INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE THINKING: A HITHERTO UNKNOWN WORK OF MAJA JANGCHUP TSÖNDRÜ (D. 1185, RMA BYA BYANG CHUB BRTSON ’GRUS) IN TANGUT TRANSLATION

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INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE THINKING:
A HITHERTO UNKNWON WORK OF MAJA JANGCHUP TSÖNDRÜ (D. 1185, TIB. RMA BYA BYANG CHUB BRTSON 'GRUS) IN TANGUT TRANSLATION*

ZHOUYANG MA

Abstract

This paper is a study of a Tangut Buddhist text translated from a Tibetan treatise on Buddhist epistemology and logic (Skt. pramāṇa, Tib. tshad ma), titled *Sev2 jij1 o2 šijj1 džu1 sji2 lju2 tshjį2* [The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking] (Tib. *rTog ge la ’jug pa gsal bar byed pa’i rgyan). The paper identifies the author of the text, ‘Master Bodhi Diligence of Central Tibet’ (Tang. Lji2 pho1 gu2 lhjj2 Po1 ijį1 jir2 dzjjį2), with Maja Jangchup Tsöndrü (d. 1185, Tib. rMa bya Byang chub brtson ’grus). Based on an appraisal of the content of the work, this paper observes that the treatise belongs to the genre of summary (Tib. bsdus pa) in the Sangpu Neutok (Tib. gSang phu ne’u thog) scholastic tradition of Buddhist epistemology. In addition to the text’s content, this paper also discusses some features of Tangut manuscripts themselves and attempts to peer into the classroom of Tangut monks. The paper further explores the connection between Maja and the Tangut Empire, especially Maja’s ties to Mt. Mati (Chin. Mati shan 馬蹄山). It concludes that he might have been the same person as ‘Grand Master Diligence’ (Tang. Khu1 džijį1 mər2 dzįjį2), who transmitted certain teachings of the Great Seal (Skt. mahāmudrā, Tib. phyag rgya chen po) to the Tanguts.

*I would like to express my thanks to my reviewers—Prof. Carmen Meinert, Dr. Pascale Hugon, and Prof. Romain Lefebvre, and my sincere gratitude to all the people who raised questions and gave comments in my lecture on the topic on June 10th, 2021. I would also like to thank Prof. Leonard van der Kuijp, Prof. Kirill Solonin, and Prof. Thomas Doctor for reading my paper with great interest and providing valuable advice. The research leading to these results received funding from the Robert H. N. Ho Family Foundation Dissertation Fellowships in Buddhist Studies 2020 under the project title “Inner Asian Buddhist Revolution: The Rise of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tangut Xia State.”

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
1. Introduction

The fact that Tibetan Buddhism has been a phenomenon not only within Tibet but also beyond it is attested by the growth of its followers in the modern western world, as well as its success among many peoples of pre-modern Asia. In seeking to understand the dynamics that have made Tibetan Buddhism such a phenomenon, scholars' interests are often directed to the Tangut Empire (ca. 1038–1227, in Chinese sources known as Xixia 西夏), where Tibetan Buddhism made a significant early stop on its journey of transmission outside Tibet. Although Tibetan historical sources provide sporadic clues regarding the rise of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tangut Empire, the texts discovered in Karakhoto¹ (a military town on the northern border of the state) undoubtedly constitute a major corpus of materials for studying that history. Among the Karakhoto collection, the many Buddhist texts translated from Tibetan, whether in Tangut or Chinese, have allowed scholars to understand what teachings were introduced to the Tangut Empire and, in some cases, how they were transmitted and assimilated.²

The current research on these Buddhist texts that have Tibetan origins is, however, not without its blind spots. The emphasis at present is put unevenly on tantric materials,³ thus largely overlooking their non-tantric connections.¹

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¹ For a general introduction to these texts, see Shi Jinbo, Tangut Language and Manuscripts: An Introduction, trans. Hansong Li (Leiden: Brill, 2020), chap. 2.

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counterparts. Tangut texts of a doctrinal or scholastic nature of course exist, and we can obtain general ideas with respect to their contents based on the descriptions of the catalogues; yet, to date, most of these texts remain untouched. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our picture of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tangut Empire will remain partial if we do not take these doctrinal and scholastic texts into consideration. In addition to their value in terms of facilitating a more comprehensive understanding of Tibetan Buddhism as seen through the eyes of the Tanguts, some of them are also essential in assisting us in making more sense of its development in the early years of the second diffusion of Buddhism (Tib. phyi dar) in Tibet. The main reason for this is that some Tibetan works that are unavailable to us have been preserved in their relatively faithful Tangut translations. Consequently, these Tangut translations of the Tibetan originals that concern doctrinal and scholastic topics have the potential to make a particularly important contribution to the study of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy.

The recent publication of the 28th volume of the facsimiles of Karakhoto texts housed in Russia showcases a group of Tangut translations of Tibetan works on Buddhist epistemology and logic (Skt. pramāṇa, Tib. tshad ma). Among these texts, I have identified the Tangut translation of Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel [Epistemology—The Dispeller of the Mind’s Darkness] (henceforth Epistemology), the major work on
epistemology by Chapa Chökyi Senggé (1109–1169, Tib. Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge). I have also studied the Tangut translation of Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu (Tib. Rigs pa’i thigs pa), and concluded that this translation was based on the Tibetan version translated and revised by Ngok Lotsawa Loden Shérap (ca. 1059–1109, Tib. rNgog lo tsā ba bLo ldan shes rab). On the basis of these results and preliminary observations of the other texts in this collection, I have made the tentative conclusion that the Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism received by the Tanguts came mainly from the Sangpu Neutok (Tib. gSang phu ne’u thog, henceforth Sangpu) tradition.

In the present study, partly as a way to further substantiate my assumption, I shall provide a preliminary examination of one of these works, titled Sew jij o sjij dzju sji lju tshij [The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking] (Tib. *rTog ge la ’jug pa gsal bar byed pa’i rgyan), the Tibetan original of which is not available. I shall first review previous scholarship and provide descriptive scholarship and the extant fragments of the Tangut translation, after which I shall attempt to identify the author with the twelfth-century Tibetan scholar Maja Jangchup Tsöndrü (d. 1185, Tib. rMa bya Byang chub brtson’grus). In section 3, I provide a brief examination of the content of the work, and compare it with other works that had probably influenced it. This

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9 The accurate pronunciation of the combination of the two Tibetan syllables rma and bya would be ‘Mabja’. However, in strict accord with the rules of the system of phonetic transcription established by the Tibetan Himalayan Library, I use ‘Maja’ consistently in this paper.
examination is followed by a study of certain multilingual features of the manuscripts. By putting this work in the context of the transmission of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tangut Empire, section 5 discusses the significance of the work. The final section of the present paper is a transcription and translation of the beginning of this work from Tangut.

2. Identification of Cat. no. 314

2.1 Cat. no. 314 and Previous Scholarship

It was in their 1963 catalogue that Zoya I. Gorbacheva and Evgenij I. Kychanov first realised that several Tangut fragments, namely #5073, #5114, #5801, and #7905 are parts of a single work, presumably because these fragments bear the same title at either their beginning or end. Hence, they assigned them one catalogue number 314 (henceforth cat. no. 314).10 Gorbacheva and Kychanov correctly identified and recorded the Tangut title as རུ་ལོ་བོ་སྐྲོལ་མཐོང་ཐོན་གྱིས་ཡོང་བོད།, yet they translated this into Chinese inaccurately, as ‘Ornament that Verifies the Notes According to the Introduction of Examination’ (Chin. Cha ru shun ji yan zhuangyan 察入順記驗莊嚴), which does not make much sense. The four fragments were not mentioned by Nishida Tatsuo in his 1977 catalogue,11 and they were revisited only by Kychanov in his 1999 catalogue, where he gave some detailed descriptions of the four fragments.12 For some reason, Kychanov added the character ljä (雚), ‘verse’, at the end of the Tangut title in the 1963 catalogue, making it Sew² _MODAL1, dżu¹ sljä¹ tshij¹ ljä¹ (雚鰌鴂鴞鰌鰌鴞). There seem to be no grounds for this addition, however, since the character does not appear in the title of any fragment.

Hui Hong (惠宏) and Duan Yuquan (段玉泉), in their 2015 catalogue,

followed in general the description in Kychanov’s 1999 catalogue, retaining the character lja¹ (꣒) at the end, but they changed the Chinese translation of the title to ‘The Verses of the Ornament that Summarises the Teaching of the Introduction to Examination’ (Chin. Cha zhi ru fa quan she zhuang yan ji 察之入法诠摄庄严偈). This translation, despite its coherence, is flawed because Hui and Duan added, in addition to Kychanov’s modification, ‘teaching’ (Chin. fa 法), which is not in the Tangut title.

With the publication of the facsimiles of the fragments in ECHC 28, we are now obliged to return to the ground on which Gorbacheva and Kychanov stood in 1963, and confirm that the title is The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking (Tang. Sew² jij¹ o² śjij¹ dzju¹ sji² lja² tshijj² 嶧篑聴鈮聴靁鈮). ECHC 28 also contains another fragment of the work, namely #5112, which was not mentioned in any previous catalogue. Consequently, we now have five fragments in total of the work at hand, all of which are manuscripts. For the convenience of description, I rename them as F1–F5. Although they seem to be different volumes of the work, none of them is complete. They lack either a beginning or an end. Table 1 summarises their sizes, formats, and contents, based on Kychanov’s 1999 catalogue.

Kychanov noticed that F1 preserves the Sanskrit title of the work in the form of Tangut phonetic transcription (see fig. 1), yet he did not try to transcribe the title in his catalogue. My transcription and reconstruction of the title are the following:

Tja¹ rjar² kja¹ ja bja² tja¹ rjar¹ pji¹ rjar¹ (swa¹?) (?) kja¹ ja lja² ηə² kja¹ rjar¹ nja² mja¹

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13 Hui Hong 惠宏 and Duan Yuquan 段玉泉, Xixia wenxian jieti mulu 西夏文献解题目录 [A Descriptive Catalogue of Tangut Literature] (Yinchuan: Yangguang chubanshe, 2015), 297.

14 They most likely took the nominalizer śjij¹ (聴) as tsjir¹ (聴).

15 However, ECHC 28 recorded it incorrectly as #5119, presumably because the editors misread the numeral ‘2’ written on the manuscript as ‘9’.

16 At the beginning or end of each fragment, a volume number is indicated. I use ‘volume’ consistently in this paper to translate the Tangut word 卷, which is a loanword of the Chinese juan 卷.

17 Kychanov, Katalog Tangytckix byddiyckix pamyatnikov Institut Boctokovedeniya Pocciyckoy Akademii Hayk, 509.
Table 1. Description of the five fragments of the text.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inventory number</th>
<th>Volume number</th>
<th>Size and Format</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#5114 (F1)</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>21 × 64 cm</td>
<td>Beginning of the first volume. Opening verses and some prose written in a cursive style.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 characters a line in the prose part</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5112 (F2)</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>About the same size as #5114. 19 characters a line in the prose part</td>
<td>Beginning of the first volume. Clearly by a different hand from #5114.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5073 (F3)</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>19.5×593 cm</td>
<td>Beginning of the second volume.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22 characters a line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5801 (F4)</td>
<td>Two</td>
<td>19.5×51 cm</td>
<td>End of the second volume. Might be the same manuscript as #5801 because of the similar size and format.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22–23 characters a line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7905 (F5)</td>
<td>Eight</td>
<td>20×487 cm</td>
<td>Beginning of the eighth volume. This fragment is further broken into several pieces.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 characters a line</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 The contents of some of these pieces do not seem to form coherent narratives in relation to the others. It is possible, therefore, that some pieces of F5 are in fact from other volumes, rather than from volume eight.

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Even though there are two illegible characters in between,\textsuperscript{19} with the hint of the reconstructed Sanskrit title, we can now safely and accurately translate the Tangut title as \textit{The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking}. In particular, because the Sanskrit title starts with \textit{tarka}, it is more reasonable to translate the Tangut word \textit{sew}\textsuperscript{2} (𗅢), literally meaning ‘conceptual thought’, as ‘speculative thinking’.\textsuperscript{20}

Of course, the fact that the work has a Sanskrit title does not in itself warrant its being considered a translation from Sanskrit. Kychanov had already recorded correctly in his catalogue the name of the author that

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\textsuperscript{19} If we take the first character of these two as \textit{swa} (સ), then it seems we can at least decide the term for ‘to clarify’ stems from the root \textit{pra-sad}.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Sew}\textsuperscript{2} (𗅢) is normally used to translate Tibetan \textit{rtog pa}, literally meaning ‘conceptual thought’. In this case, as \textit{tarka} indicates Tibetan \textit{rtog ge}, I use ‘speculative thinking’ to translate \textit{sew}\textsuperscript{2} (𗅢). Tibetan \textit{rtog ge} can be seen as \textit{rtog pa}, plus an intensifier.

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appears at the beginnings of F3 and F5.\textsuperscript{21} The Tangut reads ‘Master Bodhi Diligence of Central Tibet’ (Tang. $Lj\tilde{i}^2$ $ph\tilde{a}^1$ $gu^2$ $lh\tilde{j}^j_1^f$ $Po^1$ $tj\tilde{j}^j_1^l$ $jir^2$ $dz\tilde{j}^j_2^i$ 麓漂謝緝巍激 Avec). Hence, it is clear that the work was composed by a Tibetan, and that the Sanskrit title is merely an artificial construction. It is likely that, when the treatise was translated, the Tangut translator translated the Tibetan title but left the Sanskrit one in phonetic transcription. Based on the Tangut and Sanskrit titles, a possible reconstruction of the Tibetan title is *$rTog$ $ge$ $la$ ‘$jug$ $pa$ $gsal$ $bar$ $byed$ $pa$’i $rgyan$. The catalogues do not discuss the identity of the author or give other bibliographic information related to the work. These are the primary issues addressed in the following sections.

