⁰

As a term for ‘the collection [of merit],’ *jizhu* is quite unusual and rarely appears in any Chinese Buddhist texts. It is unlikely that Moheyan was responsible for the coinage, for this idea frequently appears in Chinese *sūtras* as *fude ziliang* (福德資糧) (Skt. *puṇyasambhāra*; Tib. *bsod nams*

bzhed; cf. Lewis Doney, ed., *Bringing Buddhism to Tibet: History and Narrative in the Dba’ bzhed Manuscript* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021), 136, 138.

³⁸ Kamalaśīla summarises this unconventional view as follows: *cittavikalpasamutthāpitaśubhāśubhakarmavaśena sattvāḥ [...] saṃsāre saṃsaranti | ye punar na kiṃcīc cintayanti nāpi kiñcit karma kurvanti te parimucyante saṃsārāt* | “[Because] sentient beings transmigrate in saṃsāra [...] under the control of good and bad karma activated by mental concepts, those who do not think or do anything will be liberated from saṃsāra”; Giuseppe Tucci, *Minor Buddhist Texts: Part III, Third Bhāvanākrama* (Roma: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1971), 13–14. Kamalaśīla goes on to criticise it as an abandonment of both wisdom and skilful means (ibid., 14–15).

³⁹ Demiéville, *Le concile*, 146.

⁴⁰ ZLJ^A, 151a6–b1: 從淳熟中現其功德，從積貯然後成就，不得言新積貯中無功德；cf. Demiéville, *Le concile*, 149.

kyi tshogs).⁴¹ It is more plausible that *jizhu* was coined by the translators as a rendering of Tib. *tshogs*.

After Moheyan asserts in A I.7 that

from the perspective of the ultimate meaning beyond words and explanations, one cannot claim that the six *pāramitās* and other approaches to the *dharmā* are indispensable or not. This is explained extensively in various scriptures.⁴²

Q II.7e counters this assertion by pointing out the logical contradiction: if discussing the indispensability of various practices is pointless, why is it “explained extensively in various scriptures” by the Buddha?

[§II.7e] Another question: ‘Since you have claimed this [i.e., that the ultimate meaning transcends the question of whether these approaches are indispensable] is ‘explained extensively in the scriptures’, how is it explained? The discussion of whether they are indispensable or not [in the scriptures] does not meet with [(Chin. *buhui* 不會)] [your claim].’

Answer: ‘What is explained extensively by the scriptural passages is that [these approaches] are indispensable for those with dull faculties; those with sharp faculties are beyond the discussion of whether they are indispensable or not. [...]’⁴³

The Chinese phrase *buhui* (不會; lit. ‘not to meet’), which reappears in Q II.8b, clearly puzzles Demiéville, who, after having gone through many possibilities, eventually forces the Indo-Tibetan side to admit that ‘we do not understand’ (Chin. *buhui*).⁴⁴ Similarly, Demiéville renders Q II.8b as “Vous parlez de cheval sauvage et de mirage: en vérité, nous ne comprenons pas” (Chin. *qi yema yangyan shishi buhui* 其野馬陽炎實是不會).⁴⁵ However, it is extremely unlikely that the Indian masters would

⁴¹ In Q II.1a, this concept is correctly rendered as Chin. *gongde ju* 功德聚.

⁴² ZLJ^A, 136b4: 如勝義離言說，六波羅蜜及諸法門不可說言要與(ZLJ^B om. 與)不要。諸經廣說; cf. Demiéville, *Le concile*, 85.

⁴³ ZLJ^A, 137a5–a6: 又問：言「經文廣說」，如何說？為說言要不要不會。答：「經文廣說」者，鈍根說要；利根不論要不要 [...]；cf. Demiéville, *Le concile*, 85–86.

⁴⁴ “Nous ne comprenons pas” (Demiéville, *Le concile*, 86, 89). This interpretation is seconded by Ueyama; 会せず (Ueyama, *Tonkō bukkō*, 575, 576).

⁴⁵ Demiéville, *Le concile*, 89; ZLJ^A, 138a3. In A I.8, Moheyan only mentions the Chinese term *yangyan* (陽炎), which is rendered as Tib. *smyug* (read *smyig*) *rgyu* in TQA^A, without bringing up the term Chin. *yema* (野馬). The appearance of this additional term seems to be a clear sign that this question was translated from Tibetan. It might be the case that Chin. *yangyan yema* is an attempt to render Tib. *smig rgyu ri dags skom pa* (Skt. *mrgātrṣṇikā*). Mvyt 2817 has *smig rgyu (ri dwags)* for *mrgātrṣṇikā*.



not have understood what a heat haze or mirage is and have admitted defeat so easily.

A more plausible interpretation of this sentence would be ‘it (*qi*) does not meet with [illusions] such as a heat haze or mirage’, with *qi* (其) referring to the bodily, verbal, and mental *karma* (Tib. *'khor gsum*; Chin. *sanye* 三業) discussed previously in §II.8a. It means that one should not trivialise the workings of *karma* at the level of conventional reality (Skt. *saṃvṛtisatya*) by invoking the concept of ultimate reality (Chin. *faxingli* 法性理,⁴⁶ Skt. *dharmatā*). At any rate, *buhui* here cannot be understood through Chinese alone, as the underlying Tibetan for *buhui* seems to be something close to *mi 'du ba* (‘not included/subsumed’).⁴⁷

3.2. Unnatural Word Order

Unnatural syntax may reveal the existence of a translation process, even though it is rather difficult to detect when there is no corresponding Tibetan text available. Here are three examples from the second-round questions—

In Q II.1a, Moheyan’s opponents point out that:

⁴⁶ Demiéville thinks Moheyan’s term of choice *faxingli* is ‘faultif’ (Demiéville, *Le concile*, 67). Nonetheless, this term is commonly used in commentary traditions and Moheyan probably picked it up from the *Xin Huayanjing lun* 新華嚴經論 [A New Treatise on the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*] (T. 1739.36) by Li Tongxuan (635–730, 李通玄).

⁴⁷ For the use of *'du ba* in the discussion of *nīrvikalpa* meditation, see *dMyigs su myed pa tshul gcig pa'i gzhung* (P.T. 116/5, P.T. 823/2, P.T. 21/3, P.T. 821, and P.T. 822) and *Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don* (Derge Tōhoku no. 3910). For example, *theg pa chen po* (read *po'i* with *Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don*) *chos rnam par myi rtog pa'i nang du // byang cub du sems bskyed pa 'dus pa ji lta bu zhe na // rdo rje gcod pa'i mdo las // 'du shes thams cad rnam par spangs te // bla na myed pa'i byang cub du sems bskyed do // zhes 'byung //* “One asks, ‘how can the generation of the aspiration for awakening meet with [(*'dus pa*)] the non-conceptual teaching of Mahāyāna?’ [Answer:] ‘In the *Vajracchedikā*, it is said: when one abandons all thoughts, one generates the aspiration for the unsurpassed awakening’; P.T. 116/5, v23.2–23.4; cf. *Cig car 'jug pa rnam par mi rtog pa'i bsgom don*, Derge Tengyur 3910, mdo 'grel (dbu ma), ki (vol. 110), 10a. For a translation of P.T. 116/5, see Flemming Faber, “A Tibetan Dunhuang Treatise on Simultaneous Enlightenment: The *dMyigs su myed pa tshul gcig pa'i gzhung*,” *Acta Orientalia* 46 (1985): 47–77; Okimoto Katsumi 沖本克己, “Uiichi musōgi ni tsuite: Tonkō hakken no chibetto go tekisuto no kōtei to wayaku 『唯一無想義』について: 敦煌発見のチベット語テキストの校訂と和訳 [On the Meaning of the Single Method of Non-objectification: An Edited Version and Japanese Translation of a Tibetan Text Found at Dunhuang],” *Zengaku kenkyū* 禅学研究 [Studies in Zen Buddhism] 66 (1987): 15–35.

If one can become a buddha by getting rid of delusional thoughts alone, there would be no need to discuss the six *pāramitās*, and the twelve types of scriptures should only discuss methods of destroying delusional thoughts. Since they do not discuss things in this way, [your claim] is not logical.⁴⁸

The jarring part here is the unnatural Chinese OV (object-verb) order of *wangxiang li* (妄想離), as Moheyan uses *li wangxiang* (離妄想) or a similar expression in the VO (verb-object) order repeatedly in his answers.⁴⁹ Although there is no available Tibetan text for this question, we learn from the TQA that this idea can be expressed in Tibetan as *'du shes bral'* *'du shes spangs*, exactly an OV-order phrase (§§I.2, I.4, I.11). It seems likely that *wangxiang li* is a slip by a translator that betrays the influence of an SOV source language.

