The Argument from Catastrophe in Climate Change – The Need to Go Beyond a (Catastrophic) Precautionary Principle

The problem of climate change arguably constitutes the greatest challenge to humankind. However, climate ethics has so far been better on the side of the diagnosis rather than of the solution or therapy of that problem. We attempt to show why this is the case and we outline what is needed for helpful ethical contributions to overcoming the climate problem. For this we focus on what may be called the argument from catastrophe in climate ethics, assessing the standard use of a catastrophic precautionary principle by Henry Shue and the non-standard use of the principle by Eugen Pissarskoi. That argument focuses on the single catastrophe of climate change and treats the problem of taking the necessary means to avoid the catastrophe mainly as a motivation problem. What is overlooked is that the solutions are not at hand, that fighting climate change involves intricate normative conflicts of goals, and that potential measures may themselves be riddled with (catastrophic) risks.