Before we turn to that discussion, however, more information can be extracted from the fragments. The highest volume number of these fragments is eight, thus showing that the work consisted of at least eight volumes in its Tangut translation. Based on the lengths of the extant fragments of the second volume, we can safely deduce that this was a relatively long Tibetan treatise. Also, the fact that F1, F2, F3, and F5 were likely written by different hands bespeaks the plausibility that the Tangut translation was copied onto several different manuscripts which were used by multiple persons. This shows that the work was a rather popular one among the Tanguts, at least the ones in Karakhoto.

2.2 Authorship
Let us now examine the name of the author which appears in the authorship statement found by Kychanov. The Tangut name is composed of two parts, the first part consisting of the two characters $po^1$ $tj\tilde{j}^j_1^l$ (麴薪) which phonetically represent Sanskrit bodhi.\textsuperscript{22} The second part is the character $jir^2$ (艸), which means ‘diligence’, as in Tibetan $ts\tilde{o}ndr\tilde{u}$ (brtson ’grus). Hence, $po^1$ $tj\tilde{j}^j_1^l$ $jir^2$ (麴薪艸) reflects Tibetan jangchup $ts\tilde{o}ndr\tilde{u}$ (byang chub brtson ’grus). Despite its being a rather common religious name in Tibetan history, considering the context and the period, the first choice is to take Jangchup Tsöndrub as Maja Jangchup Tsöndrub.

This assumption, of course, requires more evidence to support it. Unfortunately, since accounts of Maja’s life are rare, finding evidence that

\textsuperscript{21} Kychanov states that the colophon also appears at the beginning of F1; however, we cannot see it there (see appendix).

\textsuperscript{22} Although ultimately a phonetic transcription of Sanskrit, the Tangut word likely derived from its Chinese antecedent, pu ti (菩提).

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can associate him with the Tanguts is a scholarly challenge. The relatively substantial source that is often quoted is the biographical sketch of him in the late fifteenth-century Deb ther sngon po [Blue Annals]. According to that text, his teachers included Chapa, Patsap Nyima Drak (1055?–1145?, Tib. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags), Khu Dödöbar (fl. late 11th to early 12th c., Tib. Khu mDo sde ’bar), and the Kashmirian Paṇḍita Jayānanda (fl. 12th c.). He was skilled in Buddhist scriptures (Tib. lung), Buddhist epistemology, and the Middle Way (Tib. dbu ma, Skt. madhyakama), and wrote commentaries on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Tib. dBU ma rtsa ba ’shig le ’ur byas pa); Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (Tib. tShig gsal); and Jayānanda’s Tarkamudgara (Tib. rTog ge tho ba). It is also because of the Blue Annals that we know he died in 1185: “the 17th year after Chapa’s death in the earth-female-ox year [1169]”. In general, Maja is viewed in Tibetan intellectual history as an important early figure of the Kadam school, who promulgated the prasaṅgika (Tib. thal ’gyur), position of consequence of the Middle Way. No mention is made of his connection with the Tanguts in the Blue Annals, and there is likewise no mention that he wrote a work bearing the title, The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking.

Three of his works are available to us. The first one, ‘Thad pa’i rgyan [Ornament of Reason], is his commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakārikā. Another one is his dBu ma rig pa’i tshogs kyi rgyan de kho na nyid snang ba’i rtsa ba [Root Verses of the Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way: Appearance of Reality]. The third one, which bears the same title as the former with only ‘root verses’ left out, is his auto-commentary on the former. None of these three works can be said to have a strong connection to the Tangut translation with which we


24 Deb sngon, 400.6–7: phywa pa sa mo glang la gshegs nas lo bcu bdun la rma bya byang brtson gshegs /.


26 See ‘Thad rgyan. For a translation of the text, see Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü, Ornament of Reason: The Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna’s ‘Root of the Middle Way,’ trans. Dharmachakra Translation Committee (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 2011).

27 See sNang ba ’i rtsa ba. For a translation of the text, see Thomas Doctor, Reason and Experience in Tibetan Buddhism: Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü and the Traditions of the Middle Way (London: Routledge, 2014).

28 See sNang ba.

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are dealing at present, because all of them concern primarily the Middle Way. The *Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking*, in contrast, is a treatise that aims at expounding Buddhist epistemology. Therefore, available Tibetan sources cannot assist us very far in determining Maja’s authorship of the work extant in Tangut translation.

Returning to the Tangut text itself, however, we find more traces that can serve this purpose. When examining F2, I observed two more lines of the colophon that are written in a smaller size at the very right of the fragment. These two lines are severely damaged due to the beginning’s having been torn off. They are barely legible in the facsimile published in ECHC 28, but are better shown on the coloured image I obtained from the Institute of Oriental Manuscripts in St. Petersburg (see fig. 2). Based on this observation, I realised that these two lines are also written on F1, immediately after the Tibetan title in small, cursive script, which is also quite illegible (see fig. 1). Both lines contain some critical bibliographic information. While the second line will be discussed in section 4 of the present paper due to its relevance to that section, the first line of F2 is transcribed and translated below:

Composed by Master Bodhi Diligence, the monk from the Great Peacock Monastery in Central Tibet who is skilled in […] the Three Vehicles.

This line is obviously also an authorship statement, yet it adds more qualifiers to the author. The key phrase here is *wor le²* (*mage*), literally meaning ‘peacock’—which is the exact meaning of the place name from which Jangchup Tsöndrü might have come: *rma bya* (maja)! The only issue that needs further elaboration in this instance is that the sentence does not say ‘Peacock Bodhi Diligence’ directly; instead, it says he is “from the Great Peacock Monastery in Central Tibet”. Thomas Doctor remarks, Maja “comes across as an unusual name or title for a person in Tibet”. According to the Tangut colophon, then, Jangchup Tsöndrü acquired the title because of his relationship to the monastery named after

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29 This is already implied by the term ‘speculative thinking’ in its title. See section 3 of the present paper for further discussion on its content.

30 My sincere gratitude to Ms. Alla Alekseevna Sizova at the IOM for helping me obtain the images of F1 and F2.

his home region, Maja. In any case, with the name ‘Bodhi Diligence’ and the qualifier ‘peacock’, the argument that the author is different from the Maja introduced above is difficult to sustain.

Figure 2. The beginning of F2. Karakhoto. #5112, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg.

2.3 Further Evidence
If the information in the colophon does not seem completely satisfactory, further evidence in support of the argument that Maja is the author exists, of course, in the Tangut text. These textual signs become highly persuasive if we believe that Maja, like many other Tibetan scholars, had intentionally designed his works with some of his idiosyncrasies. Of course, no piece of evidence from the following list alone can prove Maja’s authorship; instead, considered together, they delineate the profile of Maja.

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First of all, we notice that Maja was inclined to begin (or conclude, in Tibetan) his titles with ornament (Tib. rgyan), which is attested by all three of the works attributed to him in Tibetan, mentioned above. Implanting one’s ‘signature’ into their titles was not uncommon for Tibetan scholars. We can easily recall here that one of Maja’s Kadam successors, Chomden Rikpé Reldri (Tib. Bcom ldan Rig[s] pa’i ral gri), alias Darma Gyeltse (1227–1305, Tib. Dar ma rgyal mtsan), in most of the cases began (or concluded, in Tibetan) his titles with ornament of flower (Tib. rgyan gyi me tog). Here, the author of the Tangut translation also began (or concluded, in Tangut) his title with ‘ornament’. Granted, ornament, as part of the title, is not uncommon throughout Buddhist history; but it is not such a known quantity among the Tibetan works from that period.

Next, let us examine the opening verses of the Tangut translation preserved in F1 and F2. What we notice immediately from the verses is that every line consists of nine characters, thus indicating nine syllables. As the Tanguts normally kept the original number of syllables when translating Tibetan verses, we can deduce that the Tibetan original of The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking likely had nine syllables per line at its beginning. Interestingly, the opening verses of Maja’s Ornament of Reason, the verses in his Root Verses of the Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way, and the opening verses of his auto-commentary on the former all have nine syllables per line. Hence, the Tangut translation does not pose an inconsistent case. It is possible that Maja intentionally formatted the opening verses of his works in this way.

Beyond these considerations, we can also observe a shared ethos between the opening verses in the Tangut text and those in Maja’s Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way. Some words and expressions in the opening verses of this Tibetan treatise on the Middle Way have perfectly matching equivalents in those of the Tangut text. The table below shows the correspondence between them. The numbers following the words and expressions are those of the lines in which they are found:

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32 English, an SVO language, would have the qualified head noun at the beginning of a clause. Contrarily, Tibetan, an SOV language, would have the head noun at the end of a clause. Tangut, having the same typology as Tibetan does, follows the same SOV syntax.

*BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tibetan in <em>The Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way</em></th>
<th>Tangut in <em>The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking</em></th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>zab cing rgya che (3)</td>
<td>嬖竃DebugEnabled (1)</td>
<td>deep and broad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zhabs la spyi bos ’dud (8)</td>
<td>嬖竃DebugEnabled (12)</td>
<td>to bow down one’s head to the feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rtse cig yid kyis (11)</td>
<td>嬖竃DebugEnabled (6)</td>
<td>with a focused mind(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skye bo phal cher (14)</td>
<td>嬖竃DebugEnabled (21)</td>
<td>living beings, usually</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chags sdang rmong pa (14)</td>
<td>嬖竃DebugEnabled (15)</td>
<td>desire, anger, ignorance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Related words and expressions in the Tangut and Tibetan texts. The numbers in brackets indicate the lines in which they are found.

The most striking fact is that line 17 in the Tangut text reflects exactly what is found in line 15 in the Tibetan text. In the following passage, I shall first list the Tangut line and translate it. I shall then provide the Tibetan line and its translation:

[ Living beings ] cannot distinguish between fine and faulty explanations.

/ legs bshad nyes bshad rnam par mi phyed pas / (15)

[Because living beings] do not distinguish between fine and faulty explanations […]

The two lines have not only almost identical meanings, but also share a solid philological bond. While *tshjìjì* (蹤) has the same meaning as *bshad*, legs and *nyes* are mirrored in *śjwī2* (蹤) and *dżjar2* (蹤). Therefore, *śjwī2* tshjìjì dżjar2 tshjìjì (蹤踪踪踪踪) establishes a ‘morpheme-to-

\(^{33}\) While *rtse cig* means ‘focused’, it would literally mean ‘pure’; yet, it is possible that the Tangut translator rendered the phrase rather freely. Also, *phji* (蹤) matches well with *yid*, as does the instrumental particle *ŋwu* (蹤) with *kyis.*

*BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”*
morpheme’ translation of legs bshad nyes bshad. Further, mə jij (骸膝) is a Tangut equivalent of the Tibetan rnam pa; and, phie (数), as a verb, properly translates phyed. The only difference between the two lines is that the Tangut line ends with a modal verb njwi (衆), ‘can’, which is not manifested in the Tibetan line. Even so, we may deduce that the original Tibetan line on which the Tangut translation was based was almost identical to the line from Maja’s Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way.

It should be noted, however, that this line is not exclusive to Maja. It also appears in the concluding verses of Ngok Lotsawa’s commentary on difficult points in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (Tib. Tshad ma rnam nges), yet the contexts are slightly different. Nevertheless, the close ties between Maja’s work and the Tangut translation in terms of word- and phrase-usage in their opening verses show that their structures and contents are related as well. Both texts begin by paying homage to the Buddha, then to the Indian masters. In The Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way, the homage is directed to Nāgārjuna; in the Tangut text, the homage is paid, as expected, to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. In particular, they discuss in their final sections why living beings cannot realise the truth, and what should be done to solve this problem. Readers can refer to appendix 1 of the present paper for a translation of the opening verses of the Tangut text, and compare it with the Tibetan.

Finally, one more place in the opening verses of The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking requires our special attention. In lines 9–12, the author pays homage to his lama (Tib. bla ma), literally high master. These lines read:

I bow down my head reverentially,

to the lotus feet of the high master, the venerable one, the lion,

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34 My thanks to Dr. Pascale Hugon for pointing this out to me.
35 dKa’ gnas, 144a3: / legs bshad nyes bshad rnam par mi phyed pa / / gzu lums rnams kyi da lta ’di na ’jig / (“The presumptuous ones who cannot distinguish between fine and faulty explanations now crumble here in this work”).
36 See the previous note. It is interesting to notice here that Maja used this line to express the necessity of composing his work, while Ngok Lotsawa wrote this line, together with the following one, to show the consequence of having composed his work.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
who clarifies the mode of being of what is knowable, the intention of the sage, with the correct agent of beholding—the two eyes of knowledge!  