In Q II.2, it is claimed that “because of various powers of one’s merit and wisdom [as prerequisites], the absorption of non-conceptualisation [(Chin. *sanmei wuguan* 三昧無觀; Skt. **nirvikalpasamādhi*)] can begin to manifest”.⁵⁰ In Chinese, an adjective usually goes before the noun that it qualifies, whereas the opposite is the case in Tibetan. The Chinese phrase *sanmei wuguan*, which clearly refers to the so-called ‘non-conceptual/no-thought meditation’ (Chin. *wuguan chan* 無觀禪) advocated by Moheyan, seems to be a word-by-word translation of Tib. *ting nge 'dzin rnam par mi rtog pa*.

In the same question, the Indian-Tibetan side questions Moheyan’s claim that “ordinary people should stop giving rise to delusional thoughts” (Chin. *fanfu*_[S] *wangxiang*_[O] *busheng*_[V] 凡夫_[S] 妄想_[O] 不生_[V]).⁵¹ As a SVO-order sentence such as *fanfu*_[S] *busheng*_[V] *wangxiang*_[O] (凡夫_[S] 不生_[V] 妄想_[O]) would sound more natural, the SOV order here seemingly hints at a Tibetan origin such as *byis pa kyis* _[S] *'du shes* _[O] *ma bskyed cig* _[V].⁵²

⁴⁸ ZLJ^A, 129b3–b4: 若只妄想離得成佛者，亦不要說六波羅蜜，十二部經只合說令滅妄想。既若不如是說，於理相違; ZLJ^A omits 離 against ZLJ^B. Also see Demiéville, *Le concile*, 53.

⁴⁹ For the Chinese phrase *li wangxiang* (離妄想), see A I.13, A III.6, A III.12, etc.

⁵⁰ ZLJ^A, 132b6–133a1: 因諸福智力故，三昧無觀從此方顯。

⁵¹ ZLJ^A, 132b4.

⁵² For *byis pa* as a rendering of *prthagjana* (‘ordinary people’), see *First Bhāvanākrama*, IOL Tib J 648, 9v6, 10v3, etc. The Tibetan phrase *'du shes ma bskyed cig* can be found in the Kangyur and Tengyurs as well.



3.3. Perplexing Quotes

There are at least five instances in which a quote from a scripture is considered defective by Demiéville.⁵³ However, most of the problematic quotes are from the questions formulated by Moheyan's opponents (e.g., Q II.2, Q III.4, Q III.6, Q III.8 and Q III.11). The existence of a translation process would explain this phenomenon: the translators clearly did not consult the Chinese Buddhist canon when rendering the quotes from Tibetan to Chinese.

These perplexing quotes do not necessarily defy understanding. For instance, Q III.8 cites the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi* to challenge Moheyan's antinomian claim that gradualist practitioners would not receive a prophecy (Chin. *shouji* 授記; Skt. *vyākaraṇa*) of their future buddhahood because they are attached to their 'cultivation and practice' (Chin. *xiuxing* 修行). It is pointed out that the fact that there are gradualists with no prophecy does not mean that gradualism prevents prophecy. In other words, correlation does not imply causation.

[Q III.8] The fact that there are people who have not received a prophecy because they are dwelling in practices does not mean that they will not receive a prophecy simply because they have been practising. [It is simply because] they are still in the process of practising, and it is not the appropriate time for them to receive a prophecy. Different types of prophecies are explained in the *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra*: there are, So-and-So, three types of prophecy that are not secretly bestowed [upon a practitioner].⁵⁴

Although Demiéville complains that "this text is either incomplete or defective,"⁵⁵ the passage still makes sense when we read it together with the claims about the prophecies in the *Śūraṅgamasamādhi*, *Daśabhūmika*, and *Laṅkāvatāra*. There are three types of prophecy that are bestowed openly upon a practitioner: (1) the one granted before a practitioner generates the *bodhicitta*, (2) the one granted as soon as a

⁵³ For example, in Q II.2, when the text cites the *Vajracchedikā*, Demiéville points out, "[L]e passage qui suit ne se retrouve, sauf erreur, dans aucune des recensions de cet ouvrage." See also Demiéville, *Le concile*, 72 fn 2. For other instances, see p. 59 fn. 3, p. 127 fn. 1, p. 142 fn. 2, p. 143 fn. 1–2.

⁵⁴ ZLJA, 149a6–b2: 緣住在修行所以不授記者，非是緣修行不授記。尚在修行中，似未合到授記時。首楞嚴三昧經中說言分明授記，不深密授記如此三授記。

⁵⁵ "Le texte est incomplet ou fautif" (Demiéville, *Le concile*, 142 fn 2). Demiéville's punctuation here needs adjustment.

practitioner generates the *bodhicitta*, and (3) the one granted when a practitioner reaches the eighth stage.⁵⁶ According to the *Daśabhūmika*, eighth-stage bodhisattvas, who dwell in non-conceptualisation, are urged by the buddhas to keep on practising:

You have not possessed the consummation of the buddhas' marks such as ten powers and four kinds of fearlessness! To strive for the consummation of the buddha's marks, please persevere and strive to be heroic!⁵⁷

If an eighth-stage bodhisattva who can easily access the non-conceptual gnosis still needs to keep on practising, it would be impossible to argue that the non-conceptual gnosis and normative practices are mutually exclusive. Indeed, it can be argued that all four types of prophecy are tied up with the idea of gradual spiritual progress.

In response, Moheyan justifies his position by citing the *Brahmapariṣcchā*, “if one does not practise all kinds of conditioned phenomena, it is termed the correct practice.”⁵⁸ Although the *Brahmapariṣcchā* here intends to point out that the concept of ‘practice’ (Skt. **pratipatti*) only exists as a convention and should not be mistaken as the ultimate,⁵⁹ Moheyan reinterprets it as a scriptural endorsement of the Chan claim that no-thought is the highest form of practice and superior to all other types of Buddhist practice.

⁵⁶ According to the *Śūramgamasamādhi*, there are four types of prophecy that might be used by a buddha to indicate a practitioner's future buddhahood. Among them, three are carried out openly in front of the practitioner and one is carried out secretly without the practitioner's knowledge. See *Śūramgamasamādhi*, Derge 132, mdo sde, da (vol. 55), 289a; also see Demiéville, *Le concile*, 141–142. For an explanation of the secret prophecy, see Nanjio, *Laṅkāvatāra*, 240–241; T. 672.16, 622b9–c13.

⁵⁷ Kondo Ryūkō 近藤隆晃, *Daśabhūmīśvaro Nāma Mahāyānasūtram* (Tokyo: Daijyō Bukkyō Kenyōkai, 1936), 136: yāsmākaṃ daśabalacaturvaiśārdyabuddhadharmasamṛddhiḥ sā tava nāsti | tasyā buddhadharmasamṛddeḥ paryeṣaṇāya abhiyoḡaṃ kuru vīryam ārabhasva |.

⁵⁸ *Brahmapariṣcchā*, T. 586.15, 49b28: 若不行一切有為法，是名正行; “One who does not engage with all conditioned phenomena is practising perfectly [(*)*samyakpratipatti*].” Cf. *Brahmapariṣcchā*, Derge 160, mdo sde, ba, 69b3–4: *gang 'dus byas kyi dngos po thams cad la yang ma zhugs pa de yang dag par zhugs pa yin no //*.

⁵⁹ For a more nuanced interpretation of *pratipatti* in the *Brahmapariṣcchā* itself, see Goshima Kiyotaka 五島清隆, “Chibetto yaku bonten shomon gyō: wayaku to yakuchū (1) チベット訳『梵天所問經』-和訳と訳注 (1) [An Annotated Japanese Translation of the *Brahmapariṣcchā* in Tibetan (1)],” *Indogaku chibetto gaku kenkyū* インド学チベット学研究 [Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies] 13 (2009): 171.



Another puzzling quote is in Q II.2, which starts with a sentence allegedly extracted from the *Vajracchedikā*, even though evidently no recension of the *Vajracchedikā* contains the quote in this form.