What draws our attention at once is the expression ‘lion’ (Tang. ka² tšij² 麋母). Recall that one of Maja’s primary teachers was Chapa, whose religious name, Chökyi Senggé, means ‘the lion of religion’. Although Chapa is famous for his thoughts on the Middle Way, his writings on Buddhist epistemology were also seminal in the development of the field of Tibetan intellectual history. Here, the expression, ‘the two eyes of knowledge’ is undoubtedly describing quality of the ‘lion’ being a master in Buddhist epistemology, since the ‘two eyes’ can metaphorically mean the two means of knowledge—namely, direct perception (Skt. pratyakṣa, Tib. mgon sum) and inference (Skt. anumāna, Tib. rjes dpag). Interestingly, the rhetoric and wording here resemble, albeit in a loose way, one verse in Maja’s Ornament of Reason in which he describes the qualities of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Note the bifurcated metaphor and words such as ‘clarify’ in the verse:

The deep and profound vajra-like words of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā clarify exactly the basis, path, and result of the Middle Way, which destroys all imagined mountains of the two extremes while not abiding in either eternalism or nihilism, or in existence or pacification.

Considering the weight of the aforementioned evidence, whether direct or indirect, we could conclude with confidence that The Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way is a Tangut translation of a hitherto unknown work of Maja from the twelfth century. This argument can be substantiated further by the next section of the present paper because, when examining the content of the work, it is apparent that some of Maja’s ideas originated in the works of his teachers.

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37 Appendix 1: 麋母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母母毋
3. A Brief Examination of the Content of the Work

3.1 Overview

The available fragments of *The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking* allow us to examine parts of its contents in volumes one, two, and eight. In volume one (F1 and F2), having finished his opening verses, Maja divides his work into two parts: the cognitive object (Tang. *mji2* 體, Tib. *yul*), and the object-bearer (Tang. *mji2* lhe2 體, Tib. *yul can* or cognition (Tang. *mji2* 態, Tib. *shes pa*). He then further compartmentalises the cognitive object as three types—namely, the real particular (Tang. *wo2* jij2 tsji2rjar1 娃鼎窪形, Tib. *don rang [gi] mtshan nyid*), the concept (Tang. *wo2* gu2 體, Tib. *don spyi*), and the cognitive object of non-conceptual erroneous cognition (Tang. *sew2* mji2 hla1 jij2 mji2 體, Tib. *rtog med ’khrul pa’i yul*). Following the outline is his very brief discussion of each of the three types. He claims, “in terms of the different ways the cognition engages [the cognitive object], there are three types of the object” (Tang. *sjij2* jij1 o2 sjij1 tjj2 do2 ya1 hju1, mji2 sq1 ms2 we2 ywu2 體, 體, 體). These are the apprehended object (Tang. *zow2* mji2 體, Tib. *gzung yul*), the intentional object (Tang. *zij2* mji2 彰, Tib. *zhen yul*), and the engaged object (Tang. *o2* mji2 彰, Tib. *’jug yul*). Maja starts his analysis of the apprehended object by stating that it includes “any object that appears to the cognition” (Tang. *lj1* kji1 *sjij2* ya1 sjaj1 jij1 mji2 ywu2 體, 體, 體). He further says that only the object of non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition, in this case, is conventionally true, whereas the other two objects—of conceptual and of non-conceptual erroneous cognitions—are conventionally false. Having said that, he presents a variety of interesting opinions on this issue held by “some holders of philosophical systems” (Tang. *sjij1* hju2 jij1 mji2rjar2 *shigw* 輽, 輽, 輽). However, our text unfortunately ends there, preventing us thereby from probing further into his thoughts in this volume. Appendix 1 of the present paper is a translation of the part available to us in volume one.

The second volume starts with a discussion (F3) of the workings of definition (Tib. *mtshan nyid*). The text begins with the topic, “Second, the definition of the definiendum” (Tang. *nj2* tsew2, nur1 lew1 *jij1* tsji2rjar1 體, 彰, 彰). The topic

*BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”*
following it on the same level is “Third, the definition of the definitional instance” (Tang. *sọ¹ tsew² tsijsraj² mji¹ jii¹ tsijsraj² rjar¹ 散喻，壟説�壟説，Tib. *gsum pa mtshan gzhi¹i mtshan nyid). Hence, we know the topic preceding these two is likely “First, the definition of the definiens” (Tib. *dang po mtshan nyid kyi mtshan nyid). These three elements, which form the basis of definition, are followed by further analysis of definition. The stock example of the cow (Tang. *gur¹ 脇，Tib. *ba lang) defined by the definiens ‘hump’ (Tang. *phow² 矮，Tib. *nog) and ‘dewlap’ (Tang. *ljii² thiji¹ 龍鰕，Tib. *lkog shal) with the definitional instance, ‘the white mottled cow’ (Tang. *zewr¹ *gur¹ 脇侞，Tib. *dkar zal), is often used. The detailed topical outline (Tib. *sa bcad) imbedded in this portion of the text allows us to view, in part, the structure of the second volume. Based on the logical connections of these topics, I have reorganised all of the upper-level topics shown in F3 with the multi-level list below. The beginning several topics are reconstructed in square brackets without Tangut. Then, each topic is presented with the English translation of the Tangut original, which is transcribed in round brackets. The position of the text is cited in the following form: ‘frame number. line number’; therefore, ‘1.4’ would mean the fourth line of the first frame of the fragment:

1. [The way what is knowable is included in the three properties.]
2. [Bringing to conclusion the nature of the three properties, which include what is knowable.]
   2.1. [Identifying the nature of the three properties.]

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40 It would seem strange at first glance that the volume does not begin with the first topic. However, this does not contradict the ‘Tanguts’ practice of translation elsewhere. I have pointed out that the way of deciding the length of a volume for the Tangut translation of Chapa’s Epistemology is not qualitative but quantitative. This means that the translator would arbitrarily conclude a volume based on a certain number of Tibetan words translated, regardless of whether the end of a volume forms a logical conclusion. See Ma, “Xixia yi Zhengli chu yi zhi an chu tan,” 143.


42 The reconstruction is based on Tsangnakpa’s commentary, which assists us greatly in this case. See section 3.3.

43 The ‘three properties’ (Tang. *sọ¹ tsijir¹ 散喻，Tib. *chos gsum) here obviously refer to the definiens, the definiendum, and the definitional instance. The term should not be confused with the ‘three properties’ used by Chapa to define the definiens of the definiens.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
2.1.1. [The definition of each of the three properties.]

2.1.1.1. [The definition of the definiens.]

2.1.1.2. Determining the definition of the definiendum (Tang. nur² lew¹ jij¹ tsjir² rjar¹ thju¹ thju¹ phji¹ 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 1.4).

2.1.1.3. The definition of the definitional instance (Tang. tsjir² miit¹ jij¹ tsjir² rjar¹ 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 2.14).

2.1.2. Because the three properties are mutually dependent, the analysis is threefold (Tang. so¹ tsjir¹ jij¹ gu² nyu² jiw¹, tshji² kij¹ jij¹ so¹ nyu² 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 3.5).

2.1.2.1. Identifying the categorical exclusion property (Tang. jij¹ lhjwo¹ mjor² lju² 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 3.7).

2.1.2.2. How those are connected (Tang. thja¹ nyewr² thji² sjø² bej¹ wæ¹ jij¹ tjìj² 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 3.17).

2.1.2.3. The means of knowledge that determines the condition of connection (Tang. bej¹ jiw¹ thju¹ thju¹ thju¹ zjï¹ lij¹ lji¹ nur¹ śjij¹ 聲煆聲煆聲煆聲煆, 3.24).

2.1.3. Having determined their connections with definition, the way each one is indicated (Tang. tsjir² rjar¹ rjar² bej¹ wæ¹ djæ² thju¹ thju¹ zjìj¹, lji¹ lji¹ nur¹ śjij¹ 聲煆聲煆聲煆聲煆, 4.17).

2.1.3.1. The indication that involves the categorical exclusion property (Tang. jij¹ lhjwo¹ nyu² nur² 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 4.19).

2.1.3.2. The indication that does not involve other exclusion properties (Tang. dzjìj² lhjwo¹ ngé² nur¹ 聲煆聲煆聲煆, 4.23).

\[\text{\textsuperscript{44} jij¹ gu² (聲煆), Tib. *phan tshun.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{45} jij¹ lhjwo¹ (聲煆), Tib. *rang ldog.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{46} bej¹ wæ¹ (聲煆), Tib. *'brel ba.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{47} bej¹ (聲煆) em.: (聲) F3.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{48} nur¹ śjij¹ (聲煆), Tib. *mtshon pa.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{49} dzjìj² lhjwo¹ (聲煆), Tib. *gzhan ldog.}\]
2.1.3.3. Rejecting objections with regard to that (Tang. thja¹ ya² tʃhi² dʒi⁰ ( gamle), 5.12).

2.2. The object established by that [=the set of the three properties] (Tang. thja¹ŋwu² dja² sji³ jii³ wo¹ (giene), 9.17).

2.3. While establishing it like that, eliminating the confusion of the ignorant persons whose intellect does not go into it (Tang. thja¹ sju² dja² sji³ jii³ kha¹, thja¹ ya² phji³ mji² tshew² we¹ mji²ŋew² jii³ lh² ? (giene), 10.12).

3. The way of positing all the phenomena, the identity and the exclusion property, as so and not so by means of that so-examined set of three properties (Tang. wji² kji¹ kio¹ jii³ tsji² so¹ ma² thja¹ŋwu² də² tsji² lji² lhjwo¹ tsji²ŋow² thja¹ lji¹ thja¹ njg² thu¹ phji³ sji³ tji³ (giene), 14.7).

3.1. Identifying the phenomena that depend on the identity and the exclusion property, which are to be posited (Tang. thu¹ lew² də² tsji² lji² lhjwo¹ ya² gji² tsji² mjor² lju² (giene), 14.10).

3.2. The definiens and what is not the definiens of those being so and not so (Tang. thja¹ŋew² thja¹ lji¹ thja¹ njg² jii³ tsji² rjar¹ lji¹ tsji² rjar¹ njg² (giene), 14.10).

3.3. The way that indicates so and not so (Tang. thja¹ŋwu² thja¹ lji¹ thja¹ njg² nur² sji² tji² (giene).

3.4. Rejecting objections with regard to that (Tang. thja¹ ya² tʃhi² dʒi⁰ (giene).

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50 thu¹ phji³ ( произведен), Tib. *rnam 'jog.
51 də² tsji² (gaben), which literally means ‘the nature of a thing’. Based on Tsangnakpa’s commentary, it is likely the translation of ngo bo here.
52 tsji² rjar¹ njg² (شحن 표시), Tib. *mtshan nyid ma yin pa? This expression is a bit strange, and is absent from the corresponding topic in Tsangnakpa’s commentary. Due to the missing content of this part, we can only surmise that this term means the definiens for positing something as not another thing.
53 Since the fragment is torn off at the beginning of topic 3.1, we do not have access to the positions of the following three topics in the text.

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Although we are not privy to the content of the middle part of the second volume, which is missing, we know that the end of the volume (F4) is a discussion of direct perception (Tang. *majrjom* ju2 Investor, Tib. *mgon sum*). Based on the general structure of a Sangpu epistemological work (see 3.3), we can deduce that the missing part likely addresses the definition of knowledge as accepted by Maja, which would be of great interest. However, this part remains a mystery for the time being.

It is difficult to form a coherent understanding of volume eight, due to the highly fragmentary status of the manuscript of that volume (F5); however, it is clear that volume eight elaborates mainly on the different ways of formulating inference for others, and the reasons for doing so. Several quotations contained in this volume will be discussed in the following section of the present paper.

### 3.2. Citations and Quotations

Making sense of the citations and quotations in a text is critical for understanding the author’s intellectual milieu, yet I have not been able to identify many such citations and quotations in my preliminary examination of the fragments of *The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking*. There is no obvious sign of citing the viewpoints of Indian or Tibetan masters. This disinterest is in sharp contrast to another Tibetan treatise on Buddhist epistemology translated into Tangut, cat. no. 231, in which a number of Tibetan scholars from Sangpu Monastery are cited.\(^{54}\) I have, however, been able to identify four places where passages from canonical works are quoted directly. I shall discuss these passages briefly, below.

The first one, a verse, appears at the very beginning of the work in F1 and F2. Since a translation is given in appendix 1 of the present paper, I shall not repeat it here. Maja does not cite the source of the verse, the substance of which underscores the importance of reasoning, comparing it to grinding gold with fire. This is a fairly well-known verse in canonical texts, and somehow ‘floats’ in a variety of works. It can be found, for example, in Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattvasamgraha*,\(^ {55}\) which itself is a milestone in Buddhist epistemology.

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54 Ma, “The *Nyāyabindu* in Tangut Translation,” 790.
55 For a detailed discussion of the quote, see appendix 1.
The second place is in F5, where two statements from the first chapter of Dharmakirti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya are quoted. The Tangut passage reads:

The text also says, ‘because, by means of teaching the cognitive object, one is made to remember the relation between the object-bearer [and the object], and ‘because, by means of teaching the reason, [‘non-existent’], one establishes the convention for an ignorant person’.

The first statement matches with:

\[ \text{yul bstan pas zhus pa’i yul can gyi ’brel pa dran pa’i phyir te} \]

The second statement matches with:

\[ \text{[med do zhes] rgyu mtshan nye bar bstan pas rmongs pa la tha snyad sgrub par byed de} \]

The only difference here is that the niow (鈑), ‘because’, at the end of the Tangut translation of the second statement is not contained in the Tibetan original. These two statements appear at the beginning of the Pramāṇaviniścaya, where Dharmakirti argues for the validity of inference for cognitive objects that do not exist. Maja here quotes the statements to discuss the relationship between a cognitive object and the convention. An observation here is that the Pramāṇaviniścaya is cited as jwir (笈, Tib. *gzhung), ‘text’.