[Q II.2] Another new question: It is said in the *Vajracchedikā*, ‘If one thoroughly understands phenomena, and, after seeing them clearly, does not see them, this is wisdom [(Skt. *prajñā*)].’ [...] Ordinary people by nature do not understand all phenomena and do not possess various kinds of qualities. They would not be able to achieve buddhahood by only destroying their delusional thoughts.⁶⁰

Demiéville, while not being able to locate the *locus classicus* of this quote in the *Vajracchedikā*, surmises that “Il semble que il s’agisse ici d’une interprétation gradualiste des paradoxes de la *Prajñāpāramitā* et de son «bréviaire», la *Vajracchedikā*.”⁶¹ It is unclear what paradoxes Demiéville specifically refers to here; it seems that he does not realise that this line functions as an explanatory note. Instead of directly quoting the *Vajracchedikā*, the text explains a line from the *Vajracchedikā* first quoted by Moheyan in A I.1a, “Those who eliminate all delusional thoughts and karmic imprints are called the buddhas”.⁶² In this light, Q II.2 is a response to A I.2, A I.2 is a response to Q I.2, and Q I.2 is a response to A I.1a.

This explanatory note aims at reinterpreting the typical *prajñāpāramitā* paradox ‘not seeing (Skt. *apaśyanā*) is the correct seeing (Skt. *samyakpaśyanā*)’.⁶³ The Chinese term *buguan* (不觀), which can be

⁶⁰ ZLJA, 132b2–b3: 又再新問：《金剛經》云：「若了達諸法，觀了然後不觀者，是智慧。」[...] 凡夫本來不達一切法，猶未具諸功德，唯滅妄想，不得成佛。

⁶¹ Demiéville, *Le concile*, 72 fn. 2:

⁶² ZLJA, 129a5: 離一切妄想習氣，則名諸佛。 Cf. *Vajracchedikā*, T. 235.9, 750b9: 離一切諸相，則名諸佛; also cf. the pre-Mahāvīyūtpatti Tibetan *Vajracchedikā*: *de ci yI slad du zhe na’ du shes tham shad dang bral ba’ ni // sang rgyas bcom lan ’da ’so //* (IOL Tib J 286, f.183v1).

⁶³ For example, *ji ltar gang mthong ba dang / gang gis mthong ba de mi mthong ba dang / rnam par mi mthong ba de ltar ltos shig / rgyal po chen po de ni chos thams cad la yang dag par mthong ba ste / rgyal po chen po ma mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba’o //*; “You should see in such a way that what is seen and the one who sees are unseen and unobserved. Great king, that is correct seeing with regard to all dharmas, in that, great king, not seeing is correct seeing”; Paul Harrison and Jens-Uwe Hartmann, “Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanāsūtra,” in *Manuscripts in the Schøyen Collection I: Buddhist Manuscripts, Volume 1*, ed. Jens Braarvig (Oslo: Hermes Publishing, 2000), 185–186. Similar statements can also be found in the *Brahmapariṣcā* (Derge Tōhoku no. 160), the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (Derge Tōhoku no. 56), *Sarvaṇyāsamuccayasamādhi* (Derge Tōhoku no. 134), *Sāgaranāgarāja-pariṣcā* (Derge Tōhoku no. 153), etc. I thank Paul Harrison for pointing out the relevant passage and explaining this paradox to me.

interpreted either as ‘not examining’ or ‘not conceptualising’, is Moheyan’s term of choice for no-thought meditation. The point here is that the discussion of ‘unseeing’ in various *sūtras*, including the *Vajracchedikā*, should not be mistaken as a direct endorsement of Moheyan’s no-thought, because ‘unseeing’ in Mahāyāna has to be guided by and coupled with wisdom, which requires the operations of thoughts and concepts. This passage’s emphasis on the role of wisdom in meditation reminds us of a similar statement in Kamalaśīla’s *First Bhāvanākrama*:

The seeing of ultimate reality is the unseeing of all phenomena, after examining them with the wisdom eye and when a vision of perfect knowledge emerges. It is said in *sūtras* in this way, ‘what is the seeing of ultimate reality? It is the unseeing of all phenomena.’⁶⁴

It is quite possible that Q II.2 betrays the influence of the *First Bhāvanākrama*, a text that was already translated before the first promulgation of the *sGra sbyor bam pa gnyis pa* [Word Formation in Two Fascicles] in 883/895.⁶⁵

In Q III.6, Moheyan’s opponents argue that Chan practitioners cannot really enter a non-conceptual state of mind, because no-thought itself is but a concept. Here they cite the *Lañkāvatāra* to support their argument that no-thought meditation would at best lead a practitioner to a heaven.

⁶⁴ First Bhāvanākrama, IOL Tib J 648, ff. 5a7–5b1: *yang dag pa’I dam pa mthong ba de ni / gang chos thams chad shes rab gyi myig gyIs brtags te / yang dag pa’I ye shes gyl snang ba shard* (read *shar*) *na chi’ang* (read *ci’ang*) *myi mthong ba’o // de skad mdo sde las kyang don dam pa mthong ba gang zhe na chos thams chad myi mthong ba yin no zhes ’byung ngo //*; Giuseppe Tucci, ed., *Minor Buddhist Texts: Part II, First Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla (Roma: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958), 211–212: *etad eva tat paramatattvadarśanam yat sarvadharmān prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayataḥ samyagjñānāvaloke saty adarśanam | tathā coktaṃ sūtre katamaṃ paramārthadarśanam | sarvadharmānām adarśanam iti |*. The Dunhuang version of the First Bhāvanākrama (IOL Tib J 648), unlike the revised version in the Tengyurs, features a set of terminology that predates the *sGra sbyor bam pa gnyis pa* first promulgated in 783/795. Also see Harada Satoru 原田寛, “Tonkōhon sGom rim dañ po kō 敦煌本 sGom rim dañ po 考 [On the Dunhuang Version of sGom rim dañ po],” *Nihon chibetto gakkai kaihō* 日本西藏学会会報 [Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies] 28 (1982): 4–8. A direct copy of IOL Tib J 648, ff. 1–5 can be found in P.T. 682, ff. 1v, 3, 5–7, 9–10 + PT 825, ff. 1–4, 6–8, 10–11.

⁶⁵ The *sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa* was mostly likely promulgated in 795 as an aftermath of the Samyé debate; see Jampa Panglung, “New Fragments of the sGra-sbyor bam-po gñis-pa,” *East and West* 44.1 (1994): 166–167. For arguments for dating the ‘pig year’ decree to 783, see Scherrer-Schaub, “Enacting Words,” 289–292.



[Q III.6] It is said in the seven-fascicle *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ‘even if one embarks on the sudden path via this method of examination [advocated by you], one only enters the heaven of unconscious beings [(Chin. *feixiangtian* 非想天)]⁶⁶ and appears as if devoid of mental activity [(Chin. *wuxinxiang* 無心想)].’ [...] If someone asks this, how would you respond?⁶⁷

In the Chinese versions of the *Laṅkāvatāra*, not only is the quoted sentence nowhere to be found, but also the two key terms *feixiangtian* and *wuxinxiang* do not even appear.⁶⁸ However, one can easily locate the Tibetan source by substituting Chin. *feixiangtian* with Tib. *’og min* (Skt. *akaniṣṭha*) and Chin. *wuxinxiang* with Tib. *rnam par mi rtog pa* (Skt. *nirvikalpa*):

Those who never conceptualise anything [(cf. Chin. *wuxinxiang*)],
being away from mental phenomena,
are in the heavenly Akaniṣṭha mansion [(cf. Chin. *feixiangtian*)],
where all kinds of evil are abandoned.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Although the Chinese term *feixiang tian* mostly exists in Chinese Buddhist texts as a shorthand for the heaven of neither-thought-nor-no-thought (Chin. *feixiang feifeixiang tian* 非想非非想天; Skt. *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*), Q III.5 reveals that this term in the ZLJ refers to “unconscious beings” (Skt. *asamjñika-sattvāḥ*) living in the Br̥hatphala Heaven (Chin. *daguo* 大果); see ZLJ^A, 148a3. Evidently *daguo* is a literal rendering of the Tibetan term *bras bu chen ba*, because the Sanskrit equivalent *br̥hatphala* is commonly translated as *guangguo* 廣果, instead of *daguo*, in Chinese Buddhist texts. For the loaction of the unconscious beings, see Robert F. Sharf, “Is Nirvāna the Same as Insentience? Chinese Struggles with an Indian Buddhist Ideal,” in *India in the Chinese Imagination: Myth, Religion, and Thought*, ed. John Kieschnick and Meir Shahar (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 156.

⁶⁷ ZLJ^A, 148b5–6: 《楞伽》七卷中說：『從此門觀察入頓門，亦入分別非想天，現無心想。』[...] 若有人問，如何對。

⁶⁸ The three Chinese versions of the *Laṅkāvatāra* are T. 670.16 by Guṇabhadra (4 fascicles), T. 671.16 by Bodhiruci (10 fascicles), and T. 672.16 by Śikṣānanda (7 fascicles). Demiéville claims that the Chinese phrase ‘seven fascicles’ (Chin. *qijuan* 七卷) is a way to refer to the entirety of the *Laṅkāvatāra* (Demiéville, *Le concile*, 139 n7). However, it is obvious that this quote does not refer to an idea that is fully discussed by the *Laṅkāvatāra* or frequently mentioned throughout the *sūtra*.

⁶⁹ *Laṅkāvatāra*, Derge 107, *mdo sde, ca* (vol. 49), 160b1: *lha yi pho brang ’og min no // sdiḡ pa thams cad rnam spangs par // rtag tu rnam par mi rtog ldan // sems dang sems las byung ba spangs //*; T. 672.16, 625c6–c7: 常行無分別，遠離心心法；住色究竟天，離諸過失處；Nanjio Bunyiu 南條文雄, ed., *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), 269: *akaniṣṭhabhavane divye sarvapāpavivarjite | nirvikalpāḥ sadā yuktāś cittacaittavivarjitāḥ //*. This verse summarises a preceding prose, which also features the term ‘sudden’ (Skt. *yogapat*); Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, 56: *niṣyandabuddho yugapat satvagocaraṃ paripācyaṅkaniṣṭhabhavanavimānālaye yogayoginām arpayati*; “The Issuance-Buddha, having suddenly matured the dwelling-

Moheyan’s opponents point out that Chan practitioners, having plunged into no-thought meditation, must exist on an ontological plane corresponding to their preferred meditative state—unconsciousness. Even if they are successful in eliminating their thoughts, they would at most reach Akaniṣṭha, if not the heaven of unconscious beings.⁷⁰ Therefore, this approach is still not radically ‘sudden’ because mid-points between the human realm and *nirvāṇa* are still utilised.

In brief, textual infelicities such as unusual wording, unnatural word order, and perplexing quotes testify to the interlingual nature of the so-called ‘new questions’ and the third-round questions in the ZLJ (tab. 2).

place of beings, places yoga practitioners in a palatial residence in the Akaniṣṭha Mansion”; T. 672.16, 596b10–b12: 報佛亦爾，於色究竟天，頓能成熟一切眾生令修諸行。

⁷⁰ Akaniṣṭha is the heaven closest to the ‘realm of formlessness’ (Skt. *ārūpyadhātu*), whereas the “unconscious beings” (*asaṃjñīsattvāḥ*) in the lower part of the realm of the fourth *dhyāna*. It is unclear who made the mistake of equating *asaṃjñīsattvāḥ* with Akaniṣṭha.



Contents	Treatment in ZLJ	Treatment in TQA
‘Old questions’	Chinese translation	Tibetan original
Moheyan’s answers to the ‘old questions’	Chinese original	Tibetan translation
‘New questions’	Chinese translation	(Not extant)
Moheyan’s answers to the ‘new questions’	Chinese original	
The third-round of questions	Chinese translation	
Moheyan’s answers to the third-round of questions	Chinese original	

Table 2. Textual evidence for the three rounds of questions and answers.

4. The Structure of the ZLJ

The ZLJ is not a well-homogenised whole but a compilation of disparate texts including a preface by Wang Xi and a series of writings produced by Moheyan and his opponents. Because the text provides no division headings, it is not always clear where a division starts or ends. Scholars have attempted to break down the main text into Q&A series and the so-called memorials in different ways. For example, Demiéville marks six sections in his French translation: the preface, the first Q&A series that contains both ‘old questions’ and ‘new questions’, the first memorial, the second Q&A series, the second memorial, and the third memorial.⁷¹ Ueyama and Harada differ with Demiéville in how to dissect the second half of the ZLJ (tab. 3).⁷²

⁷¹ See Demiéville, *Le concile*. Demiéville takes the phrase ‘mémorial d’information de Mahāyāna’ (Chin. *Moheyan wenzou* 摩訶衍聞奏) (ZLJ^A, f. 155a5) as the explicit of the second memorial, and the following phrase *wei fofayi jichan jiaoli* (為佛法義寂禪教理) as the incipit of the third memorial (p. 157). However, other scholars all agree that *Moheyan wenzou* 摩訶衍聞奏 is not the explicit of the previous section, but the first phrase of the next section.

⁷² See Ueyama, *Tonkō bukkyō*, 256; Harada, “Makaen zenji kō,” 112. For an overview of the different schemata, see Ibuki Atsushi 伊吹敦, “Makaen to tongo Taishō seiri ketsu” 摩訶衍と『頓悟大乘正理決』[Moheyan and *Dunwu dasheng zhengli jue*],” *Ronsō ajia no bunka to shisō* 論叢アジアの文化と思想 [Asian Culture and Thought] 1 (1992): 4–5. Ibuki largely follows Ueyama’s schema, except for combining Ueyama’s second testimonial and the autobiography into one division.

Demiéville	Harada	Ueyama
I. Wang Xi's preface (126b1–129a3)		
II. 1st Q&A (129a3–143a1)		
1st memorial (143a1–145b1)		III. 1st petition (上表文) (143a1–145b1)
2nd Q&A (145b1–153a3)	2nd Q&A (145b1–154a6)	IV. 2nd Q&A (145b1–153a3)
2nd memorial (153a3–155a5)		V. 2nd petition (153a3–154a1)
		VI. 3rd Q&A (154a2–154a6)
	2nd memorial (154a6–155a5)	VII. 1st testimonial (聞奏文) (154a6–155a4)
3rd memorial (155a5–158a4)		VIII. 2nd testimonial (155a5–155b6)
		IX. autobiography (155b6–158a4)

Table 3. Three schemata of the ZLJ.

Ueyama terms Demiéville's 'first memorial' as Jap. *jōhyōbun* (上表文), perhaps because it ends with 'the petition is submitted' (Chin. *biaoshang* 表上). However, the Jap. *jōhyōbun* is a genre label used in pre-modern Japanese writings; the correct term used during the time of the Tang Dynasty (618–907, 唐) would have simply been 'petition' (Chin. *biao* 表).⁷³ More specifically, here Chin. *biao* refers to a petitionary appendage attached to a piece of writing submitted to the throne as an explanatory memo.⁷⁴ In Moheyan's case, the main text submitted to the throne was a Q&A series, and the *biao* would have been considered a supplement to the main text. A 'petition' in this sense usually starts with 'I, as your servant, humbly petition' (Chin. *chen ... yan* 臣...言) and ends with 'I prostrate again and again and have humbly spoken' (Chin. *dunshou dunshou jinyan* 頓首頓首謹言) or a variation of this phrase, even though Moheyan might

⁷³ Chin. *wenzouwen* (聞奏文), a term coined by Ueyama, does not seem to provide any analytical advantage. The first *wenzouwen* (ZLJ^A, 154a6–155a4) is clearly a petition, as it starts with *chen ... yan* (臣...言), ends with *dunshou dunshou jinyan* (頓首頓首謹言), and is referenced by Moheyan explicitly as a *biao*.

⁷⁴ There are many similar petitions in the *Quan Tangwen* 全唐文 [A Complete Works of the Tang]; for instance, when Yuan Jie (723–772, 元結) submitted his *Shiyi* 時議 [Timely Discussions] to Emperor Tang Suzong (r. 756–762, 唐肅宗) in 759, a 150-word petition was attached at the beginning; see Dong Hao 董浩, et al., *Quan Tangwen* 全唐文 [A Complete Works of the Tang] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 381.6a4–b2.



have chosen to edit out some formulaic phrases when he was compiling the ZLJ.

If we agree that there were three rounds of Q&A in total, there must have been at least three petition-like texts submitted to the court, with each belonging to a specific round of Q&A. Because Moheyan inserts each ‘new question’ underneath the corresponding answer to the ‘old question’ in the ZLJ, we would expect the first two petition-like texts to be placed immediately after the first- and second-round Q&As and the third petition-like text after the third-round Q&A. The textual unit placed immediately after the end of the third petition lacks the customary beginning and closing phrases of a petition, even though Moheyan in it speaks directly to the Tibetan emperor and refers to himself as ‘your servant’ (Chin. *chen* 臣). Therefore, it is a petition-like submission to the throne, but not necessarily a petition *per se* (tab. 4). The last textual unit, which starts with the phrase ‘points taught by Master [Mohe]yan to his disciples’ (Chin. *yan heshang jiao mentu zidi chu* 衍和上教門徒子弟處), is part of a sermon made by Moheyan to his followers.