The third passage, which is a single direct quotation, is found also in F5. The text quotes the same source, the first chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya. The Tangut text reads:

\[ \text{tannimittopadarśanenānupalabhernāstīti vyavahāraḥ sādhyate mūḍhaṁ prati} \] (Pvin, 3). The Sanskrit text confirms the reading of the Tibetan text.

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56 F5, 5.10–12.
58 Vetter, Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, 34.
59 Cf. the Sanskrit text: tannimittopadarśanenānupalabhernāstīti vyavahāraḥ sādhyate mūḍham prati (Pvin, 3). The Sanskrit text confirms the reading of the Tibetan text.
Like the sensation of things such as desire, when the self is formulated as the cognitive object, the comprehended, the comprehending, and the result of comprehension abide in it. This should be expressed for all cases. Because those are the essence of experience, it is suitable that they exist as the experiences themselves. Therefore, the existence of the suitability itself is claimed to be the means of knowledge, the self the comprehended, the reflexive awareness the result.

These lines match with verses 56–57 in the first chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*:

```
/dper na ’dod chags sogs tshor bzhin /
der bdag yul du bzhaṅ pa na /
gzial bya ’jal byed ’bras gnas pa /
di ni kun la sbyar bar bya / (I.56)
/de la’ang nyams myongs bdag nyid phyir /
/de dag rang bdag myong bar rang /
de’i phyir rung nyid de tshad bdag /
gzial bya rang rig ’bras bu yin / (I.57)
```

Both verses are conveyed by Dharmakīrti to explain the function of reflexive awareness (Tib. *rang rig*, Tang. *ji'[tśi] Tib. *ji skad*), taking the awareness itself as the cognitive object. Maja cites the verses to elaborate on the same concept, but he does not cite *jwi[r]* (叕), meaning ‘text’, this time; instead, he merely writes, *thja*[d] (叕, Tib. *’dod*), literally meaning ‘it says’. Several places in the Tangut translation are slightly different from the Tibetan text in the canonical version. For example, the finite verb of verse 57 reads *yin*, ‘to be’. The Tangut translation, however, has *gi]* (叕, Tib. *’dod*), literally meaning ‘to claim’. Also, in the first line of this verse, while the Tibetan text starts with *de la’ang*, meaning ‘further, in that connection’, the Tangut text has in the same place *thja*[yewr] (叕敟,
If we believe that the ‘morpheme–morpheme’ principle of translation was strictly enforced, then Maja could have used a source different from the canonical version of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* which we have today, or he could have used his ‘creative memory’ for the verse.

Finally, there is yet another direct quotation in F5, quoting three lines from a verse. The Tangut text reads:

The *sūtra* says, ‘The external object is not to be grasped. A mind disturbed by predispositions appears to be the object’.

Although these lines reflect a famous ‘floating verse’ that is inserted across many works, since Maja clearly cites ‘*sūtra*’ (Tang. *lwar*², Tib. *mdo*) here, they are most likely from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, which has in its last chapter of verses:

/ phyi rol gyi ni don med do // bag chags kyis ni dkrugs pa’i sans // don du snang ba shin tu ’byung /

While the Yogācāra position indicated by these lines is obvious, the context in which Maja cites it is not altogether clear because of the limited information given on the small piece of fragment. The passage immediately before the quotation points to the fact that “separate identities of subject and object do not exist”.

### 3.3 Significance of the Work in Tibetan Intellectual History

I have mentioned in the introduction of this paper that the Tanguts likely practiced a Tibetan Buddhist scholastic tradition that stemmed from Sangpu Monastery. The discovery of Maja’s *Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking* can apparently further substantiate this idea. Given that Maja was a student of Chapa, one would already be inclined to assume that the work is in line with Chapa’s *Epistemology*. This is indeed so; and it can be observed from two aspects—namely, the structure and the content.

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63 Cf. the Sanskrit text for this verse, *Prin*, 42: *tatrāpyanubhāvatvāt te yogyāḥ svāmasamvadi | iti sā yogyata mānāmatā meyāḥ phalaṃ svavit ||*. This text aligns the canonical version more closely with *tatra api* for ‘de’ang’, and without an *iṣ* verb for ‘*dod*’.

64 F5, 15.2–3.

65 *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Derge Tōhoku no. 107), in *bKa’ ‟gyur* 49, 405.

66 F5, 15.1–2: 蘇撫説薩迦娘禮娘.

*BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”*
The beginning of Maja’s first volume, a typical presentation of the typology of awareness, obviously mirrors the narratives at the beginning of Chapa’s work. The beginning of the second volume echoes the beginning of the second chapter of Epistemology, where Chapa discusses “how the definiendum is indicated by the definiens” (Tib. mtshan nyid kyis mtshon bya mtshon pa’i tshul, Outline, 211). The end of the second volume may be in line with Chapa’s discussion of direct perception in his third chapter. Much of the content in the eighth volume can be matched with parts of the fourth and fifth chapters of Chapa’s treatise. Chapa and Maja’s structures reflect the typical outline of a Sangpu epistemological ‘summary’, the genre that aims at elucidating the systematic knowledge in this field. In this regard, Maja’s work is, of course, similar to many other Sangpu epistemological summaries, including the Tshad ma de kho na nyid bsdus pa [Summary of the Essential Nature of Epistemology], whose author has only recently been identified with Jépa Zhönnu Jangchup (ca. 1150–1210, Tib. ’Jad pa gZhon nu byang chub), another master belonging to the Sangpu intellectual tradition.

In the first volume of Maja’s treatise, traces of Chapa’s influence on Maja’s thoughts on epistemology are clearly reflected as well. For example, Chapa’s idea of whether a certain kind of apprehended object is true or false is clearly inherited by Maja. Also, Maja’s claim that certain cognitive objects involve correct conventional truth, whereas others involve mistaken conventional truth, is also stated clearly by Jépa in his work. These are presented in detail in appendix 1 of the present paper. Lastly, Maja’s familiarity with Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya, as shown in section 3.2, is a reflection of the general interest in the texts of Sangpu masters.

67 For a translation of the first chapter of Chapa’s work, see Hugon and Stoltz, The Roar of a Tibetan Lion, chap. 2.
69 This part in Chapa’s Epistemology is discussed in Hugon, “The Origin of the Theory of Definition and Its Place in Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s Philosophical System.”
71 Sangpu masters’ general interest in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya is an important feature of the later phase of the Pre-Classical Period of Buddhist epistemology in Tibet. See BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
Perhaps the most striking fact about the connection between Maja’s treatise and the Sangpu epistemological tradition is that Maja’s narratives on the theory of definition match closely those in the commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* composed by Tsangnakpa Tsöndrü Senggé (d. after 1185, Tib. gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge). Tsangnakpa was also a student of Chapa, and his commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* was one of the first post-Chapa works on epistemology (see fig. 3). At the beginning of his commentary, having discussed the statement of purpose (Tib. dgos ’brel) in Dharmakīrti’s composition, he elaborates on the definition of knowledge with an extensive presentation of the theory of definition in general. Here, he compartmentalises his presentation into three topics:

Further, it will be ascertained with three topics: (1) the way what is knowable entails the three properties; (2) bringing to conclusion the nature of the three properties, which are entailed; (3) the way the three properties posit what is knowable.73

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72 For an introduction to Tsangnakpa and his commentary, see van der Kuijp, *An Introduction to Gtsang-nag-pa’s ‘Tshad-ma-rnam-par nges-pa’i ti-ka legs-bshad bsdu-s-pa’.*

73 Ṭi ka, 7a4–5: de yang shes bya la chos gsum gyis khyab pa’i tshul dang / khyab byed chos gsum gyi rang bzhin gan la dbab pa dang / chos gsum gyis shes bya rnam par ’jog pa’i tshul gsum gyis nges par bya ba.
In particular, the third topic is reframed in its section with the following phrase: “The way of positing the identity and the exclusion property, those which are knowable, as so and not so by means of the three properties.” Therefore, it would match almost entirely with the Tibetan original of topic 3 of the corresponding part in Maja’s treatise (see section 3.1). Although we do not know the exact title of topic 2 in Maja’s work, its content and all the lower-level topics are closely in line with those of the second topic in Tsangnakpa’s commentary. Moreover, the first three topics under topic 3 of Maja’s text also serve quite well as parallels to the three lower-level topics of Tsangnakpa’s third topic. Only topic 3.4, “rejecting objections”, is missing from Tsangnakpa’s work; but that omission is, of course, understandable, since the topic aims only at getting rid of potential challenges.

The connections between the two texts are not limited to the level of structure. While entirely identical sentences are few, they are closely related in the way they develop their arguments. An immediate example is the discussion of identity (Tang. *da^rti^2 bsam mi’i, Tib. *ngo bo) at the beginning of their third topic. Maja’s text reads as follows:

‘Identity’ here is not stated as that which is casually efficient, because the unreal is also posited by means of a single identity in particular for the representation of a double moon and the concept. It is not established self-sufficiently, either, because its representation is also posited as nominally existent. It is not the case that the identity is stated as the particular and the exclusion property is stated as the universal, either, because there is no identity that does not exist within the exclusion property.

Compare the corresponding passage in Tsangnakpa’s commentary:

'dir ngo bo\'am rdzas zhes bya ba dngos po nyid ni ma yin te l spyi dang zla gnyis la yang grags pas so l rang dbang du grub pa\'ang ma yin te btags yod

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74 Ti ka, 15a5: chos gsum gyis shes bya rnams ngo bo dang ldog pa de dang de ma yin du rnam par jog pa\'i tshul.

75 See Ti ka, 15a5: ngo bo dang ldog pa\'i don dang l de dang de ma yin gyi mtshan nyid dang l des de dag de dang de ma yin du mtshan pa\'i tshul gsum l.

76 It seems that we need to supply these two characters to make the sentence grammatically complete. It is likely that the scribe forgot to include them.

77 F3, 14.10-14.
la’ang rdzas cig dang tha dad ’jog pas so / phyi rol pa’i lhar chos can dang chos la rdzas dang ldog par brjod pa’ang ma yin te / ldog pa las ma gtags pa’i rdzas nyid myed pa’i phyir ro l. 78

Here, ‘identity’ or ‘substance’ is not reality, because it is also heard in the concept and the double moon. It is not established self-sufficiently either, because the same and different substances are also posited as nominally existent. It is not the case that, like the externalists, the substance and exclusion property are stated as the property-bearer and the property either, because there is no substance that excludes the exclusion property.

In addition to the strong resonance between the contents of the two texts, some philological bonds are also worth noting. The Tangut construction njəŋwuŋ […] niowlj (פשר […] 낑)item), meaning ‘…is not…, because of…,’ is well reflected in Tsangnakpa’s commentary as ma yin te […] pas so or phyir ro. Interestingly, the Tibetan particle at the beginning ’dir (‘here’) is faithfully indicated by thju2 (縦) in Maja’s text. Some terms, though different, are synonyms. For example, being ‘casually efficient’ (Tang. gjijl yie2 wji1  lớ�行, Tib. don byed) and being ‘real’ (Tib. dngos po) are not substantially different in Buddhist epistemology.

The intellectual connection between Maja and Tsangnakpa is partly an expected one, since both of them were among the ‘Eight Great Lions’79 of Chapa. However, the connection is somehow also a curious one, because many of their narratives—the passage discussed above, for example—are not found, to my knowledge, in Chapa’s epistemological texts.80 So, did one author copy from the other? Or did both of them reuse a text composed by a third author? These questions undoubtedly require further research to answer.

Finally, non-Sangpu overtones are also heard from Maja’s text. At the opening of his treatise, Maja claims:

rippling, 麦鍰鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃鴃, 麦鍰鴃.

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78 Ti ka, 15a5–6.
79 The eight major students of Chapa, because they all inherited the name ‘Senggé’ (i.e. ‘lion’) from Chapa, are called the ‘Eight Great Lions’. For the position of the ‘Eight Great Lions’ in Tibetan epistemological history, see Hugon and Stoltz, The Roar of a Tibetan Lion, 51–52.
80 Here, I mean the two texts available to us—namely, Chapa’s Epistemology, and his commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya.
For that reason, in order to easily make known the nature of the means of knowledge that is introduced through the force of one’s own essence, I composed this [work].

This sentence, especially its middle part, echoes exactly the very first two lines of Jayānanda’s Tarkamudgara:

/yul dngos stobs kyis zhugs pa yi // tshad mas de nyid rtogs so zhes /

By means of the means of knowledge that is introduced through the force of the real object, the reality is realised.

The expression ‘the means of knowledge that is introduced through the force of one’s own essence’ (Tang. ȶiȶInjectorie ȶiy ȶjem ȶiｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙｙ)yul dngos stobs kyis zhugs pa yi tshad ma. The only difference is that it normally translates ngo bo (‘essence’) instead of dngos po (‘real thing’); however, that discrepancy is minor, since the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. As mentioned in section 2.2, Maja was also a student of Jayānanda, and, most intriguingly, he is reported to have written a commentary on Jayānanda’s Tarkamudgara. We should not forget that Maja’s work is titled The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking, thus containing the exact phrase, speculative thinking (Skt. tarka). While Maja’s work is by no means that commentary (i.e., because it is obviously a summary), the influence of Jayānanda on Maja’s thoughts on epistemology seems present.

But this resonance may also lead us to an extraordinarily curious issue in intellectual history. While Jayānanda cites ‘the means of knowledge that is introduced through the force of the real object’ (Tib. yul dngos stobs kyis zhugs pa yi tshad ma) as a viewpoint held by some followers of Dharmakīrti, he does not hold the statement as valid since it contradicts the position of the Middle Way that the means of knowledge, which functions on the conventional level, cannot warrant something ultimately ‘real.’ Maja also regards the statement as problematic in his works of the Middle Way. Therefore, why would he compose the treatise ‘in order to

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81 Tarka, 1876.
82 My thanks to Prof. Thomas Doctor for pointing this out to me.
84 See The Yakherds, Knowing Illusion: Bringing a Tibetan Debate into Contemporary Discourse, Volume 1: A Philosophical History of the Debate (New York: Oxford University
easily make known the nature of the means of knowledge that is 
introduced through the force of one’s own essence”? A tentative answer 
might be that he authored the treatise quite early in his life when he was 
still a faithful follower of Chapa. Or could he have written the work in the 
Tangut Empire as an entry-level textbook for the Tanguts who might not 
be prepared for sophisticated philosophical inquiries? It is also possible 
that Maja might have regarded his epistemological work as representing a 
different intellectual tradition that was not detrimental to his position of 
the Middle Way. Although our current evidence is not sufficient for 
providing a satisfactory answer, the issue undoubtedly remains an 
interesting one for further examination.

In short, the Tangut translation of Maja’s *Ornament that Clarifies the 
Introduction to Speculative Thinking* provides us with another important 
text that falls into the Sangpu epistemological tradition. In particular, the 
strong intellectual bonds between Maja and Tsangnakpa is of great interest, 
and traces of Jayānanda’s influence on Maja are also attested, albeit in a 
curious way. These all shed new light on the study of the post-Chapa 
development of Buddhist epistemology in Tibet.

4. Certain Multilingual Features of F1 and F2

In addition to the content of the Tangut text, the presentation of the 
fragments themselves is also significant in helping us make sense of the 
context in which these manuscripts were copied and used. Especially in 
F1 and F2, the extensive annotations alongside the body text show that 
these manuscripts were not only copied, but also used for scholastic 
training. For example, in F1, next to the word *mjuṅ njiṅ* in line 9 
of the opening verses, the annotation *njwiṅ mjijr* is used. While the 
former is a phonetic transcription of the Sanskrit *muni*, the latter is a 
translation, meaning ‘sage’. Many of these glosses suggest that the readers 
of these manuscripts were making efforts to understand the meaning of 
the text. While it is possible that the annotations were made by the scribes, 
they were most likely traces of the readers who attended a reading or

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learning session with the teacher giving explanation on things such as the meaning of muni described above.

A remarkable phenomenon is the multilingual features of F1 and F2. Specifically speaking, Chinese numerals ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘three’, ‘four’, ‘five’ (etc.) are ubiquitous alongside the body text in both F1 and F2. F1, particularly, has, in addition to Chinese numerals, Tibetan letters ka, kha, ga, nga, ca (etc.) in many places as well. The meaning of these numerals and letters remains largely unclear. In F2, the Chinese numerals are generally written not in the normal sequence of one–two–three, but three–two–one. It is difficult to discern the exact internal logic of these signs at this time, without other clues.

In one place, however, it is clear: the Sanskrit and Tangut titles in F1. For the phonetic transcription of every Sanskrit word, a Chinese numeral is assigned. For example, ‘one’ marks tja’ rja’ rja’ (ওঃ রঃ রঃ), the phonetic transcription of tarka; ‘two’ marks ja bja’ tja’ rja’ (দ্বঃ পঃ ওঃ রঃ), the phonetic transcription of avatāra; and so on. Accordingly, for every Tangut word in the Tangut title, the Chinese numeral is also assigned, which means sew’ jij’ (স্বঃ জিজঃ), meaning ‘to speculative thinking,’ is marked by ‘one’; o’ śjij’ (ওঃ জিজঃ), meaning ‘introduction,’ is marked by ‘two’; and so on. Hence, the words marked by the same Chinese numeral have the same meaning, but are from different languages. Let us now try to make sense of this method of annotation. The reader of this manuscript was no doubt a Tangut, yet the Tangut also had knowledge of Chinese and Tibetan scripts. When using this text, our reader wanted to know the Sanskrit equivalents of the Tangut Buddhist terms. For this reason, Chinese numerals were used as markers to establish equivalences between the two languages.

At the same time, this does not seem to be all the requirements of our reader’s reading or learning session of this text. Would this reader not also want to know the Tibetan equivalents of these terms, since the text was originally composed in Tibetan? It is possible our reader also possessed the Tibetan version of the text, and both texts were read jointly in the session. Likewise, the Chinese numerals were also marked on the Tibetan text, to which we now have no access. This would then explain the randomness of the Chinese numerals and the Tibetan letters in F1. The apparent randomness would disappear, however, if we found the same terms in a Tibetan text of the work also marked by the same markers in the Tangut manuscripts.

_BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”_
In any case, the use of Chinese and Tibetan scripts to mark the manuscript and the intention to figure out the Sanskrit equivalents of Tangut Buddhist terms reveal that the scholastic training some Tanguts received underscored the multilingual nature of Buddhism. Readers were required to cultivate the awareness that Buddhist texts were written in and translated into different languages. In a loose sense, this training is not so very different from that which we receive today in programmes of Buddhist studies.

5. Reconstructing Maja’s Activities in the Tangut Empire

5.1. Maja and Mt. Mati

It may be asked at this point, how did the Tanguts become acquainted with The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking, which was composed by a Tibetan scholar who received some of his training in the distant Tibetan plateau? Here, we need to turn to the second line of the colophon in F1 and F2, which was overlooked by previous scholarship (see 2.2). It will also become the starting point to solve a series of problems that have been afflicting scholars in the field of Tangut studies.

Recall that the first line of the colophon says that the work was composed by Maja. The second line informs us as to how the text was translated. The line contained in F2 reads:

ไหวฉัตรแสงมณีบุษบาภูท

Translated by Supreme (?) (? bu², 曉), the monk who is skilled in the Three Vehicles [...] in the presence85 of Master Diligence himself in the Great Enlightenment Monastery of Mt. Mati.

Although I have not yet been able to identify the first character of the name of the translator, the second character by² (曉), literally meaning ‘supreme’, is clear. This appears to be a Tangut religious name, in which ‘supreme’ is a common component for the last character. Notwithstanding the incomplete name of the translator, there are pieces of information in this line which are perhaps more important. First of all, we know that the text was translated in the presence of Maja; therefore, this was accomplished when Maja was alive. Also, the translator was likely a

85 ‘In the presence’ here is a translation of ‘jij’ mjo’ do² (鶴落 Yayın), in which the first character means ‘self’, the second means ‘real’, and the third is a locative particle.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
Tangut disciple of Maja, and one who had mastered Tibetan. Finally, the place of translation is the Great Enlightenment (Tang. Tha’ {d}wewr² 敬緣, Chin. Dajue 大覺) Monastery. We do not know about this monastery, as it was not mentioned in the Tangut sources previously studied; however, we do know that it was located in Mt. Mati (Tang. Biā² {thi}² 𔑩𔔥, Chin. Mati shan 馬蹄山, Tib. rTa rjes dgon)\(^6\) literally meaning ‘the Mountain of Horseshoe’. Mt. Mati, of course, is a well-known Buddhist site in the history of the Tangut Empire. It belonged to the Prefecture of Ganzhou (甘州), and is still called Mt. Mati today (see the map 1 in section 6). The remains of Buddhist statues and monastic cells are still visible on the cliffs.\(^7\)

In light of the foregoing, we can now safely conclude that Maja himself had been to the Tangut Empire. Although we do not know if he had ever spent time at the imperial court in Xingqing (興慶), it is clear that he was active in the north-western part of the empire, where there was a significant Tibetan population. He recruited some Tangut disciples, who helped him translate his works into Tangut and studied them. The fragments in Kara krótko represent a further expansion of his influence to the north.

The next question then follows: why would Maja go to the Tangut Empire? To this, our answer can remain only hypothetical, but not without some persuasive reasons. Here, we need to bring up again Jayānanda, the figure connected to both the Tangut Empire and to Maja. The stories of this Kashmirian scholar in the Tangut Empire have been well told.\(^8\) He was most renowned for holding the title of state preceptor (Tang. Lhlij² dzji² 隨靜, Chin. guoshi 國師) of the Tangut court. He wrote the Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā at the Tangut court, and helped translate the Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā into Tangut. His prestige and influence in the empire were thus presumably high.

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\(^6\) The Tangut name Biā² thi² is a phonetic transcription of the Chinese Mati.

\(^7\) Building projects on Mt. Mati started in the fourth or fifth century, and the mountain served as a crucial Buddhist site along the silk roads ever since. See Bianca Horlemann. “Buddhist Sites in A mdo and Former Longyou from the 8th to the 13th Century.” In Old Tibetan Studies, ed. Cristina Scherrer-Schaub (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 126, 147.

We have already seen the bond between Maja and Jayānanda in a few instances, since the former was a student of the latter; but we should add here that the bond was a strong one, perhaps stronger than his bond with Chapa. The Blue Annals noted the attitude of Maja towards both of his teachers in this way:

Further, comparing to Master Chapa’s system of thought, he had more faith in the systems of people like Jayānanda.\(^89\)

Though he enjoyed his glory in the Tangut Empire, Jayānanda appears to have had an unpleasant experience in Tibet. He was probably forced to leave due to his defeat in a public debate with Chapa at Sangpu Monastery, when Chapa was the abbot of that monastery from 1152 to 1169.\(^90\) Maja, because of his faith in Jayānanda, had a reason to leave with him for the Tanguts. It was possibly at this time that Maja parted with Chapa and departed with Jayānanda. According to such a scenario, it is not difficult to imagine that Maja was treated by the Tanguts as a junior colleague of Jayānanda, and given opportunities to preach in the empire.

5.2 Maja and ‘Grand Master Diligence’ of the Great Seal

Our journey to trace Maja’s activities in the Tangut Empire has not yet concluded. In some Tangut sources, there emerges another ‘Grand Master Diligence’ (Tang. Khu¹ dźjj₁ mə̀ r₂ dzjj₂ 訴軼禪彿).\(^91\) This elusive figure appears to be critical in transmitting some of the teachings of the Great Seal or mahāmudrā to the Tanguts.\(^92\) The major disciple who received his teachings was the renowned Tśhja źjɨ r (fl. late 12th century, 錯鴻, Chin. Dehui 德慧), the state preceptor of wisdom and radiance in Mt. Lan (Tang. lā¹ ɲə̀ r₁ sjj₁ swwl₁ lhjj₁ dzjj₁ 鍘鴻德慧彿彿).\(^93\) The identity of this

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\(^{89}\) Deb sngon, 406–407: ‘di yang slob dpon phywa ba ’i lugs las / ja ya ānnda la sogs pa ’i lugs la lhag par dad par mdzad l.

\(^{90}\) For this debate, see van der Kuijp, “Jayānanda”, 193.

\(^{91}\) Note here the word ‘diligence’ (禪彿) is written differently in Tangut (before it was 訴軼). For a discussion of this, see below.


Grand Master Diligence has troubled scholars for a long time; yet, while I do not claim to have solved all of the problems so conveniently, since we have already established that Master Bodhi Diligence was Maja, it is not inappropriate for us to enquire as to whether the two figures could be connected in some way.

Three Tangut texts contain some substantial information about the activities of this Grand Master Diligence. The first one (cat. no. 345: #824, and #2526) is titled Ljij2 tjij2 nji2 džja1 tshij1 šiogl PCODE72 CODE72 CODE72 CODE72 [The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal]. This text was written down in Tangut by Tśhja źjir, although it embodied the oral transmission he received from Grand Master Diligence. The second text (cat. no. 345: #2851), titled Ljij2 tjij2 nji2 džja1 tshij1 šiog1 la1 PCODE72 CODE72 CODE72 CODE72 [Notes on the Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal], is a commentary on the former. The third text (cat. no. 345: #2858, and #7163) is also a commentary on the first text.

Let us first examine the second text, in which one passage describes the circumstance in which Tśhja źjir received the teachings from Grand Master Diligence. It reads:

The master Tśhja źjir received in the region of Tsongkha96 the holy teaching of ‘no-thought’97 from Grand Master Diligence while he was teaching the Middle Way and Buddhist epistemology to many of his former students. 98

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94 See Solonin, “Xixiawan Dushouyin wenxian zakao,” 262; Nie Hongyin 聶鴻音, Xixia fojing xu ba yizhu 西夏佛經序跋譯註 [Annotated Translations of the Prefaces and Colophons of Tangut Buddhist Scriptures] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2016), 45–58; Sun and Nie, Xixiawan zangchuan fojiao shiliao 西夏藏傳佛教簡編 [Annotated Translations of the Preface and Colophon of Tangut Buddhist Scriptures] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2016), 45, 300–302; and, most recently, Kirill Solonin 索羅寧, “Xixia Dehui shangshi liangzhong chuancheng yu han zang fojiao yuanrong 西夏德慧上師兩種傳承與漢藏佛教圓融 [Two Teachings Transmitted by the Tangut Master Dehui and Sino-Tibetan Syncretic Buddhism],” Zhongguo zangxue 中國藏學 China Tibetology 3 (2021): 132.

95 It is curious that the third text also bears the title, The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal, at the end; however, its content is apparently a commentary.

96 Tsow² ka² (蔆蔆蔆), Tib. Tsong kha.

97 ‘No-thought’ (Tang. ljir² mjiij² 翻翻) is connected to the amanasikāra concept in mahāmudrā, but it seems they are not completely the same. The concept in Tśhja źjir’s text represents a possible Chan influence. See Kirill Solonin, “Mahāmudrā Texts in the Tangut Buddhism and the Doctrine of No-thought,” Xiyu lishi yuyan yanjiu jikan 西域歷史語言研究集刊 Historical and Philological Studies of China’s Western Region 2 (2009): 277–305; Solonin, “Xixia Dehui shangshi liangzhong chuancheng yu han zang fojiao yuanrong,” 132–134.