A new schema	ZLJ ^A	Ueyama’s divisions
1. Wang Xi’s preface	126b1–129a3	I
2. First- and second-round Q&As	129a3–143a1	II
3. First petition	143a1–145a5	III
4. Second petition	145a1–145b1	
5. Third-round Q&A	145b1–154a6	IV + V + VI
6. Third petition	154a6–155a4	VII
7. A petition-like submission	155a5–155b6	VIII
8. A sermon	155b6–158a4	IX

Table 4. A new schema of the ZLJ.

5. Closing Remarks

Demiéville clearly does not have a particular regard for Moheyan’s writing, as he remarks:

Les mémoriaux adressés au Roi du Tibet témoignent d’une culture littéraire de piètre aloi, et la rédaction de la controverse doctrinale elle-même, avec

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.4. Ding, “Telling Infelicities and Hidden Intelligibility”

ses maladresses, ses sous-entendus, ses ellipses embarrassées, ses emprunts au langage vulgaire, ne contribue que trop à obscurcir encore des idées.⁷⁵

Be that as it may, Moheyan should not be blamed for every infelicity in the ZLJ. The fact is that the questions were translated from Tibetan to Chinese by Tibetan translators who were not versed in Chinese Buddhism.

The ZLJ is by no means a literary masterpiece, but it testifies to a largely effective process of communication. Throughout the ZLJ, the Indian-Tibetan side seemingly understands Moheyan's claims well and recognises the possible doctrinal consequences of his brand of Chan, such as the relegation of wisdom (§II.2), the nullification of the ten-stage schema (§II.5), the lack of skilful means (§II.7b), the trivialisation of *karma* (§§II.8a–8b), the conflation of the meditative attainment of unconscious beings (Skt. *asaṃjñīsamāpatti*) and the non-conceptual absorption (Skt. *nirvikalpasamādhi*) (§§III.5–7), and the denial of prophecies to gradualists (§III.8). Despite the interlingual infelicities, Moheyan manages to comprehend these objections to a satisfactory degree, even though he lacks a philosopher's penchant for a systematised apology.

⁷⁵ Demiéville, *Le concile*, 20.



Appendices

Appendix I: P.T. 829/2

Note: Harada considers P.T. 829/2 to be part of the TQA; see Harada, “Makaen zenji kō,” 109. Sam van Schaik asserts that IOL Tib J 704 and P.T. 829 belong to the same concertina, even though there are lacunae that prevent the two manuscripts being joined together continuously; see van Schaik, *The Tibetan Chan Manuscripts*, 37–39.

[r2.3] @ // *dbu ma 'I don gyi mkhan po / theg pa chen po la chos kyi don dang rgyu dris pa 'I lan dang gzhung du* [r2.4] *bris pa 'o* // [r2.5] @ // *theg pa chen po 'i mdo sde las 'du shes thams cad dang bral na sangs rgyas shes 'byung bas /*

[The non-conceptual meditation] is written in the answers to the questions about the meaning and causes of Mahāyāna teachings [by] the Mādhyamika master [(Moheyan?)] and scriptures [(Tib. *gzhung*)]. According to Mahāyāna *sūtras*, once one gets rid of thoughts, one is called a buddha.

Appendix II: P.T. 21/1

Note: Okimoto considers P.T. 21/1 to be part of the TQA; see Okimoto, “Tonkō shutsudo no chibetto bun zenshū bunken no naiyō,” 437–438. Cf. the English translation in Gómez, “The Direct and the Gradual Approaches,” 124–125; for the parallel in IOL Tib J 689/1, see Meinert, “The Conjunction of Chinese Chan and Tibetan rDzogs chen Thought,” 245–246, 287–288.

[r1.1] *myI rung ba 'o* // *chos so chog thams cad ni / blang du rung ba dang / dor du rung ba 'I dngos po myed de* // *blang dor gyi 'du shes myi bskyed do* // [r1.2] *'di ltar rtogs nas / bsam gtan du bsgom ba 'i thabs la / sgo drug bzlogs te* // *sems la bltas na // myi bden ba 'i 'du shes* [r1.3] *'ba' shig g.yo zhing / skye shI 'I las byed par dad (read chad) // 'du shes g.yos na / yod pa dang myed pa dang / gtsang ba dang myi gtsang ba dang* [r1.4] *stong pa dang myi stong ba la stsogs pa cir yang myi bsam / myi bsam bar yang myi bsam / myi brtag de la ma tshor te / bsam bzhin* [r1.5] *du spyad na ni skye shI // tshor te 'du shes bzhin ma spyad ma blangs ma chags na / sems thang nge yang grol thar re re // de bzhin du bsgoms* [r1.6] *te // myi bden ba 'i 'du shes dang / bag chags thams cad dang / bral ma thag du mngon bar 'tshang rgya 'o // myi rtog pa 'I gzhung rdzogs so //*

[...] not suitable. Because there is no substance [(Tib. *dngos po*)] to be accepted or rejected with regard to all phenomena, one should not give rise to thoughts such as acceptance or rejection. There is a method of practising

meditation once you understand [all phenomena] in this way: if you turn off [(Tib. *bzlog*)] your six faculties⁷⁶ and contemplate your own mind, you can refrain from carrying out transmigration[-inducing] deeds when a delusional thought [(Tib. *myi bden ba 'i 'du shes*; Chin. *wangxiang* 妄想)] is aroused.⁷⁷ When thoughts are aroused, do not think about anything, [including dichotomies] such as existing and non-existing, being pure and impure, being empty and not empty, and keep refraining from thinking; without examining them, you are not aware of them.⁷⁸ Intentionally acting upon them [brings about] transmigration! If you, while being aware of them, do not act upon them as thoughts, do not accept them, are not attached to them, every single one of your thoughts will be liberated. If you meditate in this way, once you get rid of all delusional thoughts and karmic imprints, you will become awakened. The *Treatise on Non-Conceptuality* is completed.

Appendix III: The ‘Old Questions’ and ‘New Questions’

Note: Because of the limited scope of this article, Appendix III only deals with the so-called ‘old questions’ and ‘new questions’ (ZLJA, 129a4–143a1) in order to facilitate an understanding of the interlingual nature of the questions and how the first two rounds of Q&A are intermeshed in the

⁷⁶ “[T]he expression ‘reversing mind’s six faculties so as not to engage in deluded objects’ (*sems kyi sgo drug 'khrul pa'i yul la myi 'jug par bzlog*) is a rendering of the Chinese phrase ‘turning the luminosity [of the mind] towards the mind’s source’ (*fanzhao xinyuan*), and is thus understood as a definition for the meditation method called ‘gazing at mind’ (*sems la btas, kanxin*);” Carmen Meinert, “The Conjunction of Chinese Chan and Tibetan Rdzogs chen Thought: Reflections on the Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts IOL Tib J 689-1 and PT 699,” in *Contributions to the Cultural History of Early Tibet*, ed. Matthew T. Kapstein and Brandon Dotson (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 270. As Meinert points out, the locus classicus is in the Pseudo-*Śūraṅgamasūtra*; see T.945.19, 131a.20–a21.

⁷⁷ This is a bungled rendering of a line from the *Mahāyānaparinirvāṇasūtra*, see T. 374.12, 469c17: 既覺了已，令諸煩惱無所能為; Derge 119, mdo sde, nya (vol. 52), 283b6: *de ltar tshor bas na nyon mongs pa thams cad kyis mi tshugs so //*. Moheyan cites the same line in A III.3 and explains it as follows: “是故坐禪看心，妄想念起，覺則不取不住，不順煩惱作業，是名念念解脫 [Therefore, if one carries out sitting meditation and contemplates the mind, when delusional thoughts arise, one detects them without accepting or rejecting and does not generate karma according to one’s afflictions. This is called ‘the liberation of each and every thought’]. (ZLJA, 147b2–b3).

⁷⁸ This sentence is adapted from Moheyan’s A I.5: 心想若動，有無淨不淨，空不空等，盡皆不思。不觀者亦不思; TQA^A r1.4–r2.1: *'du shes g.yos na / yod pa dang myed pa dang gtsang ba dang myi gtsang ba dang / stong ba dang myi stong ba la stsogs pa cir yang myi bsams // myi rtog myi bsam bar yang myi bsams ste.*



ZLJ.⁷⁹ The numbering of the questions is provisional and only for the purpose of this article. The order of the two sets of questions in the ZLJ is kept. The English translation translates the Tibetan text, instead of the Chinese text, whenever there is Tibetan text available.

§I.1a.

(Not in TQA^A or TQA^B.)

問曰：「令看心除習氣，出何經文？」

Question: With regard to [your claim that] ‘one should contemplate the mind to eliminate one’s karmic imprints [(Tib. *bag chags*; Skt. *vāsanā*)]’, what would be your scriptural sources?⁸⁰

§I.1b.

[TQA^B] *theg pa chen po 'I mdo las bshad shing smos pa // theg pa chen po zhes bya ba 'I gzhung ci lta bu //*

問：「所言大乘經者，何名大乘義？」

You explain and talk about ‘Mahāyāna sūtras’. How do you define ‘Mahāyāna’?

§II.1a.

第一問：或有人言⁸¹：「佛者無量多劫已來，無⁸²量功德、智聚圓備，然始成佛；獨離妄想，不得成佛。何以故？若只妄想離⁸³得成佛者，亦不要說六波羅蜜，十二部經只合說令滅妄想。既若不如是說，於理相違。」

The first [new] question: Some may object, ‘The buddhas achieved buddhahood only after acquiring an immeasurable amount of merit and a perfect accumulation of knowledge in innumerable eons. One cannot achieve buddhahood by only getting rid of delusional thoughts. Why is that? If one can become a buddha by getting rid of delusional thoughts alone, there would be no need to discuss the six *pāramitās*, and the twelve types of

⁷⁹ For Moheyān’s answers originally composed in Chinese, Demiéville’s French translation is still reliably good for consultation. As one can quickly tell, Moheyān’s answers are rather predictable.

⁸⁰ This question is raised probably because the *Da foding jing* 大佛頂經 [Scripture of the Great Crown of the Buddha], i.e., Pseudo-*Śūraṅgamasūtra*, which Moheyān relied on to make the claim that the contemplation of the mind directly leads to liberation, is a Chinese apocryphon and unknown to Moheyān’s opponents.

⁸¹ The Chinese phrase *huoyou ren yan* (或有人言) seems to be a translation of Tib. *kha cig na re* (‘some may say’).

⁸² ZLJ^B starts here.

⁸³ ZLJ^B: 離; ZLJ^A: om.

scriptures should only discuss how to destroy delusional thoughts. Since they do not discuss things in this way, [your claim] is not logical.’

§II.1b.

又問：有天人制於妄想，以制妄想故，生無想天。此等不至佛道。明知除想，不得成佛。

Another question: There are heavenly beings who suppress their delusional thoughts. Because [they have previously practised] suppressing their delusional thoughts, they are born as beings in the heaven of unconsciousness [(Skt. *asaṃjñīsattvā devāḥ*)]. [Practices] such as this would not lead one to the awakening of the Buddha⁸⁴. It illustrates that one cannot [directly] achieve buddhahood by eliminating one’s thoughts.

§II.1c.

問：《楞伽經》云：「所言與聲聞授記，化佛化聲聞授記。據此只是方便調伏眾生。」數箇義中，涅槃道是三乘也。若「離於想、大小之乘無可言」者，謂「無想不觀大小乘」，非無大小。譬如聲聞，證涅槃後，大小之乘，更無所觀，此聲聞人，豈得言入大乘道不？」

Question: It is said in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ‘What I said about bestowing a prophecy to a *śrāvaka* refers to a magically-conjured buddha bestowing a prophecy to a magically-conjured *śrāvaka*.’⁸⁵ Therefore, it is just a skilful means to train sentient beings. In several interpretations, the way of *nirvāṇa* is the three vehicles. Concerning [your claim that] ‘there is nothing to be said about Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna once one is free of thoughts’, even if one stops thinking about and conceptualising Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, it does not mean there is [no distinction between] Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. For example, even though *śrāvakas* do not conceptualise Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna after realising their *nirvāṇa*, we cannot say these *śrāvakas* have entered the way of Mahāyāna [i.e., have become Mahāyānists], right? [Because] the distinction between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna exists independently of whether or not one conceptualises it.

§II.1d.

又問：「所言聲聞住無想⁸⁶，得入大乘否？」

⁸⁴ The term *fodao* (佛道) can refer to the Buddhist path in general or the unsurpassed perfect *bodhi* in particular.

⁸⁵ Cf. Nanjio, *Laṅkāvatāra*, 241: *tan nirmitaśrāvakān nirmāṇakāyair vyākaroṭi na ca dharmatābuddhaiḥ; Laṅkāvatāra*, T. 672.16, 622b23–b24: 又變化佛與化聲聞而授記別，非法性佛。

⁸⁶ ZLJ^B: 想; ZLJ^A: 相. A semantic distinction between the two characters may not have existed here.



Another question: [Since you claim that no-thought is a Mahāyāna practice;] If *śrāvakas* stay in no-thought, are they able to enter Mahāyāna [i.e., to become Mahāyānists]?

§I.2.

[TQA^B] *'du shes bral na sangs rgyas zhes bya ba ming bshad mdo sde*⁸⁷ *gang gI*⁸⁸ *nang nas 'byung //*

第二問：「『離一切相，名諸佛。』⁸⁹是何經說？」

In what scriptures [(Tib. *mdo sde*)] is it said, 'one's name is called the Buddha if one eliminates thoughts [(Tib. *'du shes*; Skt. *saṃjñā*)]'?

§II.2.

又再新⁹⁰問：《金剛經》云：「若了達諸法，觀了、然後不觀者，是智慧⁹¹。」若具脩一切善已，然始無脩，為化眾生，大⁹²智自然成就，言先願力故。為凡夫妄想不生，凡夫本來不達一切法⁹³，猶未具諸功德，唯滅妄想，不得成佛。

以要言之：解一切法是智，修一切善⁹⁴是福，為成就如是一切故，所以經歷多劫，因諸福智力故，三昧無觀，從此方顯。

又《首楞嚴⁹⁵三昧經》云：「初習觀故，然得此三昧，譬如學射，初射竹籬，大如牛身；已後漸小，由如毛髮，並亦皆中。」從習於觀，是漸修行，諸佛所說，皆是漸門，不見頓門。

Another new question: It is said in the *Vajracchedikā*, 'If one thoroughly understands phenomena, and, after seeing them clearly, does not see them, this is wisdom.' If [bodhisattvas], having fully possessed all good qualities, [are able to] begin ceasing practice [for themselves] in order to transform sentient beings and to naturally obtain achievements with great wisdom, it is because of the power of their original vows [(Skt. **pūrvaprañidhāna*)]. [You claim that even] ordinary people should stop giving rise to delusional thoughts. But ordinary people by nature do not

⁸⁷ Emendation: *mdo sde*; TQA^B: *sde*. Cf. P.T. 829/2: *theg pa chen po 'i mdo sde las 'du shes thams cad dang bral na sangs rgyas shes 'byung bas /*

⁸⁸ Emendation: *gI*; TQA^B: *ging*.

⁸⁹ This is from the *Vajracchedikā*; cf. T. 235.9, 750b9: 離一切諸相，則名諸佛. This sentence in the pre-*Mahāvīyūtpatti* Tibetan version is quite close to the Chinese; see IOL Tib J 286, f.183v1: *de ci yI slad du zhe na' 'du shes tham shad dang bral ba' nI // sang rgyas bcom lan 'da 'so //*.

⁹⁰ ZLJ^A: 再新; ZLJ^B: 新再.

⁹¹ ZLJ^A: 慧; ZLJ^B: 惠.

⁹² ZLJ^B: 大; ZLJ^A Ue: 生大.

⁹³ ZLJ^B Ue: 法; ZLJ^A: om.

⁹⁴ ZLJ^B: 善; ZLJ^A Ue: 善法.

⁹⁵ ZLJ^A: 首楞嚴; ZLJ^B: 楞伽華嚴.

understand all phenomena and do not possess the various qualities that would enable them to achieve buddhahood by only destroying their delusional thoughts.

In summary, it is for wisdom that one analyses all phenomena, it is for merit that one performs all kinds of good deeds. It is for all manner of achievements in these [two] ways that [a bodhisattva] progresses through many eons. Because of the various powers of [a bodhisattva's] merit and wisdom, the absorption [(Skt. *samādhi*)] of non-conceptualisation can begin to manifest.

Also, it is said in the *Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra*, 'For beginners, they obtain this *samādhi* through learning contemplation. It is similar to learning archery. At first, one shoots at a bamboo mat⁹⁶ as large as the body of an ox. Gradually [the target] becomes smaller and smaller, and eventually one can even hit a target as small as a thread or hair.'⁹⁷ In terms of learning, contemplation is a gradual practice. All practices that the buddhas have taught are gradual methods, and no sudden methods can be found.

§I.3.