98 #2851, 25.15–16: 𗼆𗨁𗫔𗮅𗫦𗫿𗗙𗱈𗵘𗱠𗰜𘘚𘋩 𗆫𗤋𗼃𗧘𗋚𗨙, 𗫔𗮅𗫦𗫿𗗙𗱈𗵘𗱠𗰜𘘚世界杯displayed in Tangut by Tśhja źjir, although it embodied the oral transmission he received from Grand Master Diligence. The second text (cat. no. 345: #2851), titled Ljij2 tjij2 nji2 džja1 tshij1 šiog1 la1 PCODE72 CODE72 CODE72 CODE72 [Notes on the Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal], is a commentary on the former. The third text (cat. no. 345: #2858, and #7163) is also a commentary on the first text.

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96 Tsow² ka² (蔆蔆蔆), Tib. Tsong kha.

97 ‘No-thought’ (Tang. ljir² mjiij² 翻翻) is connected to the amanasikāra concept in mahāmudrā, but it seems they are not completely the same. The concept in Tśhja źjir’s text represents a possible Chan influence. See Kirill Solonin, “Mahāmudrā Texts in the Tangut Buddhism and the Doctrine of No-thought,” Xiyu lishi yuyan yanjiu jikan 西域歷史語言研究集刊 Historical and Philological Studies of China’s Western Region 2 (2009): 277–305; Solonin, “Xixia Dehui shangshi liangzhong chuancheng yu han zang fojiao yuanrong,” 132–134.

98 #2851, 25.15–16: 𗼆𗨁𗫔𗮅𗫦𗫿𗗙𗱈𗵘𗱠𗰜𘘚世界杯displayed in Tangut by Tśhja źjir, although it embodied the oral transmission he received from Grand Master Diligence. The second text (cat. no. 345: #2851), titled Ljij2 tjij2 nji2 džja1 tshij1 šiog1 la1 PCODE72 CODE72 CODE72 CODE72 [Notes on the Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal], is a commentary on the former. The third text (cat. no. 345: #2858, and #7163) is also a commentary on the first text.

95 It is curious that the third text also bears the title, The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal, at the end; however, its content is apparently a commentary.

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Two points are worth noting here. The first one is the region Tsongkha (Tib. Tsong kha), where the Tsongkha Tibetan tribal confederation ruled until the early 12th centuries, was at this time under the civil administration of the Tangut Empire. Tsongkha had long been a hub of intensive religious exchanges between the Tibetans and other peoples. Maja’s presence in Mt. Mati has already been attested above. Likewise, the distance between Mt. Mati and Tsongkha was not far, the two places being connected by a major road that went through the Qilian Mountain Range (Chin. Qilian shan 祁連山) via the Biandu Pass (Chin. Biandu kou 扁都口) (see map 1). The second point is about the teachings. It seems Grand Master Diligence offered sessions on the Middle Way and Buddhist epistemology, in which he was presumably an expert. Maja, of course, was an expert in both fields.

Let us now turn to an examination of the basic text itself, the *Notes on the Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal*. Its preface narrates how the teachings originated in India and were transmitted ultimately to Grand Master Diligence. According to the narrative, there were altogether eight generations of grand masters (Tang. ṃōr² dzijj² 聲律). While the first seven masters were all of Indic origin, only the

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99 The Tsongkha region was traditionally known in Chinese sources as the region of Hehuang (河湟). The Tsongkha tribal confederation consolidated by Tibetan chieftain Gusiluo (Chin. 唃厮啰, Tib. *Rgyal sras) in the early 11th century first allied to the Northern Song (960–1127, 北宋) to fend off the offence of the Tanguts. In the late 11th century, due to the increasing Song aggressions, the confederation shifted its alliance to the Tanguts. The confederation was finally conquered by the Northern Song in 1104. However, following the collapse of the Northern Song in 1127, its land was further taken by the Tangut Empire, which transformed the region into four prefectures. For the Tsongkha confederation, see Bianca Horlemann. “The Relations of the Eleventh-Century Tsong kha Tribal Confederation to Its Neighbour States on the Silk Road.” In *Contributions to the Cultural History of Early Tibet*, ed. Matthew T. Kapstein and Brandon Dotson (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 79–101; Zhu Qiyuan 祝启源. *Qintang sheng shuai: Gusiluo zhengquan yanjiu [The Rise and Fall of Qingtang: A Study of the Gusiluo Regime]*, (Xining: Qinghai renmin chubanshe, 2010).

eighth, Grand Master Diligence, was Tibetan. A passage in his biography is worth quoting in full here:

This eighth grand master was a Tibetan person. His surname was Sengge. Having worn the three robes, his mind was awakened for destroying the three poisons; having practiced the four holdings, he made the aspiration to transcend the four births. With the seven treatises of Buddhist epistemology, he formulated the three: thesis, logical reason, and example. With the sixfold collection of the Middle Way, he differentiated the two truths: the ultimate and the conventional. While teaching the sūtras, discipline, and treatises, he translated Sanskrit texts day by day; while familiarising himself with ethical conducts, meditative absorption, and insight, he composed Tibetan works night by night. With every intention in harmony with enlightenment, he accumulated the provisions for the path to enlightenment; with every thought in contradiction with defilement, he subdued the suffering of defilement. Later, he became the grand master of Tśhja žjir and transmitted to him the quintessential instruction.

This passage, written beautifully in Chinese four-six prose (Chin. pianwen 驢文) style, discloses also two important pieces of information.

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101 See the following passages for a discussion of the name.
102 I.e., the tricīvara. According to the vinaya, the Buddha decided that the monk and nun need only three robes (the larger outer one, the upper one, and the lower one) to stay warm. Here, the text indicates that Grand Master Diligence adhered strictly.
103 I.e., samgrahavastu. It refers to the four conducts, such as using kind words. Buddhists are expected to engage in these acts to attract more followers.
104 The four births, such as viviparous birth, exhaust all the modes of birth all beings experience. Transcending the four births amounts to being free from cyclic existence.
105 I.e., the seven treatises on Buddhist epistemology composed by Dharmakīrti, including the Pramāṇaviniścaya.
106 Nie (Xixia fojing xu ba yizhu, 56, n. 59) understands tšhjiw¹ tšiow¹ (銅皴) as a translation of the Chinese six faculties (Chin. liu jü 六聚) (i.e., eyes, ears, etc.). This is likely incorrect. The ‘sixfold collection of the Middle Way’ (Tib. tshogs drug), which refers to the six works of Nāgārjuna on the Middle Way. This understanding is much more plausible, considering the expression about the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti in the previous segment. Surprisingly, Maja was known to be the foremost advocate of this concept in Tibet. See, for example, his Thad rgyan, 7a5–9a4, where he elaborates this idea in detail. For a translation of this section, see Mabja Jangchub Tsöndrü, Ornament of Reason, 99–103.
The first reinforces the point mentioned above—that is, that the expertise of Grand Master Diligence in the Middle Way and Buddhist epistemology was well known to the Tanguts at his time. The second piece is his surname, which is recorded as Sjiŋə (𗜫𗕘). As the second character is written in smaller size, the two characters should be read as a single, compounded syllable. It should be noted here that there is no definite way of forming the compound. Normally, when the second syllable is smaller and starts with a nasal consonant, the consonant is taken by the previous syllable as an ending, and the vowel of the second syllable is, accordingly, lost. Therefore, in this case, the compound could be read as something similar to ‘sing’.

It is, however, extremely difficult to come up with a surname in Tibetan history that bears such a sound. Therefore, I argue that Sjiŋə in fact transcribes Senggé (Tib. seng ge), ‘lion’ in Tibetan. Instead of removing a vowel in the two syllables, the compound here could reflect rapid speech, in which the two syllables are read so fast that they sound just like one. The reason for doing so was likely to imitate the Tibetan sengge (script: གྭ), the way seng ge (script: གེ) was sometimes compounded. Although something like ‘sing’ would be an unusual name in Tibetan society, Senggé could well be a religious name. We have seen already that Chapa had seng ge in his religious name, and his eight main disciples were known to be the ‘Eight Great Lions’ because every one of them had Senggé as a part of their religious names. Among these eight disciples, Maja Tsöpé Senggé (Tib. rMa bya rTsod pa'i seng ge, the ‘lion of debate’) has been identified with Maja Jangchup Tsöndrü. Hence, Sjiŋə (𗜫𗕘) could be the religious name derived from Chapa—and Maja possessed that very name.

The third text, which is also a commentary on the basic text of The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal, provides some very useful details of the situation in which Tšhjažir first heard the teachings of the Great Seal from Grand Master Diligence. The passage

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108 See Nie, Xixia fojing xu ba yizhu, 55, n. 54.
109 The roar of a lion is a metaphor for eloquence and cogency in Buddhist teaching and debate. Thus, Senggé has become a very popular name in Tibetan society until the present day.
110 See section 3.3’s discussion of the connection between Tsangnakpa and Maja.
talks about five perfected conditions of this transmission: (1) the master; (2) the disciples; (3) the place; (4) the time; and (5) the teaching. Although some characters of the starting point of the passage are yet to be recognised, the last section, which describes the last two conditions, is the following:

The perfection of time: as for the year, it was the renshen year; as for the month, it was the eleventh month; as for the day, it was the twenty-fifth day; as for the hour, it was the hour of xu. The perfection of teaching: this teaching that is a completely fulfilled collection of instruction.

Because Tshja žjir flourished in the period of Emperor Renzong (r. 1139–1193, 仁宗), we can only consider this renshen (壬申) year as 1152, and the 25th day of the 11th month of that year could well have overlapped with the beginning of 1153 already. Now, if we recall the circumstances under which Maja left Tibet, we surmise that he departed with Jayānanda, who had been defeated by Chapa in a debate during Chapa’s tenure as the abbot of Sangpu Neutok Monastery at some point between 1152 and 1169. Late 1152 or early 1153 is, of course, covered by that period. In fact, if we suppose that the debate, as a challenge to the new face, took place immediately after Chapa ascended the throne, then the chronology would make perfect sense: Maja left with Jayānanda in the middle of 1152, and arrived in Tsongkha late in that same year. Soon after, he was encountered by Tshja žjir, who was privy to his arrival.

Let us now review the pieces of evidence we gathered for the purpose of establishing the identity of Grand Master Diligence:

(a) Grand Master Diligence was active in Tsongkha, and Maja was present in Mt. Mati; the two places were both ruled by the Tanguts at that time and were close.

(b) Grand Master Diligence was regarded as an outstanding teacher in the Middle Way and Buddhist epistemology; Maja was known to be an expert in exactly the same two fields.

(c) Grand Master Diligence was given the name Senggé; Maja, as a member of Chapa’s religious clan, was known as Tsöpé Senggé.

(d) Tshja žjir first heard the teachings on the Great Seal in late 1152.

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112 nej wrij (猴年), Chin. renshen (壬申), the ninth year of the Chinese sexagenary cycle, which equals to the water-monkey year in the Tibetan system.

113 na (戌), Chin. xu (戌), the second-to-last hour of a day.

114 #2858, 4.a4–6; #7163, 6.a1–3: 龙鼠鼠螯螯; 儒鼠, 儒鞠鞠腹; 儒鞠, 弥弓弥鞠; 螯鞠, 弥蛛鞠鞠; 螯鞠, 儒鞠鞠鞠; 儒鞠鞠鞠; 螯鞠鞠鞠; 螯鞠鞠鞠.
or early 1153; Maja could have arrived in Tsongkha just around that time.

(e) Both Grand Master Diligence and Maja had ‘diligence’ as a part of their religious names.

If it were the case that only two or three pieces of the evidence listed above were available, we would not be able to ascertain that Grand Master Diligence and Maja were the same person; but, with all five points in place, it is difficult to see these facts as completely coincidental. Therefore, based on the available evidence, it is relatively reasonable to claim that Grand Master Diligence and Maja were one and the same figure.

There are, however, two more issues—and they may form the basis of a challenge against this claim—which need further clarification. The first one is related to the different ways diligence (Tib. brtson ’grus) was translated for both names. While for ‘Bodhi Diligence’ it was translated as dži̱j2 (龍), for ‘Grand Master Diligence’ it was translated as khu¹ dži̱j¹ (龍). We should note here that there was, of course, some freedom when different Tanguts were translating the same Tibetan terms.115 Also, even equivalences between Tibetan and Tangut terms in the same work were not fixed. For example, in the Tangut translation of the Verses on the Collection of Precious Qualities, ethical conducts (Tib. tshul khrims) is translated both as kie¹ (経) and dži̱j¹ wer¹ (経).116 For these reasons, an inconsistency in rendering brtson ’grus into Tangut is not unusual.

The second issue calls for the rejection of a certain bias. The question arises: how could Maja, a scholar known only for his expertise in Buddhist philosophy, also be a master of the Great Seal that aims at meditative realisation? It is indeed the case that Tibetan Buddhists, especially those in the early periods of the second diffusion, are generally labelled as either scholastic thinkers (like the Sangpu masters) or great yogis (like Marpa and his disciples) in Tibetan sources; yet, these narratives cannot reflect the entire ethos of a figure. For example, despite being one who was

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115 For example, two Tangut translations (#0728, #7578) of the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti, although both are translated from Tibetan, chose to translate the term bcom ldan ’das (Skt. bhagavat) differently. While one translates it literally as tsiJ¹ dJ¹ džiJ¹ 龍龍龍 (‘destroy—have—transcend’), the other one uses the phonetic transcription of bhagavat, i.e. ba’ wo¹ ba’ 彼龍龍. See Zhang Yongfu 张永富, “Zhengshiming jìng Xia Han yiben kao lue 《真实名经》夏、汉译本考略 [A Brief Study of the Chinese and Tangut Translations of the Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti],” Xixia xue 西夏学, Tangutology 2 (2021): 192–193.

116 The former literally means ‘abstention’, while the latter means ‘the way of rules’. See Duan, Xixia ‘Gongde bao ji ji’ kua yuyan duikan yanjiu, 147, 272–273.
interested primarily in the thoughts of the Middle Way, Atiśa (982–1054), the father of the Kadam school, wrote several works that discussed the teachings of the Great Seal. If we believe the accounts of the preface to *The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal*, then Grand Master Diligence received the teachings from a Newar master called ‘Lord of Speech’ (Tang. Dwu¹ dzju² 諏嘆, Skt. *Vagīśvara*, Tib. *Ngag gi dbang phyug*), thus independent of the early Kagyū (Tib. *bka’ bsgyud*) lineages. This could explain the silence of Grand Master Diligence in the accounts of the Kagyū school.

We should also note that the primary interest of Tšhja Žiir was tantric practices, which could be the main reason for his promulgation of the teachings of Grand Master Diligence, even though the primary interest of the Master does seem to be the Middle Way and Buddhist epistemology. Due to the lack of collective efforts, the actual influence of *The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal* is doubtful compared to that of the mainstream Great Seal teachings, which were transmitted by multiple influential Kagyū masters. Solonin argues that the tradition of *The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal* could have already died out by the dawn of the Yuan Dynasty (1279–1368, 元) because, unlike the mainstream teachings on the Great Seal that were further translated into Chinese, there is no sign that *The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal* was translated any further.

6. Conclusion

Based on the key information “peacock” in the colophon and other pieces of internal evidence in the text, we can conclude that ‘Master Bodhi Diligence of Central Tibet,’ the author of *The Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking* is no other than Maja Jangchup Tsöndrü. The treatise, which is a typical ‘summary’ on Buddhist epistemology and logic in the Sangpu tradition, closely parallels the works on the same topic composed by Chapa, Tsangnakpa, and other Sangpu masters in terms of its content and structure. Various annotations left on

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118 Tšhja Žiir was the translator of a large number of tantric texts. In contrast, no text about Buddhist scholasticism currently available is known to have been translated by him.
119 Solonin, “Xixiawen Dashouyin wenxian zakao,” 263; Solonin, “Xixia Dehui shangshi liangzhong chuancheng yu han zang fojiao yuanrong,” 137.
the fragments of the Tangut translation attest to the scholarly engagement of Maja’s Tangut audience.

Section 5 surely contains some courageous moves towards reconstructing a complete picture of Maja’s activities in the Tangut Empire, based on some flashes of evidence that are not seen in Tibetan historical accounts such as the Blue Annals. What we can confidently determine, based on the translator’s colophon in F1 and F2, is that Maja had been to Mt. Mati and had taught in the Tangut Empire. The other parts of the reconstruction, relying heavily upon the assumption that Maja and Grand Master Diligence were the same person, must, of course, remain only tentative until justified by further studies. Nevertheless, if we consider the chain of evidence in this section to be reasonable, then we may appreciate the following summary of Maja’s activities in the Tangut Empire.

Maja originally learned from both Chapa and Jayānanda. In early or mid-1152, when Chapa had just become the abbot of Sangpu Neutok Monastery, a public debate was carried out between Chapa and Jayānanda. The latter was defeated in the debate, and thus had to leave Tibet. Maja, because of his preference for Jayānanda over Chapa, left Tibet for the Tangut Empire, together with Jayānanda. In late 1152, they arrived in Tsongkha. While Jayānanda was invited to the court to become a state preceptor, Maja remained in Tsongkha, where the population was mainly Tibetan, to teach, chiefly, the Middle Way and Buddhist epistemology. At that time, Tshja žjir heard of his name and went to his session. Tshja žjir, interested primarily in tantric teachings, received some oral instructions on the Great Seal from Maja. Later, Tshja žjir wrote these instructions down in Tangut and titled them The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal. Having gathered some Tangut students who could also read Tibetan, Maja collaborated with them to translate his Tibetan works into Tangut. Maja’s Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Speculative Thinking was translated at this time in Mt. Mati. Both this text and The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal later arrived in the north, and were utilised by Tangut Buddhists in Karakhoto. Following the deduction in this chronological outline, Maja then only completed his works of the Middle Way after 1152, though we do not know if he finished them in the Tangut land or Tibet, where he might have later returned.
This reconstruction, if accepted, is significant, as it reveals a fundamental aspect of the history of the rise of Tibetan Buddhism in the Tangut Empire. The agency of the Tibetan masters, not the importance of the teachings themselves, was critical in forming the structure of the assimilation of Tibetan Buddhism into the land of the Tangut Empire. Modern studies intend to find a structure in Tangut Buddhist texts on which teachings from different schools as we know them today—Nyingma (Tib. rnying ma), Kadam, Kagyü, Sakya (Tib. sa skya), and so on—can be mapped. However, as we have seen in the case of Maja, the teachings one master could offer were sometimes random and lacking a systematic nature. This is quite different from some cases in the history of Chinese Buddhism, in which, for example, Xuanzang (602–664, 玄奘) was very conscious of the Yogācāra scriptures he was looking for before he departed for India. Tibetans and masters from the subcontinent, once

\[\text{Map 1. Possible route taken by Maja in the Tangut Empire}^{120}\]

invited, were granted complete freedom to teach. Hence, these teachings, faithfully preserved in Tangut materials, display a remarkable diversity that we do not see in the later institutionalised and formalised systems, as in the case of the Great Seal teachings that came to be dominated by members of the Kagyü and Sakya traditions. These local voices of Buddhist teachings forgotten by the mainstream players will now undoubtedly help us better appreciate the mellifluous variations of the Buddhist theme in Inner Asia.

Appendix 1: Transcription and Translation of F1 and F2

I pay homage to the youthful Mañjuśrī!

I pay homage reverentially to he who is the authoritative person, the one who does not deceive living beings, Siddhārtha, the Savior, who dispels the unrealised, the mistakenly realised, and the doubtfully cognised, with respect to the profound and broad mode of being of what is knowable!

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121 I did not repeat here the titles and the colophon information, which are discussed in section 2.

122 mij’i new2 (疆域), literally meaning ‘domains,’ written alongside džij’i šij’i (疆域) in F2.

123 iṣhya2 wa2 gor1 kie2 (疆域疆域), Tib. *tshad ma’i skyes bu.

124 gij’i šij’i (疆域), Tib. *don grub, thus further translating the Sanskrit proper noun siddhārtha.

125 giu myjj’r (疆域), Tib. *’dren pa. Gju’ (疆) means ‘to save,’ ‘to rescue.’ Although ’dren pa literally means ‘guide,’ the Tanguts frequently translated it as ‘savior.’

126 rjar’ giij’i wja2 (疆域疆域), Tib. *rab tu sel.

127 ji2 na’ wa2 liij’i (疆域疆域), Tib. *zab mo rgya che.

128 džij’i šij’i (疆域), Tib. *gnaus lugs.

129 sjij’2 lew2 (疆域), Tib. *shes bya.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
I pay homage reverentially to the one who, with his pure mind, composed the brief work\textsuperscript{130}, out of the subject matter\textsuperscript{131} of correct conceptual thought, the sole traversal of the path of softness\textsuperscript{132}, and, to the one who, possessing the power of knowledge, has destroyed the inferior systems of his opponents, the author of the \textit{Vārttika}\textsuperscript{133} on what is knowable!\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{130} ljow\textsuperscript{2} wo\textsuperscript{2} (耽婲) seems to match well with the Tibetan term \textit{bsdus don} in a morpheme-to-morpheme manner. I take the ‘brief work’ here as meaning Dignāga’s \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya}.

\textit{131} \textit{ljū} (著), Tib. *lus, which literally means ‘body.’

\textit{132} w\textit{2} tśja\textsuperscript{1} (般若), Tib. *jam lan? It seems the only way to make sense of the phrase ‘path of softness’ is to explain it as the way of Mañjuśrī. The connection between Dignāga and Mañjuśrī is expounded by Xuanzang, \textit{Jinendrabuddhi, Jñānaśrī, and Dharmottara}. In general, Mañjuśrī once appeared to Dignāga and promised to become his guide to enlightenment. See Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp and Arthur P. McKeown, \textit{Bcom ldan ral gri (1227–1305) on Indian Buddhist Logic and Epistemology: His Commentary on Dignāga’s “Pramāṇaśamuccaya,”} (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2013), lxiv–lxix. The legend fits well the context here. Also, cf. the very first two lines after the homage in Maja’s \textit{Root Verses of the Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way}:: “The meaning of the Middle Way that is free from extremes, the single traversed path, the subject matter of what is to be elucidated and known among the words of the Tathāgata” (sNang ba’i rtsa ba, 1a1: / de gshegs gsung gi brjod bya shes bya’i lus / / bgrod pa gcig lam mtha’ bral dbu ma’i don /).

\textit{133} Although the identification of the two characters is not completely certain, \textit{mə\textsuperscript{2} gjɨ\textsuperscript{2}} (乾癲) would fit ideally the context. Despite previous unattested in Tangut sources, \textit{ma\textsuperscript{2} gjɨ\textsuperscript{2}} (乾癰) would match well with the Tibetan \textit{rnam ’grel} (i.e. \textit{Pramāṇavārttika}) in a morpheme-to-morpheme manner. \textit{ma\textsuperscript{2} gjɨ\textsuperscript{2} yijr\textsuperscript{1}} (乾癲鸑, Tib. *\textit{rnam ’grel mdzad}), the ‘author of \textit{Pramāṇavārttika},’ would then stand for Dharmakīrti.

\textit{134} While this line can be, following the discussion of the last note, effectively reconstructed as \textit{shes bya rnam ’grel mdzad la gus phyag tshal, shes bya} here would be curious. I temporarily take it as the object on which the \textit{Pramāṇavārttika} comments.

\textit{135} \textit{njiw\textsuperscript{2} mijr\textsuperscript{2}} (師尊, Tib. *thub pa), literally meaning ‘the sage’, written alongside \textit{mi\textsuperscript{2} nji\textsuperscript{2}} (師尊), the phonetic transcription of \textit{muni}, in F1.

\textit{136} \textit{phju\textsuperscript{2} dzj\textsuperscript{2}} (師尊) < Chin. \textit{shang shi} (上師), Tib. *\textit{bla ma}.

\textit{137} \textit{pju\textsuperscript{3} mijr\textsuperscript{2}} (師尊) F1; \textit{njiw\textsuperscript{2} we\textsuperscript{2}} (師尊), meaning ‘he who is capable’ (F2).
I bow down my head reverentially, to the lotus feet of the high master, the venerable one, the lion, who clarifies the mode of being of what is knowable, the intention of the sage, with the correct agent of beholding—the two eyes of knowledge!\textsuperscript{138}

I will explain the reality of contradiction and relation with compassion, \textsuperscript{139} the *Ornament that Clarifies the Introduction to Correct\textsuperscript{140} Speculative Thinking.*

Because their eyes of their discriminating intellect are confused by a biased and disturbed intellect, living beings, usually, cannot distinguish between fine and faulty explanations.\textsuperscript{142} It is difficult for them to delight in this decent explanation that is extraordinarily correct.

\textsuperscript{138} For a discussion of this verse, see section 2.3. Also, cf. two lines in Tsangnakpa’s opening verses of his commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya:* “I pay homage to the masters, the parallels to the Victorious One, who have bestowed [me] the agent of observing, the two eyes of knowledge!” (Ṭi ka, 1b2: / lta byed tshad ma’i myig gnyis sbyin mdzad pa’i // rgyal mtshungs bla ma rnams la phyag ’tshal lo/).

\textsuperscript{139} While the line of the work title is not marked by a locative particle, it is not reasonable to assume the text is the agent of explanation. Therefore, I take “I” as the inexplicitly stated agent here while putting the work title as the place of explanation.

\textsuperscript{140} Ḫiř ryej (を行) here can be reconstructed in two ways: (1) the adjective yang dag pa, thus meaning ‘correct’; (2) the prefix yongs su, which, by grouping together with sew (脢), Tib. *rtog pa, would indicate just ‘speculative thinking.’ The translation here follows the former.

\textsuperscript{141} Rjii rje (徹著), Tib. *phyogs ’dzin.

\textsuperscript{142} We can find an almost exact match of this line in Maja’s *Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way,* see section 2.3.

*BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”*
Nevertheless, it is reasonable that living beings, have suffering and have mental ability, having eliminated greed, anger, arrogance, ignorance, and jealousy, engage in this correct, decent method, the basis of authentic doctrine, with a diligent and reverent mind.

The fact that some are [in] the upper realms and some have a number of faults is through the force of their knowing or not knowing the mode of being of what is knowable. Because of that, the skilful means of knowing that [i.e., the mode of being of what is knowable] is said to be the act of Lord among Sages who has become the protector.

'Monks or scholars! Similar to grinding gold with fire, having thoroughly examined my words, while you should accept them, it is not because of belief.'