[TQA^B] 'du shes thams cad ces 'byung ba // 'du shes nyId cl lta bu 'du shes shes bya ba nI //

舊問第三問：「所⁹⁸言一切想者，其想云何？」

You mention 'all kinds of thoughts'. How would you define 'thoughts'?

§II.3.

新問第三：上至諸佛，下至地獄之想，切要茲長。成就善法，遠離惡法，因此而行。若不識佛，不知地獄，如說十二因緣中無明。凡夫中不合脩行此法。

The third new question: [Contrary to what you have claimed,] one should cultivate thoughts ranging from the buddhas to the hells.⁹⁹ As a result, one is able to perform wholesome deeds and stay away from unwholesome matters. If one cannot recognise the buddhas or understand that there are hells, one remains in a state of ignorance described in the list of the twelve causes and conditions. It is not appropriate for ordinary people to [begin by] practising the method [advocated by you].

⁹⁶ It is 'a large target' (Chin. *dazhun* 大準) in T. 642.15 and 'an oxhide' (Tib. *lang gi ko ba*) in Derge 132, *mdo sde, da* (vol. 55), 271b4.

⁹⁷ This is loosely adapted from *Śūraṅgamasamādhi*, Derge 132, *mdo sde, da* (vol. 55), 271b4–7; cf. T. 642.15, 633c18–c25.

⁹⁸ ZLJ^B: 所; ZLJ^A Ue: om.

⁹⁹ This refers to the practice of 'mindfulness' (Skt. *anusmṛti*).



§I.4.

[TQA^A] *dris pa* /¹⁰⁰ *'du shes la nyes pa ji*¹⁰¹ *yod* //

舊問：「想有何過？」

Question: What are the faults of thoughts?

§II.4.

新問第四，問：或有故令生長之想，或有不令生想，處凡夫地，初修行時，不得除一切想。

The fourth new question asks: There are [wholesome] thoughts that people are intentionally told to cultivate, and there are thoughts that people are told to avoid. When practitioners are in the stage of ordinary people or have just started to practise, they should not engage in eliminating all kinds of thoughts.

§I.5.

[TQA^A] *dris pa* // *sems la blta zhes bya ba ji lta bu yin* //

舊問：「云何看心？」

Question: What is 'contemplating the mind'?¹⁰²

§II.5.

新問第五，問：據《十地經》中：「八地菩薩唯¹⁰³入不觀，佛令入修行。」據此事，凡夫初地猶未得，唯不觀如何可得¹⁰⁴？

The fifth new question: According to the *Daśabhūmikāsūtra*, 'Only the bodhisattvas in the eighth stage can enter non-conceptuality [(Skt. *nirvikalpa*)], in which the buddhas ask them to keep on practising.' According to this, since ordinary people cannot even reach the first stage, how can they obtain [buddhahood] only by not conceptualising?

§I.6.

[TQA^A] *dris pa* // *'du shes dang bag chags sbyang na thabs ji ltar sbyang* //

舊問：「作何方便，除得妄想及以習氣？」

¹⁰⁰ TQA^A: *dris pa*; TQA^B om.

¹⁰¹ TQA^A: *ji*; TQA^B: *ci*.

¹⁰² For *kanxin* in Tibetan Chan, see Meinert, "The Conjunction of Chinese Chan and Tibetan Rdzogs chen Thought," 243–248.

¹⁰³ The 'correct' word order would prefer Chin. 唯八地菩薩。

¹⁰⁴ ZLJ^A: 得; ZLJ^B: 觀。

Question: How should thoughts and karmic imprints be eliminated?

§II.6a.

新問第六，問：如前所說，凡夫初學，豈得喻佛？佛是已成就者。

The sixth new question asks: As we have explained before, how can you compare ordinary people who are beginners, with the buddhas who have already obtained accomplishments [by using the buddha-nature theory]?

§II.6b.

又：佛言¹⁰⁵「無有少法可得」者，不可執著言說。若無少法可得、無思無觀利益一切者，可不是得否？

Again: When the Buddha said, ‘there is not even a minute *dharmā* to be obtained,’¹⁰⁶ this refers to [the teaching that] one should not be attached to words and explanations. If [you insist that the saying] ‘there is not even a minute *dharmā* to be obtained’ equates to [your claim that] ‘one can benefit all sentient beings by practising no-thought and no-conceptualisation,’ isn’t there something to be obtained? [Therefore, it is not logical.]

§I.7.

[TQA^A] *dris pa // pha rol du phyin pa drug la stsogs pa 'i chos kyi sgo gzhan dgos sam mi dgos //*

舊問：「六波羅蜜等及諸法門，要不要？」

Question: Are other doors to the *dharmā* [i.e., methods of practice] such as the six *pāramitās* needed or not needed?

§II.7a.

新問第七，問：「世間及第一義諦，是一是異¹⁰⁷？」

The seventh new question asks: Are the mundane truth and the truth of the ultimate meaning the same or different?

¹⁰⁵ ZLJ^A: 佛言; ZLJ^B: 言佛.

¹⁰⁶ This is referring to the quote earlier from the *Vajracchedikā*: 乃至無有少法可得，是為無上菩提 “To the extent that there is not even a minute *dharmā* to be obtained, it is the unsurpassed *bodhi*” (T. 235.8, 751c22–c23). The Sanskrit equivalent is in §22, “Not even a fine or minute (Skt. *anu*) *dharmā* is to be found or apprehended in it. That is why it is called ‘superfine or supreme (Skt. *anuttarā*) and perfect awakening;” Paul Harrison, “Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā: A New English Translation of the Sanskrit Text Based on Two Manuscript from Greater Gandhāra,” in *Manuscripts in the Schøyen Collection: Buddhist Manuscripts, Volume III*, ed. Jens Braarvig (Oslo: Hermes Academic, 2006), 155.

¹⁰⁷ ZLJ^A: 是一是異; ZLJ^B om.



§ II.7b.

又問：此方便，為顯示第一義故，只為鈍根者，為復利鈍¹⁰⁸俱要？

Another question: This method [(Tib. *thabs*)] [of Chan] is for the sake of revealing the ultimate meaning. Is it only for people with dull faculties, or is it needed for people with sharp faculties as well as people with dull faculties?

§II.7c.

又問：六波羅蜜等及餘法門，不可¹⁰⁹言說要不要者，何為不可說？

Another question: As for the six *pāramitās* and other approaches to the Dharma, [you claim that] one should not declare whether they are indispensable or not. Why should one not declare [a definite position]?

§II.7e.

又問：「言『經文廣說』，如何說？為說言要不要不會。」

Another question: “Since you have claimed [that the ultimate meaning transcends the question of whether these approaches to the *dharma* are indispensable] is ‘explained extensively in the scriptures’, how is it explained? The discussion of whether they are indispensable or not [in the scriptures] does not meet with [your claim].”

§I.8.

[TQA^A] *dris pa / pha rol du phyin pa drug la stsogs pa dgos na thabs ji ltar spyad /*

舊問：「六波羅蜜等要時，如何修行？」

Question: When the six *pāramitās* and so on are needed, in what manner can they be practised [so that they do not contradict the no-thought advocated by you]?

§II.8a.

新問第八問：所言「三業清淨時六波羅蜜，凡夫未能行得。且修習不觀，中間不修行，待三業清淨，然後修習」，為復未能淨得三業，強修，如何修行？

The eighth new question asks: You say, ‘Ordinary people are not able to practise the six *pāramitās*, [which can only happen] when three kinds of *karma* [i.e., the bodily, verbal, and mental *karma*] are purified. In the meantime, they should stop practising [the six *pāramitās*] and cultivate non-conceptuality. Once they have purified the three kinds of *karma*, they can

¹⁰⁸ ZLJ^A: 鈍; ZLJ^B: 根.

¹⁰⁹ ZLJ^B: 可; ZLJ^A om.

start to practise [the six *pāramitās*].’ How is it possible for people to force themselves to practise [non-conceptuality] without even being able to purify their three kinds of *karma*?

§II.8b.

又問云¹¹⁰：其野馬陽炎實是不會。

Another Question: It [i.e., the bodily, verbal, and mental *karma*] does not meet with [i.e., cannot be subsumed under the category of] [illusions] such as heat hazes or mirages.

§I.9.

[TQA^A] *dris pa / chos kyi sgo 'di spyod na / ci tsaṃ zhig na grol thar pa thob //*

舊問：「修此法門，早晚得解脫？」

Question: When will liberation be obtained if this approach to the *dharma* is practised?

§I.10.

[TQA^A] *dris pa // chos kyi gzhuṅ 'di spyod pas / bsod nams ji yod //*

舊問，「又行此法義，有何功德？」

Question: How much merit is [generated] when this approach to the *dharma* [advocated by you] is practised?

§II.9.

新問第九，問：「『令一切眾生盡證無上菩提猶¹¹¹不及此福』者，此無上菩提，乃成有上，此乃是否？次後說言『無上菩提等從般若¹¹²波羅蜜出』、『無上菩提不出般若波羅蜜』；不出者，說是阿¹¹³那箇菩提¹¹⁴？若¹¹⁵說無上菩提，據如今現¹¹⁶般若波羅蜜，似如此：只如此¹¹⁷說者，不可是無上菩提。」

The ninth ‘new question’ asks: If the merit [of staying faithful upon hearing the principle of *prajñāpāramitā*] surpasses that of enabling all sentient beings to completely realise the unsurpassed *bodhi*, [paradoxically,

¹¹⁰ ZLJ^A: 云; ZLJ^B: om.

¹¹¹ ZLJ^B: 猶; ZLJ^A: 由.

¹¹² ZLJ^B: 若; ZLJ^A: om.

¹¹³ ZLJ^A: 阿; ZLJ^B: om.

¹¹⁴ Demiéville’s correction: 提; ZLJ^A ZLJ^B Ue: 薩.

¹¹⁵ ZLJ^B: 若; ZLJ^A: om.

¹¹⁶ ZLJ^A: 現; ZLJ^B: 現說.

¹¹⁷ ZLJ^B: 如此; ZLJ^A: 此如.



prajñāpāramitā] would become something superior to the ‘unsurpassed *bodhi*.’ Isn’t it the case? Then you mention that ‘*prajñāpāramitā* gives rise to the unsurpassed *bodhi* and so on’ and that ‘the unsurpassed *bodhi* does not give rise to *prajñāpāramitā*.’ As for the latter, what kind of *bodhi* is that? You refer to it as the unsurpassed *bodhi*, but, according to the *prajñāpāramitā*, the following seems to be the case: if you speak of it in such a way, it cannot be the unsurpassed *bodhi*.

§I.11.

[TQA^A] *dris pa / 'du shes spangs te / myi sems myi rtog pa nas thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes ji ltar 'byung //*

舊問：「若離想¹¹⁸、不思、不觀，云何顯¹¹⁹得一切種智？」

Question: After one gets rid of thoughts and does not think or conceptualise, how can omniscience [(Skt. *sarvākārajñāna*)] manifest itself?

§II.10.

新問第十，問：「此言是實乃是已成就具勢(read 十)力者之法，非是凡¹²⁰夫之法者！」

The tenth new question asks, ‘This claim [that omniscience naturally arises once one gets rid of thoughts] is actually a method for the accomplished one who possesses the ten powers [(Skt. *daśabala*)], not for ordinary people.’¹²¹

§I.12.

[TQA^A] *dris pa / myi rtog pa'i ye shes kyis sems can gyi don ji ltar mdzad //*

舊問：「若不¹²²觀智，云何利益眾生？」

Question: How does one benefit sentient beings with non-conceptual gnosis [(Skt. *nirvikalpajñāna*)]?

§I.13.

[TQA^A] *dris pa / bshad pa la yul 'dzin pa dang / rnam par shes pa 'dzin pa dang / dbu ma 'dzin pa gsum yod na / 'di skad du bshad pa'i gzhung gang /*

又問：說執境、執識、執中論，此三法中，今依何宗？

¹¹⁸ ZLJ^B: 想; ZLJ^A: 相.

¹¹⁹ ZLJ^B: 顯; ZLJ^A: om.

¹²⁰ ZLJ^B: 凡; ZLJ^A: 非.

¹²¹ This is obviously not a question per se, but rather an objection to which Moheyan is expected to respond.

¹²² ZLJ^B: 不; ZLJ^A: om.

Question: Given that there are three [ontological positions], one that clings to external objects, one that clings to consciousness, and one that clings to Madhyamaka, which one is the principle [(Tib. *gzhung*)] discussed in your explanations?

§II.11.

新問第十一，問：此義是般若波羅蜜者，縱令是般若波羅蜜智慧可得，論禪不相當。佛由(read 猶)自於般若波羅蜜分別作六種，共智慧¹²³各自別說。

The eleventh new question asks: [You claim that] ‘the principle [of no-thought] is *prajñāpāramitā*.’ Even if [this is the case and] wisdom as *prajñāpāramitā* can be obtained [via no-thought], it cannot be equated to Chan [because *Chan* means ‘meditation’ (*dhyāna*), not wisdom (*prajñā*)]. The Buddha, by distinguishing between the six *pāramitās* that include *prajñāpāramitā*, explains separately [various issues] including wisdom.

§I.14.

[TQA^A] *dris pa // gzhung de ltar na mdo sde las rnam pa mang por spros pa / gzhan ci'i phyir bshad //*

舊問：「義既如此，何為『諸經廣說』？」

Question: If the principle is such [i.e., no fixed position can be established], for what reason are many kinds of conceptual elaboration explained in the *sūtras*?

§II.12a

又問：眾生本來有佛性者，何以得知本來有？如外道言有我，有何差別？

Another question: [You claim that] ‘sentient beings naturally possess buddha nature.’ How do you know that they ‘naturally possess’ [it]? How is it different from the claim made by non-Buddhists that ‘there exists a [permanent] self’?

§II.12b

又問：何名為眾生？

Another question: How would you define sentient beings?

¹²³ ZLJ^A: 慧; ZLJ^B: 惠.



§II.12c

又問：何名二¹²⁴乘人？

Another question: How would you define the practitioners of the [lower] two vehicles [i.e., Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna]?

§I.15

[TQA^A] *dris pa / sangs rgyas kyis sems can gyi 'du shes ji ltar bshad //*
[Not in the ZLJ]

Question: How did the Buddha talk about sentient beings' thoughts?

¹²⁴ ZLJ^A: 二; ZLJ^B: 三.

Abbreviations

A	An answer in a text that contains a Q&A section (e.g., ZLJ or TQA).
Derge	Kangyur, Derge edition.
Derge Tengyur	Tengyur, Derge edition.
Derge Tōhoku no.	<i>Chibetto daijōkyō sōmokuroku</i> 西藏大藏經總目錄 <i>Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥbyur)</i> , edited by Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽 et al. Sendai: Tōhoku Imperial University, 1934.
IOL Tib J	Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts preserved at the British Library in London (formerly in the India Office Library (IOL)).
Mvyt	<i>Mahāvvyutpatti</i> numbering according to <i>Hon 'yaku myōgi taishū</i> 翻訳名義大集 [Mahāvvyutpatti], edited by Ryōzaburō Sakaki 榭亮三郎. Kyoto: Shingonshū Kyōto Daigaku, 1916.
om.	omits
P.	Pelliot Collection of Chinese Dunhuang Manuscripts preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
P. T.	Pelliot Collection of Tibetan Dunhuang Manuscripts preserved at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
Q	A question in a text that contains a Q&A section (e.g., ZLJ or TQA).
S.	Stein Collection of Chinese Dunhuang Manuscripts preserved at the British Library in London.
T.	<i>Taishō shinshū daijōkyō</i> 大正新脩大藏經 [Taishō <i>tripīṭaka</i>], edited by Takakusu Junjirō 高順次郎 et. al. Tokyo: Taishō issaikyō kankōkai, 1924–1935.
TQA	The Tibetan text for the ‘old questions’ and the corresponding answers (TQA ^A + TQA ^B)
TQA ^A	P.T. 823/1
TQA ^B	P.T. 827/2
Ue	The transcript of the ZLJ in <i>Zōho Tonkō Bukkyō no kenkyū</i> 增補敦煌仏教の研究 [A Study of Dunhuang Buddhism with Supplements], edited by Ueyama Daishun 上山大峻. 540–598. 1990. Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 2012.
ZLJ	<i>Dasheng dunwu zhengli jue</i> 大乘頓悟正理決 [The Judgement on Sudden Awakening Being the True Principle of Mahāyāna]
ZLJ ^A	P. 4646 + S. 8609
ZLJ ^B	S. 2672



- § Marks a textual unit consisting of at least a question and one or more answers. When a specific question or answer is mentioned, § is not used (e.g., Q 1.1, A I.10, etc.).
- @ The head mark (Tib. *yig mgo*) for the beginning of a textual unit in Tibetan.
- * reconstructed titles or terminologies

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P.T. 116/5. *dMyigs su myed pa tshul gcig pa'i gzhung* [The Treatise on Non-Objectification as the Only Method].

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