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143 pwa (้ว) F1; jii (ี) F2.
144 jii (ี) F1; F2 om. I suspect jii (ี) here is a phonetic loan of jii (ี).
145 tśier (ี) (ี) (ี), Tib. *thabs.
146 mju (ุ) jii (ี) dzju (ี), Tib. *thub pa 'i dbang phyug.
147 pj (ุ) mjijr (ี) here probably translates mgon since pj (ุ) mjijr (ี) for mgon po is well attested in Tangut sources. Also, it could be a translation of skyob since the expression here is reminiscent of the phrase skyob pa 'i thabs in the opening verses of Epistemology (Mun sel, 1b4).
148 This seems to be a famous ‘floating verse’ that runs across many texts in the Tibetan canon. Reportedly, the verse was stated by the Buddha. For example, in the fifth chapter of the Vimalaprabhā, there is: / bsregs bcad brdar ba'i gser bzhin du / mkhas pa rnams kyis yongs brtags nas / bdag gsung blang bya dge slong dag / gus pa'i phyir ni ma yin no / (bKa’ gyur 100, 117). However, philologically speaking, none of the versions of the verse in the bKa’ gyur seems to serve as the Tibetan original for this Tangut translation. A much
Following the aforementioned way, one examines [it] in a threefold manner. One should know [it] by means of the experience\(^{149}\) that is like unadulterated fine gold, the logical reason\(^{150}\) that is endowed with the threefold definition, and the words that are believed. With respect to the three domains of what is to be cognised, the speculative thinkers\(^{151}\) should engage in what is not undermined by the two types of knowledge and the scriptures that are believed and engage in what is established by those.

Moreover, here, there are two topics:
(1) Ascertaining\(^{155}\) the nature of the cognitive object\(^{156}\), the thing to be cognised; and,
(2) Ascertaining the nature of the cognition, the object-bearer\(^{157}\).

From among them, the first—the mere thing to be cognised that is capable of becoming the cognitive object of the awareness—involves three topics:

1.1 The real particular\(^{158}\); and,
1.2 The concept\(^{159}\); and,
1.3 The cognitive object of non-conceptual erroneous cognition\(^{160}\).

The first, having the capacity of appearing to the non-conceptual non-erroneous (cognition) is that which is causally efficacious\(^{161}\). It involves, among the real\(^{162}\) of experience, the mind\(^{163}\), the mental factors\(^{164}\), and the essence of external objects\(^{165}\) such as form.

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\(^{155}\) *thju' thju' phji'i* (聡繫繖), Tib. *nges par byed.

\(^{156}\) *mij'\(^2\)* (繖), Tib. *yul.

\(^{157}\) *mij'\(^2\)* lhew\(^2\) (聡繖), Tib. *yul can. I.e., the cognitive subject.

\(^{158}\) *wo' jii' tsji\(^r\) rjar'* (繖繪繙繖), Tib. *don rang [gil] mthshan nyid.

\(^{159}\) *wo' gu'* (繖), Tib. *don spyi.

\(^{160}\) *sew* mij' lhag' jii' mij' (聡繫繖繖繖), Tib. *rtog med 'khrul pa'i yul.

\(^{161}\) *gi\(^i\)* ye' wi\(^i\) njiv\(^i\) (聡繫繖繖), Tib. *don byed nus pa.

\(^{162}\) *kwor'} tsji\(^r\) (繖繪), Tib. *dngos po.

\(^{163}\) *mi\(^i\)* (繖), Tib. *sens.

\(^{164}\) *ni\(^i\)* bu' sji\(^o\) (繖繖繪繖), Tib. *sens las byung ba.

\(^{165}\) *djir' wo* (聡繖), Tib. *phyi don.

*BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”*
The second, regardless of whether or not the particular is possible\textsuperscript{166} for the thing to be cognised, involves the phenomena capable of appearing to conceptual thought. It is devoid of causal efficacy. And, with the representations\textsuperscript{167} of time and place mixed up, it is the manifest feature\textsuperscript{168} that is not clear\textsuperscript{169}.

The third is that which has the capacity of appearing to the non-conceptual erroneous (cognition). It is devoid of causal efficacy, such as the representation of a double moon.

Further, in terms of the different ways the cognition engages [the cognitive object], there are three types of the object—the apprehended object\textsuperscript{171}, the intentional object\textsuperscript{172}, and the engaged object\textsuperscript{173}.

The first one is any object that appears to the cognition (end F1)—successively, the apprehended objects of non-conceptual non-erroneous, of conceptual, and of non-conceptual erroneous cognitions, because they well exhaust the scenarios of whether the entity of the

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\textsuperscript{166} tji\textsuperscript{2} mo\textsuperscript{1} mji\textsuperscript{1} tji\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸骸骸), Tib. *srid dam mi srid.

\textsuperscript{167} jiji\textsuperscript{1} (骸), Tib. *rnam pa.

\textsuperscript{168} mo\textsuperscript{2} jiji\textsuperscript{2} lhew\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸骸骸), Tib. *rnam ldan. Because of this reconstruction, I use the term ‘manifest feature’ here following Hugon and Stoltz’s translation of the term in Chapa’s philosophy. For a discussion on the term, see Hugon and Stoltz, The Roar of a Tibetan Lion, 15.

\textsuperscript{169} mji\textsuperscript{1} džu\textsuperscript{1} šja\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸骸骸), Tib. *mi gsal ba.

\textsuperscript{170} mo\textsuperscript{2} we\textsuperscript{2} ywač zow\textsuperscript{2} mji\textsuperscript{2} ljī\textsuperscript{1} ziji\textsuperscript{1} mji\textsuperscript{2} ljī\textsuperscript{1} o\textsuperscript{2} mji\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸骸骸骸骸骸骸骸骸) missing from F1.

\textsuperscript{171} zow\textsuperscript{2} mji\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸), Tib. *gzung yul.

\textsuperscript{172} ziji\textsuperscript{1} mji\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸), Tib. *zhen yul.

\textsuperscript{173} o\textsuperscript{2} mji\textsuperscript{2} (骸骸), Tib. *jug yul.

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Apprehended object is true or not true\textsuperscript{174}, and whether the cognition that cognises the apprehended object is erroneous or not\textsuperscript{175}.\textsuperscript{176}

Following what is stated as such, the former one [object of the three], on the basis of the non-erroneous […] of the conventional cognition\textsuperscript{177}, is posited, in terms of truth\textsuperscript{178}, as the correct conventional truth\textsuperscript{179}; the latter two [objects of the three], on the basis of the erroneous […] of the conventional cognition, are posited, in terms truth, as the mistaken conventional truth\textsuperscript{180}.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{174}źjir\textsuperscript{1} mji\textsuperscript{1} źjir\textsuperscript{1} (正知正見), Tib. *bden mi bden.
\textsuperscript{175}lha\textsuperscript{1} ljī\textsuperscript{1} mji\textsuperscript{1} lha\textsuperscript{1} (正知正見), Tib. *'khrul dang mi 'khrul.
\textsuperscript{176}The passage here well resonates Chapa’s threefold typology of the apprehended object. For a discussion on the typology, see Hugon, “Can one be a Mādhyamika, a Crypto-Vaibhāṣika, and a Faithful Interpreter of Dharmakīrti?” 59–61.
\textsuperscript{177}mji\textsuperscript{2} da\textsuperscript{2} sij\textsuperscript{2} (正知正見), Tib. *tha snyad [kyi] shes pa.
\textsuperscript{178}It is difficult to effectively reconstruct źjir\textsuperscript{1} nyu\textsuperscript{2} (正知正見) in Tibetan. Since źjir\textsuperscript{1} (正) has the meaning of ‘truth’ and is an instrumental particle, I temporarily understand the term as meaning “in terms of truth,” which can fit relatively well into this context.
\textsuperscript{179}źjir\textsuperscript{1} vjei\textsuperscript{1} rjur\textsuperscript{1} mur\textsuperscript{1} džiair\textsuperscript{2} (正知正見), Tib. *yang dag pa’i kun rdzob; rjur\textsuperscript{1} mur\textsuperscript{1} džiair\textsuperscript{2} (正知正見) < Chin. shisu di (世俗諦), literally meaning ‘conventional truth,’ is a Tangut Buddhist term that has Chinese origin.
\textsuperscript{180}tśhj\textsuperscript{2} tśhj\textsuperscript{2} u\textsuperscript{2} tśhj\textsuperscript{2} (正知正見), Tib. *log pa’i kun rdzob.
\textsuperscript{181}The correct conventional truth and the mistaken conventional truth are mentioned by Jépa (see section 3.3) as the two components of the apprehended object of his ‘own system’ (Tib. rang gi lugs): “In accordance with the Vaibhāṣikas of the Śrāvakas, it follows that both the concept and the referent of the non-conceptual erroneous cognition are unreal. They are also the mistaken conventional truth on the occasion of the Middle Way. The real particular is real. It is also the correct conventional truth in the context of the Middle Way.” (Tshad bsdu, 5: nyan thos bye brag tu smra ba dang mthun par don spyi dang rtag med ‘khrul ba’i dmigs pa gnys ni dngos por ma yin par thal / dbu ma’i skabs su yang log pa’i kun rdzob bo / don rang gi mthshan nyid ni dngos por yod de / dbu ma’i skabs su’ang yang dag pa’i kun rdzob yin no/). These concepts are also discussed in Maja’s Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way. See Doctor, Reason and Experience in Tibetan Buddhism, 21–22.
With respect to this, some holders of philosophical systems say that even all apprehended objects that are categorised as external are only real because of being true as the essence of the cognition; and, some say that the real external object is false even on the conventional level. The reason why the claims are unacceptable is that, when positing the result of the perceptual knowledge of transitive awareness, the claims (end F2).

182 sjiḥ bju ṭi jij mjij ṭ (ཨཛོཨ་སྨྨ་), Tib. *grub mtha’ ’dzin pa.
183 (བདེན), Tib. *brdzun pa.
184 dzji j ’iṣji t (ཨཛོཨ་), Tib. *gzhan rig.
185 The claims presented here, despite unstated, seem to map well onto the positions of the representational idealism (Tib. sems tsam rnam bcas pa) and non-representational idealism (Tib. sems tsam rnam med pa). Both positions are refuted in Chapa’s Epistemology before Chapa’s own position is given. See Hugon, “Can one be a Mādhyamika, a Crypto-Vaibhāṣika, and a Faithful Interpreter of Dharmakīrti?,” 114–128.

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Appendix 2: Photos of F1 and F2

Figure 4. Manuscript F1. Karakhoto. #5114, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
Figure 5. Manuscript F2. Karakhoto. #5112, Institute of Oriental Manuscripts, Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg.

BuddhistRoad Paper 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
Abbreviations

# Inventory number of items assigned by the Institute of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg.

Tang. character + Character legible, transcribed with less certainty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character legible, but cannot be transcribed with certainty</th>
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</table>

*Deb sngon* 'Gos Lo tsā ba. *Deb ther sngon po* [The Blue Annals]. Chengdu: Si khrør mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1984.


F1 #5114, in *ECHC* 28, 82–83. (3 frames).

F2 #5112, in *ECHC* 28, 83. (1 frame).

F3 #5073, in *ECHC* 28, 84–88. (14 frames).

F4 #5801, in *ECHC* 28, 88. (1 frame).

F5 #7905, in *ECHC* 28, 89–94. (18 frames).

*dKa’ gnas* rNgog Lo tsā ba. “Tshad ma mam par nges pa’i dka’ ba’i gnas rmam par bshad pa [Explanation of the Difficult Points of the Pramāṇaviniścaya].” In *KDSB* 1, 419–705.


*KDSB* *bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum phyogs bsgrigs* [Collective Writings of the Kadam Sect], 120 vols, comp. Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib ’jug khang. Chengdu: Si khrør mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006–2015.


*sNang ba* rMa bya. “dBu ma rigs pa’i tshogs kyi rgyan de kho na nyid snang ba [Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the

*BuddhistRoad Paper* 1.5. Ma, “Introduction to Speculative Thinking”
Middle Way: Appearance of Reality.” In KDSB 13, 753–820.

sNang ba’i rtsa ba
rMa bya. “dBu ma rigs pa’i tshogs kyi rgyan de kho na nyid snang ba’i rtsa ba [Root Verses of the Ornament of the Collection of Reasoning of the Middle Way: Appearance of Reality].” In KDSB 13, 745–748.

Pvin.

Ţi ka
gTsang nag pa. “Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ṭi ka legs bshad bsdus pa [Commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya: Summary of Elucidation].” In KDSB 13, 13–431.

bsTan ’gyur

Tarka

‘Thad rgyan
rMa bya. “dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ’grel ba ’thad pa’i rgyan [Commentary on the Root Verses of Madhyamaka: Ornament of Reason].” In KDSB 65, 11–321.

Tshad bsdus

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#2526 Ljij_BUCKET 2 njig_BUCKET 2 dzhwa_BUCKET 1 tshig_BUCKET 1 རྣམ་གྱི་མཛད་ལྡན། [The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal]. In ECHC 30, 98–107 (28 frames).
#2851 Ljij_BUCKET 2 njig_BUCKET 2 dzhwa_BUCKET 1 tshig_BUCKET 1 la Bucket རྣམ་གྱི་མཛད་ལྡན། [Notes on the Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal]. In ECHC 30, 107–116 (26 frames).

#2858 Ljij_BUCKET 2 njig_BUCKET 2 dzhwa_BUCKET 1 tshig_BUCKET 1 རྣམ་གྱི་མཛད་ལྡན། [The Collection of the Ultimate Instruction of the Great Seal]. In ECHC 30, 116–123 (22 frames).
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